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ABSTRACT 
The present research work is a modest attempt to understand the evolution and nature 
of the Mughal political structure from 1526 to 1575, by the time most of its 
administrative and political structure had evolved. While on the one hand our work 
focuses on the impact of Central Asian institutions on Mughal politics and 
administration, it also on the other hand explores the role ofyasa on the Central Asian 
political structure. Siyasa the Persian key word and terminology equivalent to the 
English 'Politics' was used to understand the evolution of the political structure both 
in Central Asia and later on under the Mughals. Therefore, the term siyasa needs to be 
given attention and is focused upon before drawing parallels between the political 
structure of the Mongol and Islam. The term siyasa in its early usage was not a 
technical term but a common word used for 'governance' and 'statecraft' a usage, 
which was not in conflict with Jiqh. Most often it concentrated on the issues of Islamic 
governance and its legitimacy, its conflict or harmonisation with fiqh and shariat. 
From the mere and simplified meaning of 'management' it acquired new definitions 
and further additions were incorporated to it with the change in Islamic political 
structure. Siyasa by the thirteenth century, and even before that, concerned itself with 
three issues: legitimacy of the ruler or ruling house, the purpose of rule and the 
means to attain that purpose. The issue of legitimacy apparently formed the core of 
the politics {siyasa) during the medieval period; especially when in Islamic system 
there was no known fixed law of succession. The theorists were attempting to re-
define the siyasa to harmonize it not only with the fast changing poltical situations but 
also with shariat. 
The meaning and practical application of siyasa kept on evolving as the Islamic 
system itself evolved, as had been discussed in the introduction of the thesis. From the 
mere and simplified meaning of 'management' it acquired new definitions and further 
additions were incorporated to it with the change in Islamic political structure. It 
explores the processes through which Mughal political structure gradually evolved, 
securing a foothold in their South Asian dominions by 1575. The thesis also notes the 
influences in the evolutionary process, be it Islamic, Central Asian or Hindustani, and 
also revisits some of the essential concepts within the theoretical framework of 
political structure and its application and utility in sixteenth century Mughal South 
Asia. The Political Structure of Mughals has attracted scholarly attention from various 
perspectives, i.e., economic, political and military. The conscious attempts were made 
to trace the political structure under the Mughals of South Asia to the Central Asian 
structure of polity from where the Mughals traced their ancestry, both biological as 
well as imagined. The Central Asian constitutional system allegedly developed and 
implemented by Chinggis Khan known as yasa is even traced in the Mughal polity, 
surprisingly without noticing the evolution not only of yasa but also of the Mughal 
political structure itself which is also compared with that of Islam as it developed 
during the second half of the seventh century. Some scholars are of the view that 
Mughal political system lacked strong centralization and that was due to Turko-
Mongol Tribal Structure basically guided by traditional rules and regulations 
particularly Yasa-i Chinggisi or the laws of Chinggis Khan, which could hardly 
permit the rise of an absolute and despotic monarchy. 
However, scholarship has also tended to explore limitations of yasa and the growing 
importance of shariat (Islamic Laws) among the Central Asians especially after the 
death of Ching ;^is Khan and the advent of Islam. But then, this tendency to converge 
and overlap paradigms had some obvious shortcomings, for both the tribal system and 
Islamic laws complimented each other in many aspects. In the Islamic society the 
highest political authority evolved in the office oiKhalifa and in the Mongol to that of 
Khaqan. Yet there is continuing evidence, at least in contemporary works that both 
offices did not quite lose their rigor under the Mughals. Yet another important 
shortcoming in the study of Mughal political structure was to relate it to Central Asia, 
(whether to Chinggis Khan or to Timur's political system) without critical analyzing 
some of the terminologies and concepts used in those political systems.. Thus, the 
dispute among historians over some of the basic concepts such as Yasa, Qurultai, 
Amir, Sultan, Padishah, apart from the very word Mughal used for the dynasty of 
Babur in South Asia appears a misnomer. Naturally, studies done on Mughal polity 
without the kind of critique mentioned above achieve only teleological explanation of 
the Mughal political structure. While it is clear from various researches that the 
structure of Mughal polity definitely acquired prominent features as well as impetus 
from 1560 onwards, but it took at leas two full decades to fiilly develop. 
Having already discussed the definitions, implications and evolution of the term and 
concept of siyasa with in Islamic political structure. Chapter One immediately 
concerns itself with the Central Asian constitutional system, popularly known as the 
yasa of Chinggis Khan, and its overlapping with the Islamic siyasa. Naturally then 
quite a bit of Mongolian polivical history also gets incorporated there, which 
eventually strengthen our argument further. An attempt is made in this section to 
sketch in somewhat broad strokes an important aspect of the Mongolian political or 
constitutional system based on and referred to as the 'Great >'asa'. The two intervals 
of regency, i.e. after the death of Chinggis Khan and Ogedei saw a steep rise in the 
powers of the nobility and also witnessed rise in thv^  power of the priestly class. A 
precedent was thus set in motion, which only entities every surviving member of the 
deceased 'sovereign' for sovereignty, but even a member of the ruling elites could 
also manufacture it. The principle of'legitimacy' to rule acquired new meanings after 
the death of Chinggis Khan in the siyasa. It became a necessary obligation for a 
claimant to prove his 'legitimacy'. This was easier for a surviving male off-springs for 
they claimed their 'legitimacy' on the basis of 'royal blood' but it was not difficult 
either for any military genius, like Timur who could get the 'legitimacy' 
manufactured, as will be discussed in detail in the Chapter Two. This Chapter deals 
with the continuity of the Chinggisid traditions and modifications made by him 
according to the political development whereby issues like 'legitimacy' and 'justice' 
becomes prominent in medieval concept of siyasa. An attempt will be made in this 
chapter to explore this particular issue of 'legitimacy' vis-^-vis legacy, its conflict as 
well as harmonisation in defining the structure of medieval siyasa after the death of 
Chinggis Khan and also during the time of Timur. Throughout his career, Timur used 
and emphasized the 'legitimacy' of the ChaghtaiJ house and his followers too 
continued this tradition to identify themselves as upholder of Chinggisid order. At this 
time shariat became an important tool for legitimizing the rule of a ruler, and also for 
obtaining the vital support of the religious class, one might wonder what had become 
of that position of the legacy of Chinggis Khan that previously provided legitimacy to 
rule. Interestingly, we find Xhatyasa was not totally in vogue. Our sources fortunately 
points towards a number of examples to prove that Chinggisid customs, including 
yasa were instrumental in providing 'legitimacy', in fi-aming laws and in governance 
too. 
Chapter Three confines itself to the reign of the first Mughal emperor Babur and his 
position in Central Asia. This chapter also notes the subtle changes in the process of 
division of territories as assignments, the treaties with different rulers, and more 
importantly his firmness started to at least guide the 'Mughal concept of sovereignty' 
and shaped its political structure as well. His attempts to not only reform his 
administrative machinery but also to strengthen the position of the king was evident 
from various innovative methods he devised to claim a divine status, and division of 
nobility into three classes. By putting himself and his family in the first grade, 
Humayun appears to have sent the message across to his Central Asian nobility that 
he was much higher in status to all others including his relations. Through other 
metaphoric acts, like placing of veil on his phase, Humayun attempted to distance 
himself from the nobles who thought that the emperor was one amongst them. 
Humayun also claimed that the king was the shadow of God on the earth. Khwandmir 
calls him a personification of the spiritual and temporal sovereignty (Jamai Sultanati 
Haqiqi wa Majazi), and His Majesty the King, the Shadow of God (Hazrat-i Padshah 
Zill-i-Ilahi). Abul Fazl used the term 'Insan-i Kamil', or the Perfect Man for him who 
used to receive inspiration from God. As a matter of fact his It has been argued that all 
his innovations were a well-crafted strategy to make the position of the sovereign 
absolute, rather than meaningless innovations. 
In fifth chapter we have discussed the position of the foster or the milk relatives of 
Emperor Akbar who remained largely unnoticed in the modem studies, because they 
treated almost as blood relatives. The politics of the time was clearly steered by the 
legitimacy paradigm instead of Central Asian notions of sovereignty. Akbar had to 
counter the ambitions of a number of nobles of different factions who created 
problems for him in the early years of his reign due to an easy access to the 
legitimacy. Therefore after dismissing Bariam Khan and taking the reigns of 
government in his hand he ignored the principle of the legitimacy both 'milk and 
blood' by taking strong actions and introducing a set of administrative reforms. The 
tussle between different powerful groups of nobles to get the offices of Wakil and 
Diwan led Akbar to downgrade these offices by appointing people of non-Turani 
origin, ha and having absolutely no claim to these posts. This had two effects. Firstly, 
it conveyed the clear message to the haughty nobles from Central Asia that it is the 
prerogative of the sovereign to appoint anyone at any post. Secondly, by appointing 
persons having no claim to high post, Akbar in fact obliged them and believed that 
they should renain loyal to him. Placing of one generation nobility (eunuchs) and by 
recruiting more non-tumni people in his nobility, Akbar in fact successfully 
challenged the nobles believing in Central Asian principles. Recruitment of Rajput 
women in harem and their male counterparts in his nobility, recruiting personal 
disciples, initializing mansab and jagir system were all aimed at controlling the 
powers of the nobility and elevating the position of the sovereign. To raise the 
position of sovereign to that of God or his shadow was not something that was totally 
unknown in medieval politics. The Mughal Emperor was now at the centre of 
administration. He was a core, with different sections of the subjects being the 
periphery. Whereas, on one hand, the emperor was accessible from the centre to all 
his subjects, on the other hand, he was standing in the centre, like a Sun whose 
radiance affected the whole empire. Sources of the period projected Akbar as divinely 
figure and introduced, rather re- introduced the ancient but strong concept of Persian 
Kingship. Both through practical actions as well as theoretical inputs from Abul Fazl, 
Akbar was able to revive the concept of strong monarchy that helped him not only to 
rule for nearly half a century but also to sustain that rule by his progeny for another 
century. In doing so his legitimacy to rule on the basis of his ancestry not only from 
Timur but also from Alanqua, the legendry mother of all the Mongols was 
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highlighted. If the ancestry is so high then the attempt to portray Akbar as a perfect 
man and a monarch (Insan-i adil) was obvious. There are few references whereby 
Akbar exhibited some connection with the yasa and these were no less than political 
strategies themselves. Instead what was attempted by him was to revert back to the 
Persian concept of sovereignty which provided, or deem to provide strong 
centralisation and absolute power to the king. He also made the Mughal 'sovereign' a 
centre of all political social and religious affairs and elevated his position among the 
nobility and the masses to that of the vice-regent of God. With these concepts, Akbar 
was able to carve out not only a large Kingdom but also a large following and the 
success of his strategies is well illustrated from his long and nearly unchallenged 
authority. Even after his death in 1605 his sons and grandsons continued to hold the 
Kingship for another century, thereby establishing a dynastic 'legitimacy'. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The structure of Mughal polity has attracted scholarly attention from various 
perspectives. These researches reveal the longe duree of a political structure under 
the Mughals from economic, political and military angles. Conscious or semi-
conscious attempts have also tried to transmit the political structure under the 
Mughals of South Asia to the structure developed in Central Asia from where the 
former traced their ancestry, both biological as well as imagined. The Central 
Asian constitutional system allegedly developed and implemented by Chinggis 
Khan, and known asyasa, is even traced in the Mughal polity, surprisingly without 
noticing the evolution not only of,^^'^ but also of the Mughal political structure 
itself Yet another approach compares Mughal political structure with that of Islam 
as it developed during the second half of the seventh century. 
The paradigms and methodology involved, however, have been bilinear, both 
converging and overlapping with each other. Thus, some scholars are of the view 
that Mughal political system lacked strong centralisation. It was Turko-Mongol 
tribal structure basically guided by traditional rules and regulations, particularly 
Yasa-i Chinggisi or laws of Chinggis Khan which could hardly permit the rise of 
an absolute and despotic monarchy. However, scholarship has also tended to 
explore limitations of yasa and the growing importance of shariat (Islamic Laws) 
among the Centra! Asians especially after the death of Chinggis Khan and the 
advent of Islam. But then, this tendency to converge ?nd overlap paradigms had 
some obvious shortcomings, for both the tribal system and Islamic laws 
complimented each other in many aspects. The Central Asian and early Arab-
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Islamic societies were both pastoral and nomadic, and shared many 
characteristics. Besides, up to the time of Prophet and also during the tenure of its 
first four Caliphs, political structures were but quasi-developed, a feature observed 
in Central Asia even under Chinggis Khan. Political thought developed only as the 
office of Khalifa in one society and of Khaqan in the other evolved. Yet there is 
continuing evidence, at least in contemporary works that both offices did not quite 
lose their rigour under the Mughals. Patricia Crone sharing somewhat the same 
comparison says that where Mongol statesman could accumulate earthly power, 
the Arabian Prophet tapped divine authority; and where the Mongol conquests 
were an explosion caused by the disintegration of a tribal society, the Arab 
explosion by contrast was caused by its fusion.' 
The Mughals were Timurid successors in South Asia is a known fact. Trying to 
draw comparisons between a Central Asian politiy in the fifteenth century under 
Timur and distantly thirteenth century Central Asia under Chinggis with sixteenth 
century Mughal South Asia however, appears odd. Such studies apparently 
perceive some kind of 'model' or a 'structure' or a 'constitution', in the sense in 
which we use the word today and deliberately trace their continuity in South Asia. 
Yet another important shortcoming in the study of Mughal political structure, and 
in attempts to relate it to Central Asia, whether to Chinggis Khan or to Timur's 
Patricia Crone, Slaves on Horses: The Evolution of the Islamic Polity, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1980, p.25. 
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political system has been a lacl< of critical analysis of some of the terminologies 
and concepts, as well as there use by contemporary historians. Thus, the dispute 
among historians over some of the basic concepts such as Yasa, Qurultai, Amir, 
Sultan, Padishah, apart from the very word Mughal used for the dynasty of Babur 
in South Asia appears a misnomer. Naturally, studies done on Mughal polity 
without the kind of critique mentioned above achieve only teleological explanation 
of the Mughal political structure. 
The present study, thus, is a modest attempt to understand the structure of Mughal 
polity between 1526 and 1575. It explores the processes through which Mughal 
political structure gradually evolved, securing a foothold in their South Asian 
dominions by 1575. In the process, the thesis also notes the influences in the 
evolutionary process, be it Islamic, Central Asian or Hindustani, and also revisits 
some of the essential concepts within the theoretical framework of political 
structure and its application and utility in sixteenth century Mughal South Asia. 
Since the very word siyasa, the English translation of which is 'polity' or 'politics, 
forms the core of the present research, it would perhaps not be out of place to 
discuss its defmition(s) in the evolution of Islamic political thought as well as 
practice. It is only then that we would be able to understand and analyse its nature, 
and implications in sixteenth century South Asia against the backdrop of Central 
Asian political practices from where the sixteenth century rulers of South Asia 
traced their descent. 
Interrogating Siyasa: Evolution in Islamic Thought 
In dealing with tlie nature and structure of polity as proscribed in Islamic canons 
(Quran and shariat) and various other juridical works (fiqh) as opposed to works 
on history whether commissioned (court histories) or written at one's own behest 
(unofficial histories), the term siyasa finds varying usage. Thus, its English 
translation at least in nineteenth century Arabic-Middle East was synonymous with 
'politics' and 'political'. The problem gets even more compounded when these 
perso-Arabic historical as well as philosophical works deal with siyasa in the 
context of non-Muslim and early Muslim Central Asians in thirteenth and 
fourteenth centuries. Moreover, the paucity of our knowledge of non-Muslim 
source material, Chinese for example, is limited. What we then have is an analysis 
of the political structure as lefl in Muslim sources alone. These historians .or 
political theorists often created unnecessary, and often fantastical etymological 
links between Islamic canons {shariat), and Mongolian tribal law (yasa). The 
Mamluk historian, al-Maqrizi is one glaring example. He alleged that siyasa was a 
simply a corrupt form o^yasa. This had far reaching implications. It diminished 
the importance of yasa and its infallibility. This will be discussed later. 
Furthermore, some Muslim historians exhibited great hostility towards Timur and 
Mongolian customs. Consequently, the need to understand the term siyasa 
acquires considerable significance. Therefore, before any attempt is made to draw 
parallels between Mongol and Islamic polities, the term siyasa needs to be given 
attention and is focussed upon. 
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The term siyasa has been known to Muslims from the days of their third Caliph, 
Umar b. al-Khattab and more authentically to the Abbasids where its early usage is 
primarily that of statecraft and the successful conduct of public affairs.^  This 
usage is closely connected to its Biblical Hebrew roots s-u-s the meaning of which 
was 'horse', originally used in Bedouin society for the tending and training of 
beasts. Thus, we have the word sais which implied manager or trainer of horses 
and camels.^  The eighth century account Risola fil-Sahaba of Ibn al-Mukaffa 
further extends the meaning of the term siyasa in Arabic, and thence in Persian and 
Turkish usage, that is of punishment, extending as far as capital punishment, which 
the ruler was bound to put into effect in order to preserve his authority/ 
Specifically, it implies punishment beyond the /jodW penalties prescribed by Divine 
Law. Thus, Ibn al-Tiktaka in his celebrated work on state-craft and history, al-
Fakhri writes: 
Siyasa is the chief resource of the king, on which he 
relies to prevent bloodshed, defend chastity, prevent 
evil, subjugate evildoers and forestall misdeeds which 
lead to sedition and disturbance.^  
^ For details, see Vluhammad Shaban, The Abbasid Revolution, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1970. 
' J.H. Krammers & H.A.R Gibb, ed., Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam, Leiden: E.J.Brili, 1965, 
Vol.9, p.693. 
* Fauji M. Najjar has sketched in detail the evolution of Islamic political thought. See for instance, 
Fauji M. Najjar, "On Political Science, Canonical Jurisprudence and Dialectical Theology", Islamic 
Culture, Vol. 34, 1960. 
' Cited from Fauzi M Najjar, "Siyasa in Islamic Political Philosophy," in Islamic Theology and 
Philosophy, ed. M.E. Marmura, Albany: New York Press, 1984; For more extensive work, see 
Richard Walzer, Al-Farabi on the Perfect State: Mabadi ara ahl al-madina al-fadila Abu Nasr al-
Farabi.Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985. 
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The above interpretation and understanding of siyasa by Ibn al-Tiktaka stands 
true in the h'ght of Persian and Ottoman Turkish tradition where in fact the word 
siyasat-gah meant "place of torture or execution."* 
The greatest exponent of philosophical siyasa in medieval Islam, al-Farabi in his 
work Kitab Ihsa al ulum devoted an entire chapter al-Ilm al-madani, which has 
been translated as both political and civil science together with Jiqh and scholastic 
theology (ilm al-Kalam)J al-Farabi notes that al-ilm al-madani makes enquiry 
into the kinds of actions and intentional ways of behaviour and natural dispositions 
and character and traits and the natures from which those actions and ways of 
behaviour derive. Given the link between al-Farabi's ideas and those of al-Madina 
al-Fadila and al-Siyasa al-Madaniyya, al-Farabi's definition becomes a useful 
philosophical substract for the whole concept of siyasa. 
Thus, in philosophers like al-Farabi, the intimate ways in which metaphysics and 
politics, or political science connect, have been many. Not only was there this 
intimate connect between philosophy and politics in al-Farabi's writings, some 
philosophers often gave siyasa more importance than shariat, though al-Ghazali 
and Ibn Taymiyya kept it subordinate. This shows that political life was 
susceptible to philosophical scrutiny and reason. 
'' J.H. Krammers & H.A.R Gibb, ed.. Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam, Vol.9, p.693. 
For details, see Muhammad ibn Muhammad Farabi, Kitab al-Siyasah al-Madaniyah, Bayrut: al-
Matbaah al-Kathulikiyah, 1964. 
* See Walzer, Al-Farabi on the Perfect State; Also see Richard Netton, Al-Farabi and His School, 
London: Routledge, 1992. 
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The two Hanbali scholars in the first half of the fourteenth century, Ibn Taymiyya 
and his student Ibn Kayyim al-Djawziyya crystallised the law and procedures of 
Islamic jurisprudence {fiqh) and the practical demands of governance {siyasa). Ibn 
Taymaiyya's view was that if Divine Law or shariat is duly observed there would 
be no conflict between siyasa and fiqh? Earlier authorities had conceded that 
rulers had the need and right to deviate from fiqh for an effective siyasa, but Ibn 
Taymiyya claimed that such 'deviations' are unthinkable. He further explained 
that conflict arises either because7? -^// is given too narrow interpretation neglecting 
the rich resources of the shariat, or because rulers disregard Divine Will and act 
unjustly (siyasa zalirna).^^ Ibn Kayyim went a step further and claimed that true 
siyasa {siyasa adila) is but a part of shariat itself However, IbnTaymiyya's views 
are just one formulation of the relationship between fiqh and siyasa, of the roles of 
rulers and 'ulema' in upholding shariat}^ 
Now, if we merely trace various uses of the term siyasa we will find that in its 
early usage it was not a technical term, but a common word used for governance 
and statecraft, a use which betrayed little sense or no sense of conflict w'lXhfiqh. 
Early shariat legitimacy to rule, being grounded in the office of Caliph, his 
' See Serajul Haque, Imam ibn Taimiya and his Project of Reforms, Dhaka: Islamic Foundation 
Bangladesh, 1982; Zakaria bin Mat, The Criteria of Islamic Civilisation: A Study of the Concept of 
(Bid'A) Innovation- a Case Study of Ibn Taimiya (1263M-1328M), Birmingham: Birmingham 
University Press, 1987; Abdul Hakim al-Matraudi, The Hanbali School of Law and Ibn Taimiyyah: 
Conflict or Conciliation, London: Routledge, 2006. 
'° See Abdul Hakim al-Matraudi, The Hanbali School of Law and Ibn Taimiyyah. 
' ' During Ibn Taimiya's time there was much conflict between the shariat and the Islamic practices, 
like the one practiced by the Sufis. See Qamaruddin Khan, The Political Thought of Ibn Taymiyah 
Muhammad B. 'Abd-Al-Wahhab (1703MN-1791M), Lahore: Islamic Book Foundation, 1983. 
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discretion on the shariat application was axiorpatic. The first four Caliphs' 
exercised extreme broad legal authority, taking far reaching legal actions. Later, 
interpretive techniques of fiqh were different. Abu Yusuf in the eighth century 
often cedes to Caliph's discretion in fiqh matters without ever mentioning siyasa. 
Thus, the term siyasa had different connotations in different periods of history in 
the evolution of Islamic polity. Most often it concentrated on the issues of Islamic 
governance and its legitimacy, its conflict or harmonisation v/ith/iqh and shariat. 
It is perhaps not hard to comprehend the varying meanings of siyasa once we put 
into framework the development of the very nature of Islamic polity. The concern 
in the writings of medieval Islamic philosophers and historians about the whole 
issue of 'legitimacy' and siyasa comes to the forefront only if we attempt to 
understand the complexities in the development of Islamic polity itself especially 
between eighth and tenth century and particularly how its institution of Khalifat al-
Rasuliillah gradually transformed into Khalifat al-Allah. 
The institution of Caliphate was born when Prophet's closest friend and 
companion Abu Bakr in 632 became the new head of community {Khalifat al-
Rasuhdlah). Prior to that, the Prophet had himself to care of the matters affecting 
the new community {Ummah)} Thus, Abu Bakr, being the new leader of the 
community was expected to exercise authority similarly. An oath of allegiance 
'^  See S.M. Imamuddin, A Political History of the Muslims, Dacca: Najmah, 1967-73, vol. 1&2. 
(baiyyah) to Abu Bakr was taken from the community while Abu Bakr promised 
to govern 'justly' carrying out the objectives of the Prophet. 
Two questions regarding the newly formed institution of caliphate immediately 
concern us here, for it is this institution which in due course of time developed 
elements of kingship that apparently was contrary to the teachings of Islam, and 
that ensued debate on the 'legitimacy' of siyasa. What procedure was to be 
adopted to choose a Caliph, and what powers were to be entrusted to them? These 
later became central questions. 
Of the first four Caliphs (Rashidim), the difference in the procedure of the 
selection of the Caliph itself is noteworthy. Thus, Abu Bakr was proclaimed 
Caliph by the leading companions, while he designated Umar as his successor, 
which was later ratified by the Uinmah by taking baiyyah (oath of allegiance). 
Later, Umar nominated six persons including Usman and Ali to choose the Caliph 
from among tliem. A discussion had to follow before the choice fell on Usman 
who then received baiyyah. Therefore, even in the appointment of the first three 
Caliph, three different methods were explored; all however, were only to be put 
into effect if ratified by the community, or by its most influential and closest 
meinbers. 
The second question is that of the powers exercised, or to be exercised by the new 
leaders of the community. This is even more problematical since these powers 
were not at that time defined in a precise way. One cannot base any conclusion on 
the meaning of the title khalifa, which suggesting at once the ideas of succession, 
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appointment and authority, ren-ained somewhat vague, however. These powers 
seem essentially to have authorised the first three Caliphs to pursue actions for 
which the example was set by the Prophet himself and to put into practice the 
Quranic message, which itself was to be supplemented by the sunna instituted 
among the ummah in the lifetime of the Prophet, the ultimate aim being the spread 
of Islam. 
By the time of third Caliph Usman, major political developments had taken place 
giving rise to new problems. How these problems were remedied is again 
problematical as will be discussed. The expansionist forces of the Caliphs were 
making inroads far outside the Arabian Peninsula. By 644, Iran's long-reigning 
Sassanid Empire had been reduced to a tributary, and Egypt and Syria had been 
wrested from the Byzantine rule. The vast expansion needed the management of 
those areas, as well as the booty collected from there. The first task was 
accomplished by the appointment of governors, while the second was managed by 
instituting Diwan. These issues raised further problems as now the question arose 
that who will govern those areas, and whether the booty collected from these areas 
belonged to the community, or to its head. 
By appointing and giving precedence to his family (Abu Sufiyan) and amassing the 
fortunes for himself Usman initiated conflict in the two concepts of power. The 
first consisted in observing strictly the principles of Quran and giving place of 
pride to the "first converts", while the other paid greater attention to the efficiency 
of the apparatus of government. In the confrontation between All and Muawiya 
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following the judgement of Adhrub, the second concept held definitive sway, 
while also at the same time established the Ummayad dynasty.''' 
But while the Ummayads had already managed to get dynastic principle of 
caliphate firmly established in their family, they still had to manage not only their 
dominions but also the discontented element, which by this time also included, 
besides the Kharijites and Shiites, the non-Arab Muslims called Mawali. Siyasa, 
in the context of management and statecraft demanded the extinction of those 
elements which posed a threat to their authority, even if they were Muslims, an act 
denounced by the Prophet in his farewell address to the Ummah during his last 
pilgrimage. Thus, the Ummayads in the name of siyasa and in its new context of 
statecraft and management went beyond the hadd (limits) prescribed by the 
shariat, and did not hesitate to shed blood o '^the fellow Muslims. Thus, the debate 
and the extension on the usage of the term siyasj later found in the Risala fil-
Sahaba of Ibn al-Mukaffa, as discussed above, is quite understandable. 
But then what is particularly interesting in the kharijite and shiite movement 
against the Ummayads is the fact that now the authority as well as legitimacy of 
Caliphate started to be questioned. Both viewed Ummayads as opportunistic late-
comers to Islam who had unlawfully usurped and perverted its most cherished 
institution. But while the shiites advocated the vesting of the Caliphate in the 
'^  See Zuber Usman, AH bin Abu Talib, Melaka: Abbas Bandong, 1974; Also see, Muhammad 
Shibli Numani, Umar ed. Jamil Qureshi based on the tr. by Zafar Khan, London: Oxford Centre of 
Islamic Studies, I.B. Tauris, 2004. 
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Prophet's family, or more specifically in the house of the slain caliph Ali, the 
kharijite acknowledged no authority but that of the Islamic community, which 
could elect or disown any caliph who went astray. This is precisely the period 
when siyasa as a concept started to question the legitimacy of its leader. Who 
should be the caliph, how should he govern, what are his powers, whether the 
powers of the caliph are subordinate to ummah were just the kind of issues found 
in the treatises of that period. Interestingly, the answers to the above queries were 
attempted within the framework of siyasa, which increasingly began to acquire 
new definitions. 
The Ummayads not only innovated ways to counter the views of the Kharijites of 
owning the moral responsibility by caliph, they also had the principle of dynastic 
succession recognised. They also maintained the idea of unconditional obedience 
to the reigning caliph. The ideas of the Kadariyya movement against the 
Kharijites that the caliph's action cannot be scrutinised was also proclaimed and 
invoked by Yezid III. They also claimed the divine status by proclaiming the title 
0^Khalifa al-Allah. The ruling Caliphs in fact considered themselves as appointed 
by God, and the above title came into use from the start of the Ummayad era, 
helping to establish firmly the duty of obedience to the dynasty. 
The dynastic principle became more firmly established with the capture of power 
in the middle of the eighth century by Abbasids. Caliph al-Mahdi sought to 
adduce in addition the thesis according to which al-Abbas had been nominated by 
the Prophet himself as his successor. The Abbasid's panegyrists further tried to 
provide 'legitimacy' to the former, by asserting their claim that they have been 
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chosen by God to be the successor of the prophet.''* Besides the issue of 
dynastic principle being associated with the office of Caliph, some other important 
developments could be traced, notably the emergence of the office ofQazi and that 
of great amirates. 
The Seljukid period marks the end of an era and also the beginning of new period 
in Islamic thoughts and politics. This period saw decline in the powers of the 
Caliphs and the rise in the powers of religious class and viziers. Thus, what we 
have discussed in the beginning, the changing notions of siyasa, particularly in the 
works of Ghazali and Mawardi apparently is the result of the changing politics of 
the time, which due to the rise of Sultanates demanded harmonisation of shariat 
with siyasa}^ The decline of the Abbasid Caliphate brought philosophers in terms 
with new concept of Sultan, who were not only trying to find a way not only to 
legitimize their rule but also to work out the purpose and a way through which that 
purpose could be attained. The changing notions of siyasa were thus inevitable. 
The Seljukid period saw a great diversity within the empire; and in spite of the 
unifying factor of Islam and the general levelling tendency of Turkish military 
government, there was much local particularism and variety in the social ethics of 
different groups and communities. There was, for example, a standing opposition 
'" See Muhammad Shaban, The Abbasid Revolution, Cambridge: Cambridge University Pjess, 
1979; Jacob Lassner, The Shaping of Abbasid Rule, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980. As 
a primary source we liave also consulted, Abu Jafar Muhammad ibn Jarir Tabari, The Early 
Abbasid Empire, tr. John Alden Williams, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1928. 
'^  See Muhammad Abul Quasem, The Ethics of Al-Ghazali: A Composite Ethics in Islam, New 
York: Caravan Books, 1978; Leonard Binder, Al-Gha:ali's Theory of Islamic Government, 2003. 
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between the settled and semi-settled population, between Turic and non-Turic; 
and between military and non-military population. With these varying 
differentiations the political thought of the period concerned itself with the issue of 
'justice', which according to them could only be attained by following the tenets of 
shariat. The definition of siyasa at this time was to create conditions in which the 
Muslims could live a good life. The traditional view that the stability was assured 
by the maintenance of right religion and justice was broadly accepted. Ibn al-
Balkhi who wrote during the reign of Muhammad b. Malik Shah, thus observes: 
Those possessed of learning have said, 'When a king is 
adorned by religion, and his rule is stable because of 
justice, kingship will not disappear from his house 
unless, God forbid, some disorder appears in religion or 
he commits tyranny.' ^ 
By the time of the rise of Seljuks, the classical theory of Caliphate no longer 
corresponded with practice. The Caliphate had become merely a symbolic office 
maintaining links with the past; and the conception of sultanate as a simple 
delegation of authority by the Caliph to the temporal ruler could hardly be 
maintained in the political circumstances which prevailed. For, some governors 
had seized their provinces by force, while others thought they were not rebels, and 
were not subject to the appointment of the Caliph: an irregular situation which 
threatened the life of the community. The latter was supposed to exist in order to 
See The Cambridge History of Iran. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968-1991, 4, 
p.1091. 
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carry out the tenets of Islamic Law; and unless the shariat was its basis, there 
was no reason for its existence. It was thus imperative that the situation should be 
regularised. Mawardi, taking siyasa beyond the concept of shariat legalised 
usurpation of power, provided usurper conformed to shariat. From this stemmed a 
new system of administration composed of a series of interconnected jurisdictions 
whose stability depended not on the separation of the civil arm from the military, 
but on orthodoxy or 'right religion' and the personal loyalty of sultan to Caliph and 
of subordinate officials to the sultan, thus giving siyasa new meaning as 
highlighted in the works of Ghazali. 
Thus, as discussed in the foregoing pages, the meaning and practical application of 
siyasa kept on evolving as the Islamic system itself evolved. From the mere and 
simplified meaning of 'management' it acquired new definitions and further 
additions were incorporated to it with the change in Islamic political structure. 
More often it defined the role and power of the Caliph initially, and then of 
sovereigns in the management of affairs, mainly religious but then to temporal as 
well. With this, the conflict with Islamic shariat and attempts to harmonise it with 
the politics of the time appear to be the major concern for the theologians who by 
the ninth century were the agents legitimizing the caliphs themselves. Thus, what 
we have on the eve of Mongolian conquest is the conflict between the sharia' and 
the practical demands o^ siyasa. Siyasa by the thirteenth century, and even before 
that, concerned itself with three issues; 'legitimacy' of the ruler or ruling house, the 
purpose of rule and the means to attain that purpose. It is in this context and 
framework that very often the purpose of rule and the means to attain that purpose 
often came into conflict with shariat and confused with other canons and 
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conventions, like the Mongolian Yasa as understood by al-Maqrizi, which later 
had a profound impact on Mughal siyasa. This shall remain the subject of study in 
the next chapter. 
Literature Review and Justification for the Study 
Most of the work done on Mughal polity or its political structure tends to depict its 
third ruler, Akbar (1556-1605) as the 'real' originator of the Mughal Political 
Structure. Thus, a group of historians having Marxist leanings led by Irfan Habib 
tends to discern a sound economic basis, notably the extracts from the land revenue 
system like Mansabdari and Jagirdari system that not only defined the relationship 
between the rulers and the ruling elites but also gave it a form of an 'empire'." 
What actually constitute an empire, however, is dealt by Habib in reaction to the 
works of Cambridge School of thought (Muzaffar Alam, Christopher Bayly), and 
that too in the context of eighteenth century.'* Thus, while the concept of 'empire' 
eventually gets challenged and 'defined' for the eighteenth century, it remains the 
case that the concept is left hanging for the earlier period^ especially under the 
' See Irfan Habib, Agrarian System of Mughal India, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999. 
See Irfan Habib, "The Eighteenth Century in Indian Economic History," in On the Eighteenth 
Century As a Category of Asian History: Van Leur in Retrospect, ed. Leonard Blusse and Semme 
Gaastra Hampshire, 1998. Irfan Habib vehemently criticised Alam and Bayly for their works on 
eighteenth century. See Muzaffar Alam, The Crisis of Empire in Mughal North India : Awadh and 
the Punjab, 1707-48, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997; Christopher A. Bayly, Rulers, 
Townsmen and Bazaars: North Indian Society in the Age of British Expansion, 1770-1870, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983. Michael Fisher has also marvellously studied 
Awadh state during the later Mughals and their relation to Centre and has contributed immensely in 
the discussion, and debate on 'empire'. See Michael H. Fisher, A Clash of Cultures: Awadh, The 
British and the Mughals, London: Sangam, 1988. 
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founder of the dynasty, Babur, and his son and successor Humayun, for which' 
we have but little information. Farhat Hasan's recent contribution, although takes 
the discussion further, but nevertheless the argument whether there was an 
'empire' before Emperor Akbar's de facto assumption of sovereignty (1560) with 
its well-defined contours and notions of 'Kingship' and administrative structure is 
left ominous.'^ 
The concept of an 'empire' in any study on political structure remains sim qua 
non. It is not only that such a discussion sheds important light on the relation of the 
ruler with the ruling elites within and outside its 'core' and 'periphery', but also it 
questions the very concept of 'Kingship', without which, perhaps no medieval 
political structure, or for that matter polity will have any relevance. It is through 
the actual and symbolic relationship of the King, Padishah or Shahinshah in our 
case, with umara and mamabdars that a polity can be best understood. 
Quite a few sociological and political theories have been applied by historians to 
understand the political structure in general and Mughal polity in particular. 
Notable amongst them is Karl Wittfogel's theory of despotism and Max Weber 
theory of patrimonial societies. Wittfogel presents despotism as a forerunner of 
modern totalitarianism. Without delving at length into his conception of hydraulic 
society, its political co-relates, and the controversy concerning it, he describes 
" See for details Farhat Hasan, State and Locality in Mughal India : Power Relations in Western 
India, c. 1572-1730, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 
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these societies as 'dominated by a bureaucratically despotic state'.^° S.N. 
Bisciistadt employs centralised bureaucracy as tlie defining ciiaracteristic of a 
general category of societies, whicii he calls 'centralised historical bureaucratic 
empires', and places between patrimonial societies, feudal societies, and city-states 
on one side and modern societies on the other in the scale of political development. 
Eisenstadt sees members of existing political elites whose interest tie them to the 
status quo as the main opponent of these centralising rulers.^' 
Max Weber's sociological theory on patrimonial societies has been best adopted to 
understand historical phenomenon by Stephen Blake, who in the mpdel perceives 
regime as an extension of the household of the ruler. The ruler of a regime is 
juxtaposed with the role of a father in a patriarchal family. The army of the 
patrimonial state consists of the ruler's household troops; its administration is that 
of his establishment. When such a polity grew too large for the iostitutions of the 
household to produce an adequate army and administration, extra patrimonial 
officials and soldiers— the soldier's of the ruler's major subordinates—developed. 
The new officials were not bureaucrats in the modern sense because they served at 
the ruler's favour and did not obtain their positions solely on the basis of technical 
qualifications. The dilution of the personal ties to the ruler which made the polity 
coherent forced the patrimonial-bureaucratic leaders to develop new strategies to 
Karl August Wittfogcl, Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power, New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1981. 
' ' S. N. Eisenstadt, The Political System of Empires, London: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963. 
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develop and maintain the loyalty of their subordinates.^ ^ Blake, through his 
astute analysis of the model and the information furnished in Ain-i Akbari 
conclusively demonstrates that of the ideal types suggested for the Mughal Empire 
the patrimonial-bureaucratic empire is the most applicable. He argues that it is the 
rulers' household that a particular attention is required to understand the 
complexities of a political structure. 
Anand Pandian's Predatory Care: The Imperial Hunt in Mughal and British India 
also uses sociological tools to analyse the metaphor of hunting within the rulers 
and ruling eliies to counter the age long assumption of the oriental despotism of the 
Mughals under Akbar.^ ^ Pandian demonstrates that the British pursuit of man-
eaters confronted feline terror with 'sovereign' might, securing the bodies and 
hearts of resistant subjects through spectacles of responsible force, while the 
Mughal hunt, on the other hand, took unruly nobles and chieftains as the object .of 
its fearful care, winning their obedient submission through the exercise of 
predatory sovereignty. '^' 
Scholars writing on the state-craft often employ predation as metaphor for 
exploitative and injurious rule. The predatory state, as described by Peter Evans, 
for example, 'preys on its citizenry, terrorising them, despoiling their common 
^^  Stephen Blake, "The Patrimonial-Bureaucratic Empire of the Mughals," Journal of Asian Studies, 
39, 1979. Michael Fisher has also marvellously studied Awadh state during the later Mughals and 
their relation to Centre and has contributed immensely in the discussion and debate on 'empire'. 
" See Anand S. Pandian, "Predatory Care: The Imperial Hunt in Mughal and British India," Journal 
of Historical Sociology, 14, 2001. 
^^  Ibid, p.). 
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patrimony and providing little in the way of services in return.^ ^ Studies such as 
these rely on common sensical opposition between predatory rule and the care of 
the general population. The logic of the latter objective has been developed most 
comprehensively by Michael Foiicault, who suggests that the cultivation of welfare 
is the primary aim of a modern state power. Drawing a metaphor from animal 
shepherding, Foucault argues that a pastoral strategy (conducting the conduct of 
subject populations) underpins the governmentalisation of the state and the 
cultivation of the social body. The 'sovereign' power that Foucault opposes to 
pastoral power is itself predatory by nature: seizing and subtracting from his 
subjects, the 'sovereign' imposes death selectively to ensure his own survival. 
But while the above cited discussions on the political structure, whether based on 
the theories of social sciences or more particularly on the Mughal Empire 
advanced our understanding on the nature of political structure in medieval 
dynasties, yet they were not without predicaments. Most studies dwell on the reign 
of Emperor Akbar or thereafter, and 'assumes' the political genius of the Emperor 
in the resulting polity that developed under him. Little or no advances were made 
to our understr.nding of what actually happened under his predecessors, what kind 
of polity was bequeathed to Akbar, or how did the Mughal polity actually evolved 
or developed under him. It is only in the recent years that such understanding of 
the reign of Akbar has been challenged with a flurry of activities among historians. 
See Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1995; Also see Michael Taussig, Shamanism, Colonialism and the Wild 
Man: A Study in Terror and Healing, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987. 
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Such studies, from a wide range of angles, challenge the assumption that the 
political structure developed under Akbar was more than his political genius. 
John F. Richards in his outstanding work revealed that Akbar had to elevate his 
position to that of the vice-regent of God to execute the authority. One of the 
ways was to recruit the chilas (disciples or personal followers).^ ^ Rosalind O' 
Hanlon's study that deals with the ideal of manliness (masculinity) also challenges 
the assumption that divine form of kingship as developed under Akbar was owing 
to the complexities in the existing political structure, and not a result of a mere 
genius. Published in 1999 and entitled Manliness and Imperial Service in Mughal 
North India, it deals with the notions, as has already been said, of ideal manliness 
(masculinity) in comparison to Akbar's projection of the ideal monarch." O' 
Hanlon's article was, in fact, a breakthrough. It helped understand the notions of 
gender identity as well, particularly of masculinity in imperial Mughal North India. 
The scholar proposes that the Mughal Emperor was the centre of almost veritable 
'domain', which projected, formed and even symbolised other realms of the 
empire. In projecting the notions of the ideal Mughal manhood, O'Hanlon 
extensively uses the source characterised as 'Mirror of Princes". Thus, Mauziah-i 
Jahangiri (1612) of Muhammad Baqir becomes a major source of information and 
analysis for O'Hanlon. From a theoretical perspective, the conclusions drawn from 
See J. F. Richards, 'The Formulation of Imperial Authority under Aicbar and Jahangir' in his ed. 
Kingship and Authority in South Asia, Madison: University of Wisconsin South Asian Studies, 
1978. 
See Rosalind O'Hanlon, "Manliness and Imperial Service in Mughal North India," Journal of 
Economic and Sot ial History of the Orient, 42, 1999. 
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such sources provide interesting details of what the perception of idea! 
masculinity in terms of elite, particularly the ruling class should be. 
Ruby Lai's recent feministic work details out the nuances of a tribal family and 
political structure under Babur and Humayun, before commenting on the structure 
as evolved under Akbar. Lai argues, from her training in gender that how the 
various institutions were 'institutionalised' under Akbar, including harem. But 
while Lai supposedly setting out to bring to forefront the lives of "the mothers of 
royal children, their nurses and servants, and others who formed part of this 
(changing) intimate circle" does not go beyond listing of wet-nurses, and is 
noticeably silent on the court or royal family servants (eunuchs, dancing girls and 
prostitutes).^ * The book simply revolves around elite women in the Mughal 
household, thereby falling into the same trap for which she criticises Rosalind 0 ' 
Hanlon. It is hard to follow the nature of this so called 'intimate circle' without 
analysing the role of eunuchs, wet-nurses and armed women retainers, leave aside 
other menials involved in this circle. On a similar note. Munis Faruqui also deals 
with the complexities of various institutions which Akbar had to counter to elevate 
his position. 
~* Ruby Lai, Domesticity and Power in the Early Mughal World: Hisloricicing the Haram, 
Cambridge, Cambridge Studies in Islamic civilization 2005, p. 22. The author simply lists the wet 
nurses of Akbar (pp. 188-193) wilhout examining their role and also their social status. Similarly 
there is no mention of eunuchs who formed a major part of this 'intimate circle' apart from a brief 
discussion Itimad Khan (p. 195). 
See Munis D. Faruqui, "The Forgotten Prince: Mirza Hakim and the Formation of the Mughal 
Empire in India," Journal of Economic and Social History of the Orient, 48, 2005. 
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One of the reasons why our understanding of the political structure with its 
Kingship remains relatively little for Babur and Humayun, partly owes to the two 
monumental research pieces carried long time back by Iqtidar Alam Khan and R, 
P. Tripathi."'" These works had so paramount influence on the historiography of 
the Mughals that the latter's work was included in totto in the recently edited book, 
long after when it was actually published. Both these works continue to dominate 
the Mughal historiography even to this day, with scholars tentatively accepting 
their deductions. Iqtidar Alam Khan concluded that the concept of sovereignty and 
kingship under Akbar and his predecessors in South Asia was a manifestation of 
the same cone epts in Central Asia, which he, for some reasons classify as 'Turko-
Mongol theory of Kingship.' Basing his study on narrowly acute source material 
of Central Asia, Iqtidar Alam Khan assumed that the 'sovereign' in Central Asia, 
owing to tribal traditions, yasa, the concept which he uncritically and 
instrumentall)' employs, were never absolute. Since the early Mughals borrowed 
the same traditions in South Asia, it explains the vulnerable position of Babur and 
Humayun, and even Akbar early in his reign. Thus, Iqtidar Alam Khan accepting a 
teleological understanding of a so called 'Turko-Mongol theory of Kingship' 
explains the revolt of Turani nobles between 1560 and 1567 against Akbar as a 
•"' See Iqtidar /wlam Khan, "The Turko-Mongol Theory of Kingship," Medieval India - a 
Miscellany, II, 1972; R. P. Tripathi, "The Turko- Mongol Theory of Kingship," in The Mughal 
Stale 1526-1750, ed. Muzaftar Alam and Sanjay Subrahmanyam Delhi: Oxford University Press, 
1998. 
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glaring example of the Central Asian concept, which ni'llifies the absolute status 
of a monarch. '^ 
Iqitidar Alam Khan assumes that the Turkish word tiira and yasa always refer to 
fundamental law or code, which reflects the political theory of the legislator, i.e. 
Chinggis Khan. A plethora of literature ensuing from scholarly debates among the 
Central Asian scholars and others, which Khan neither acknowledged nor informed 
his understanding about some of the central question in the Central Asian polity 
have inevitably left his work somewhat superficial. 
David Ayalon in his usual style of rigorously testing etymologies of words, as well 
as the original sources opined that Great ^ a^a, or canons devised by Chinggis Khan 
existed, and that too in rather a written form.^ ^ Had it not been for the equally 
laborious work of David Morgan, our understanding on yasa as informed by 
Ayalon would have remained conclusive. Morgan challenges the conclusion of 
Ayalon and put forward his own understanding on the 'Great Yasa' of Chinggis 
Khan which he thinks was never written and was nothing more than the existing 
tribal laws. Both these scholars worked fr^ m a wide variety of original sources, 
including Persian and Chinese. Thus, their work .questions the very concept of 
Yasa on which Khan and Tripathi based their hypothesis. 
This was in another work of LA. Khan, but which carried over his erroneous understanding of the 
'Turko-Mongol theory of Kingship.' See Iqtidar Alam Khan, "The Nobility of Akbar and 
Development of His Religious Policy, \560-l5S0," Journal of Royal Asiatic Society 1 (1968). 
" See David Ayalon, "The Great Yasa of Chingiz Khan: A Re-Examination," Sludia Islamica, 33 
(1973). 
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The works on Central Asia by other scholars notably like Peter Jackson, Rene 
Grousset, Prawdin and Barthold remains indispei.iable for this research. The 
secondry works by these and other scholars provided a platform from where the 
study on the evolution of Mughal political structure could well be attempted, 
although from a diffeient perspective. Since the literature on Central Asia is too 
vast to be summarised in the present small section on literature review, these have 
been incorporated in the Ciiaplcrs i and 2 respectively. 
Sources and Methodology 
The sources to study Mughal polity in South Asia vary from their nature to their 
typology. Besides the typical sources for the Mughals, the kind of study as laid out 
in this research necessitates ihe use of Central Asian sources, as will be discussed 
later. However, court chronicles, personal memoirs, biographical dictionaries, 
general history works, epistolary records and eulogies (mainly in Persian), together 
with the European travellers' accounts, and also works by various missionaries 
provide ample evidences to construct the evolution and influences on Mughal 
polity. 
For choice of sources, Ruby Lai makes a brilliant point. Says Lai, " 1 have not 
unearthed any new sources. Instead, I have returned to sources that have been 
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available all along."^ ^ The historians have rarely exploited some sources used 
for the present research. For example, Abdul Qadir Badauni's Najat al-Rashid or 
Abul Qasim Namkin's Miimhat-i Nainkin, two important books that helps 
immensely in understanding the reign of Emperor Akbar have rarely been 
exploited by historians. Of course, other sources were only re-visited. They were 
already well known, only the perspective on them shifts. The originality of this 
research, thus, lies in llic rc-iiUcrprctalion of facts, while at tiie same time 
supplementing information from Central Asian sources. This thesis, therefore, 
proceeds on t'le basis of a 'rediscovered archive', to use Ruby Lai's words, to 
investigate the political structure of Mughal Empire. Sources, be they Persian, or 
the accounts of European travellers, still offer many challenges, if the purpose is to 
study these sources from a comparative perspective. Much of the predicament 
depends upon how to extract facts. 
The problem of 'facts' raises many difficulties. Therefore, the problem of 'facts' 
shall be explored first for its numerous diffif^ ulties. Let us begin with the problems 
of Persian sources, because while attempting tc narrate a history of Mughal 
Empire, scholars generally make Persian sources primary, continuously referring to 
them as 'authentic'. In the words of Ruby Lai: 
'^ Lai, Domesticity and Power in the Early Mughal World, p. 52. 
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The choice of certain sources as basic and central has in 
turn tended to perpetuate certain kind of histories. The 
interest in agrarian-administrative institutional histories 
for example has made chronicles like Akbarnama and 
the Ain-i Akbari appear essential to any undertaking in 
Mughal history. Relying on texts like the Akbarnama, 
historians have often uncritically reproduced the 
primary sources themselves, and therefore duplicated 
one or another chronicler's assessment of the empire, 
imperial relations, and other related matters.34 
The problem of reliance on one particular kind of source material (court 
chronicles), besides producing specific histories (political and economic), also 
encouraged a specific mode of history writing, namely narrative. Peter Hardy 
highlighted the problem with this kind of methodology as early as in the 1960''s. 
According to Peter Hardy: 
It was not only that the majority of students of medieval 
Indo-Muslim rule confined their attention to one class 
of source material; they also confined their aims to the 
writing of one form of history, the political, and in one 
mode, the narrative." 
34 Ibid., p.55. 
I'ctci- Hard 
Luzac, 1960, p. 3. 
r y, liis/orlans of Medieval India: Studies in Indo-Muslim Historical Writing, London: 
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This antiquated methodology appears to be principally responsible for giving 
undue prominence to court chronicles, which resulted in their uncritical 
examination, and to the neglect of other and new branches in history writing. 
Further, this approach gave rise to two further problems. Firstly, the inability to 
critically examine a source in a broad perspective (the objective and audience of 
the historian, as well as, the socio-political conditions of the historian's time), and 
secondly, the neglect of other works compiled during the same period. 
What is more interesting is the complete divorce of South Asian history from the 
history of contemporary dynasties like those of the Safavids and the Ottomans. A 
comparative approach might have resulted in the broadening of the intellectual 
dimensions of the modern historian, which might have opened newer areas of 
research. Also, one more result of the heavy reliance on the court chronicles was 
to limit itself to the fortunes of the king, his exploits in wars or in praising the 
whole dynasty. In the words of Peter Hardy, "But Sultans, wazirs, amirs, soldiers 
and saints so completely fill the foreground of thes^ works that the spectator not 
only cannot see the background, but is left unaware that a background exists."^* 
Along with this, the positions of the court historians have also to be kept in mind. 
There was rarely a court historian who was not recruited in the nobility, and 
therefore, was not professionally obliged to the king in writing what could earn 
praise for the latter and his whole dynasty. There appears to be a specific factor 
•^^  Ibid., p. 111. 
31 
responsible for medieval historian rhetoric and undue praise of the King. The 
decline of the Abbasid Caliphate towards the middle of the tenth century, as the (k-
facto 'sovereign' of the Muslim world, left no opportunity to professional 
historians but to look towards their own King to assume the function in the Muslim 
community previously allocated to the Caliph." It appears that this factor was 
primarily responsible for a medieval historian's rhetorical praise of the King. He 
had to elevate the sovereign's position and image. 
Yet another reason for this class of rhetoric in court chronicles appears to be the 
urge on the part of historians for reward. Praising the King and highlighting his 
political or military exploits, as well as, protecting his failures, appears to be the 
easiest way to earn reward either in monetary terms or in terms of an increase in 
rank. Abul Fazl, by writing the kind of history mentioned above was quickly 
promoted besides getting proximity to the Emperor. 
Apparently, it is for these reasons that court histories reveal great similarities in 
terms of their content, as also, rhetoric. In the words of Julie Scott Meisami: 
most of those who wrote history were court 
officials: scribes, secretaries, the occasional vizier. 
They were members of a class who shared a common 
educational background, certain stylistic approaches to 
"Ibid., p. 113. 
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literary composition and specific political concerns; 
their writings therefore exhibit many common 
assumptions as to the purposes and the proper content 
of history, as well as how it should be written. '^ 
It is, therefore, very important that one should approach court histories with 
caution, that is, not taking 'facts' at their face value. Abul Fazl has written that 
Emperor Akbar himself would suggest corrections on the rough draft of 
Akbarnama, which was read out to him. Under these circumstances, it is very 
unlikely that the Emperor would have given space to those facts which might 
suggest to the audience (mainly the ruling class) his failures, for he was 
constructed as divinely gifted in that very book. Marilyn Waldman draws a 
brilliant caricature on the methodology of the scholars: 
The criteria for the validity for the facts obtained from 
historical narratives are largely external; rarely are they 
related to the internal dynamics of the work from which 
the facts have been taken or to the interaction of the 
author's mind with the material he has presented, 
matters that have long been important in European and 
American historiography. Systematic methods and 
38 Julie Scott Meisami, Persian Historiography to the End of the Twelfth Century, Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 1999, p.6 ; Also see preface in Harbans Mukhia, Historians and 
Historiography During the Reign of Akbar, New Delhi: Blackwell Publishers, 1976. 
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categories of analysis tlirough which such questions 
could be approached are virtually none .^istent.^ ' 
Julie Scott Meisami quite rightly argues that the medieval historian's primary 
interest lay less in recording 'facts' of history and more in the construction of a 
meaningful narrative."" Thus, the interest of medieval Persian historians, 
particularly court historians, was to create a meaningful narrative that corroborated 
with the high image of the emperor. In doing so, these court historians were quite 
selective in their choice of facts. Many times some facts were deliberately omitted 
which could potentially harm the popular image of the emperor, for those facts 
would disagree with the emperor's high sounding titles. At other times, if the 
narrative required the presentation of a particular 'fact', the medieval historian 
would cleverly camouflage the 'fact' in rhetoric. One might cite here the deliberate 
matching of horoscope of Akbar with that of Timur, as well as linking the former 
with not only the mythological characters in Central Asian history, but also with 
the empire builders' like Chinggis and Timur. 
Mughal court historians, including the celebrated Abul Fazl, wrote a narrative of 
the kind just described. The attempt on the life of Emperor Akbar owing to his 
forced marriage with Indian Muslims, or the revolt of clergy during 1580-1582, 
" Marilyn Robinson Waldman, Toward a Theory of Historical Narrative: A Case Study in Perso-
Islamicaie Historiography, Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1980, p. 4. 
Meisami, Persian Historiography, p. 4. 
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find no place in the works of Abul Fazl. There appears to be thus no reason why 
one should not put to test the writings of Abul Fazl or for that matter, of any other 
court historian. Abul Fazl, like many other court historians, was himself at the 
centre of Mughal politics or at least was perceived so by other courtiers. The 
allegations against him, of manoeuvring posts and rank of nobles, as well as 
corrupting the mind of the emperor come not only from Badauni, but also, from 
Akbar's foster brother, Mirza Aziz Kuka and Emperor Jahangir, the son and 
successor of Akbar who ultimately had Abul Fazl murdered. 
However, it can hardly be debated that in terms of raw material for history, court 
historians were definitely more advantageously placed than other historians. They 
had access to official records, statistics, decrees which might have given credibility 
to their account, and could form the basis of a modern historian's interpretation. 
Still, given the reasons outlined above, it remains very important to critically 
examine the court histories against the backdrop of their style of purpose, the 
targeted audience, as also, the socio-political conditions of the time. 
With this methodology, that is, with a question mark on court official history, 
information shall be assessed to help construct a political history of Mughal 
Empire. In his attempt to highlight the high status of Emperor Akbar, Abul Fazl 
uses the high sounding titles such as, of the sovereign from the Iranian Pishdadian 
dynasty and also from Sassanians, but also links Emperor Akbar to modest Islamic 
title of Khalifa. This dichotomy has hardly been critically examined before from 
the perspective of the objective and target audience of the author. 
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Much of the predicament arising out of court histories, for reasons already 
given, could partially be overcome by adding, as well as, corroborating 
information coming from non-official accounts. Though written mostly in Persian, 
and most often dealing with court and King, these accounts are at least free of a 
committed rhetoric. Given the reliance earlier placed on official histories, it is no 
wonder that these non-official accounts have not been fully exploited. Thus, we 
find that although Akbarnama, and its detailed appendix Ain-i Akbari, remain 
popular sources for historians, the work of Badauni {Najat al-Rashid) has rarely 
been critically exploited by scholars terming the latter as a work dealing with 
issues other than the politics of the time."" 
The content ofNajal al-Rashid and Mimtakhab al-Tavarikh, both works of Badauni, 
reveal similarities with court histories yet the styles differ sharply. Badauni is 
critical of those very socio-religious policies formulated by Emperor Akbar, which 
were praised by his official historian Abul Fazl, attributing them to the emperor's 
divine inspiration. This casual difference in the presentations of 'facts' by the two 
historians of the same period underlines the basic question that exists between the 
'fact' and its 'i)resentation'. 
•" Peter Hardy describes it as a work on Sufism whereas I. A. Zilli terms it as a theological treatise. 
See Peter Hardy, ed.. The Encyclopaedia of Islam, vol. 1, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1960, 1, p. 
856;Ishtiyaq Ahmad Zilli, "Badauni Revisited: An Analytical Study of Najat ur Rashid," in 
Medieval India Essays in Intellectual Thought and Culture, ed. Iqtidar Husain Siddiqui, New 
Delhi: Manohar, 2003, p. 149. 
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Badauni, a courtier himself, wrote Muntakhab al-Tavarikh in secret, for his 
strong criticism of Aicbar. Unlike Ibn Arab Shah who neither wrote in secret, nor 
was a court historian but who vehemently criticised Timur. Badauni's book 
basically is the history of the reign of Emperor Akbar. Initially, the content does 
not highlight the author's criticism of Akbar. The author, in fact, has written about 
his own willingness to join the imperial troops to show his fidelity to Akbar. 
However, somewhere about the middle of the book, the author's criticism of the 
emperor becomes evident. In fact quite suddenly, the book begins to highlight 
those 'facts' >vhich prove Akbar's policies as glaring failures. Two reasons are 
generally ascribed for Badauni's critique of Akbar. Firstly, his rise in imperial 
recognition compared to Abul FazI was slow, which was further aggravated by the 
fact that both historians were students of the same teacher. Shaikh Mubarak, the 
father of Abul Fazl. Secondly, Badauni belonged to the clergy, which did not 
approve of Akbar's policies in religion. But then, is not the objectivity of 
Badauni's account also questionable, given his personal grudges against the 
emperor. True, Badauni's account is as subjective as that of Abul Fazl. 
Leaving aside the lack of objectivity in Badauni for the moment, let us see the kind 
of 'facts', as well as, the kind of narration that were chosen just because each 
targeted an audience, as well as, a set of social conditions. Apart from ascribing 
interpretation of 'facts', different from those provided by Abul Fazl, Badauni adds 
many new facts which otherwise do not find place in official histories. His 
interpretation of the attempted assassination of Akbar completely differs from that 
of Abul Fazl's, and provides a new understanding of the Mughal attitude to 
sexuality and ts construction of femininity. The link which Badauni provide for 
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this attempted assassination by tracing and linicing it to the customs of Chinggis 
Khan is equally interesting for it is contrary to the perception of the same canons as 
depicted by Abul Fazl. Badauni's critical observation on some of the members of 
Akbar's foster family provides quite interesting details about the role of wet-nurses 
and their kins in the Mughal body politics. 
It appears that Bndauni had a specific audience in mind. His language and style of 
writing, as well as, the presentation of 'facts' are so different from official 
histories, which probably shows that Mimtakhab ol-Tavarikh was not meant for the 
elite. The work was probably aimed at Mughal masses with the objective of 
apprising them of the situation at court, and the attitude of the emperor and the 
courtiers. The hypothesis is further strengthened by reading Badauni's other work 
Najat al-Rashid, left out by scholars as a work of theology."-
A comparative study of Badauni's two works also reveals abundant similarities. It 
appears that perhaps Najat al- Rashid was meant as a theological explanation of 
the issues that were raised in Muntakhab al-Tavarikh on the attitude of Akbar 
towards various political institutions. Basing his judgement on Quran and the 
sayings of the Prophet (which in any case needs to be checked), Badauni was 
perhaps trying to convey, again to the general masses, that Akbar was not being the 
conformist that all expected him to be. 
See footnote on page 51. 
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Abul Qasim Namkin was yet another out-of-court historian. Along with 
Badauni, Abul Qasim Namkin in Mumhat-i Namkin also touches upon those very 
issues. Mumhat-i Namkin has hardly been exploited by the scholars and had only 
recently been published. The following observation by John O.Ward would be 
true of both Badauni and Namkin who says, "an age, characterised by a rich 
variety of historical writing will be an age in which a significant number of persons 
endowed with literacy find themselves in problematical or challenging political or 
social circumstances," stands true for the reign of Akbar."^  What is particularly 
interesting about these non-official histories is the contrasting narration of the 
'facts' with official history. It is hard to say whether these non-official historians 
aimed at a general uprising against Akbar or not. However, it is clear that there 
was quite in progress a discourse on power, being almost a language game of 
manoeuvre in which a subject is formulated, transacted, shaped, regulated, 
managed, analysed and discussed. Emperor Akbar appears to be the subject in this 
discourse between those who were paid (official) to write about him and those who 
were writing on their own. 
This power-discourse, between official and unofficial historians is evident 
throughout the literary history of Mughal Empire. It is full of information that 
could help framing a history of political structure under early Mughals, which this 
thesis aims to explore. In such a situation the role of audience becomes significant, 
because that audience would determine how tie 'fact' or 'facts' are presented. 
"' Cited from , p. 4. 
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When the audience is not the elite but the general masses, the thrust shall shift 
from wars and conquests and the way the king rules the country and looks after the 
masses, the way the king lives, that is, his personal life. Thus, they would want to 
know what went in inside the palace, what did the royalty wear, what did they eat, 
and how did they spend their time, in short, the manner of their living. Military 
exploits, or political alliance were of very little significance for the masses. 
Presence in the court gave the un-official historians first hand knowledge, and it is 
because of this that these unofficial historians minus the official historians' 
penchant for rhetoric gave to their audience, the masses, insightful information 
about the personal details of the ruling house. 
Two of the Mughal emperors, Babur and Jahangir, btsides a princess Gulbadan 
Begum have left their memoirs. It is hard to categorise, Gulbadan Begum's 
memoir in this category, since it was written at the order of her nephew Akbar. 
Out of the three memoirs noted above, Gulbadan Begum's Humayunnama, has 
largely been neglected by the modern historians."''' Written on the orders of her 
nephew, Emperor Akbar (1556-1605), the memoirs of Gulbadan Begum have, not 
been properly utilised by modern historians, although the information provided by 
her about Humayun's reign especially on the role of the imperial ladies and other 
members of the royal family, besides the private lives of Babur and Humayun are 
unique. 
""' Lai, Domesticity and Power in the Early Mughal World, p. 56. 
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A careful study of the work would help a student of history to extract abundant 
information about Mughal politics originating from women quarters and the role of 
the members of royal family in it. 
The memoirs of Babur and Jahangir are quite well known to modern historians. 
Both these works have been extensively used by Mughal historians in preparing 
the history of Babur and Jahangir's reign and are well cited in political, military 
and administrative narratives. These memoirs are particularly useful for a study of 
Mughal princes; their training and attitude towards politics of the time. 
Baburnama, however, provides interesting information about customs and 
practices of his forefathers, which greatly helps us in reconstructing the role of 
these influences on Mughal body-politics. Interesting confessions are also 
recorded about 'drinking parties', and, homosexuality and its linkages to Central 
Asian customs makes it even more refreshing. 
The authors of these memoirs, Babur and Jahangir were members of a patriarchal 
society and might have followed the literary genre and conventions, which were so 
peculiar to a patriarchal society. Although, tht information coming from these 
memoirs is plenty yet it needs to be studied in its proper context with not only 
literary conventions in mind, but also noting the patriarchal ideas of the 
construction of feminine identity. Stephen Dale has also highlighted this point in 
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relation to Babur's confession of his 'love' for a boy and homosexuality in 
general."' 
Biographical {Rijal) literature substantially adds to the information, furnished in 
other Persian works. Three biographical dictionaries of Mughal nobles, in Persian, 
excluding a list compiled by Abul Fazl and elaborated by Blochmann are available. 
The translator has used the earliest known dictionary, Maasir al-Umra compiled in 
the eighteenth century by Shahnavaz Khan. Yet another well-known dictionary of 
the same period is Tazkira al-Umra of Kewal Ram. Quite recently, still another 
biographical dictionary called Dhakhira al-Khavanin of Farid Bhakkari, and 
belonging to the seventeenth century has become known."* Surprisingly, the 
authors of the both biographical dictionaries cited earlier, had largely utilised Farid 
Bhakkari's work. Shahnavaz Khan, though acknowledfjing his acquaintance with 
Dhakhira al-Khavanin, unjustly criticises it by saying that the work was based on 
heresy. All three biographical dictionaries are of immense value for the students 
of Mughal history. These dictionaries provide some interesting details of the lives 
of Mughal nobles. Again, this literature is of immense value for looking into the 
lives and role of the nobility, their rise and status. 
"' See Stephen F. Dale, "The Poetry and Autobiography of the Babur-Nama," The Journal of Asian 
Studies 55, 1996, as well as Stephen F. Dale, "Steppe Humanism: The Autobiographical Writings 
of Zahir al-din Muhammad Babur," InternationalJournal of Middle East Studies, 22, 1990. 
"* See Farid Bha ckari, Dhakira al-Khavanin, ed. Syed Moinul Haq, Karachi: Pakistan Historical 
Society, 1970. 
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The information gatiiered from the above cited Persian sources could be 
supplemented, as well as, corroborated by consulting v. large number of Mughal 
miniature paintings available in libraries across the world, the best collection being 
in the Victoria and Albert Museums in London and at the Chester Beatty library in 
Dublin. The present study has also benefited greatly from the study of miniatures. 
The period of Akbar's life covered by the miniatures at Victoria and Albert 
Museum, for example, conveys the socio-political conditions of the time. The 
themes were carefully chosen as it seems for illustration. The opening illustration 
depicts Akbar hunting, in what seems to be simply a standard royal image. 
However, studied carefully with the text, it tells us that it was not a standard 
painting depicting a usual hunting scene. This particular hunting scene had special 
Influence not only on the future of Akbar but also on the Mughal Empire. This 
particular hunting was undertaken as a strategy to oust the powerful vice-regent of 
Akbar, Bairani Khan and the stressing of young emperor's independent authority."' 
Similarly, the depiction of treachery is no less important if studied with the text. 
This particular painting relates to the events after the conquest of Malwa in 1561. 
Adham Khan, the commander of the royal forces and foster brother of Akbar, 
allegedly did not send the war spoils including 'beautiful' dancing girls of the ruler 
of Malwa to the Mughal court. To assert his authority again, Akbar rapidly 
marched towards Malva where dancing girls were presented to him. The painting 
" For details see Susan Stronge, Painting for the Mughal Emperor: The Art of the Book 1560-1660 
London: Victoria and Albert Publications, 2002, p. 60. 
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depicts various girls dancing for Aicbar, a symbol asserting his unchallenged 
status/* Thus, Mughal miniature paintings stand out in their value for 
understanding Mughal poltics and its structure. Quite a few paintings link Mughal 
Emperors to Timur or to the other Central Asian mythological characters. 
Keeping in mind the discussion in the preceding pages, the methodology for the 
present research could be summarised in the following points: 
1) Extensive use of Central Asian primary and secondary literature 
2) A wide variety of Mughal primary sources written, pictorial, 
indigenous and traveller accounts will be examined and exploited for this 
research. 
3) The use of political and sociological theories to understand the political 
structure 
4) Supplementing and testing the information in a wider perspective so as to 
include the other contemporary and near contemporary Muslim dynasties. 
This four-point methodology has been adhered to, in order to complete this 
research. 
48 Ibid., pp. 65-68. 
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Structure of the Thesis 
The present thesis incorporates chapters dealing theoretical issues as well as 
chronological evolution of political structure under the Mughals up to 1575. 
Having already discussed the definitions, implications and evolution of the term 
and concept siyasa with in Islamic political structure, the Chapter One immediately 
concerns itself with the Central Asian constitutional system, popularly known as 
the yasa of Chinggis Khan, and its overlapping with the Islamic siyasa. Naturally 
then quite a bit of Mongolian political history also gets incorporated there, which 
eventually strengthen our argument further. Chapter Two deals with the continuity 
of the Chinggisid traditions under Timur, modifications' according the 
development in politics whereby issues like 'legitimacy' and 'justice' becomes 
prominent in medieval concept of siyasa. Chapter Three confines itself to the 
reign of the fi'St Mughal emperor Babur and his position in Central Asia. This 
chapter also notes the subtle changes in the evolution process and can possibly be 
called as evolution of Mughal polity. Chapter Four and Five, traces the 
chronological events in Mughal South Asia under Humayun and Akbar whereby 
the structure of Mughal politics viz a viz siyasa finally gets evolved, at least by 
1575. 
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CHAPTER- ONE 
Interrogating Siyasa and the Yasa: Paradigms to Rule 
One major predicament in studying the structure of Mughal polity has been the 
incessant and inexorable efforts either to trace it back to Central Asia, the region 
from where they traced their lineage, or to Islamic system of governance, which 
crept into and intermingled with the Central Asian form as early as fourteenth 
century, if not before.''^  Not surprisingly then were the obvious conclusions drawn 
on the nature and structure of Mughal polity before Akbar (r. 1556-1605) as one 
lacking absolutism and centralisation.^° Few researches on the first two rulers of 
Mughal household in South Asia, Babur and Humayun, seldom probed the vital 
issues and also finer nuances on theoretical perspectives and their practical 
applications highlighted above. '^ Cumulative effect of such researches, thus have 
left a sort of paucity in providing an advance over our understanding on the nature 
of polity adopted or even extended into the Mughal dominion in South Asia by 
their first members. 
"" Some recent and earlier works on Mughal polity discusses the role of Central Asian and Islamic 
polity, mainly >'a5£7 and shariai to explain the lack of centralisation and absolutism observed during 
the reign of first two Mughal emperors. See I.A Khan, "The Turko-Mongol Theory of Kingship;" 
R.P Tripathi, "The Turko-Mongol Theory of Kingship." 
°^ Such conclusions have been repeatedly drawn. See, for example, I.A Khan, "The Nobility of 
Akbar and Development of His Religious Policy, 1560-1580." 
" The secondary literature available on Babur mainly deals with his administration or his 
conquests. See Ahsan Raza Khan, "Babur's Settlement of His Conquests in Hindustan" paper 
presented at the Indian History Congress, 29"" Session, 1967; Yog Raj Malhotra, Babur's Nobility 
and Administration in Hindustan, Jalandhar: ABS, 1996; Rushbrocik Williams, An Empire Builder 
of the Sixteenth Century, London: Longman, Green & Co., 1918. 
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While it is clear from various researches that the structure of Mughal polity 
definitely acquired prominent features as well as impetus from 1560 onwards, it 
still remains the case that the issue of political structure under its first two rulers is 
left hanging on several important fronts, especially as regards the structure of 
polity if at all it existed in a proper manner. However, in order to understand 
structure of polity in the early days of Mughal conquest of North India, a minute 
analysis of political structure under the Mongols in Central Asia, having already 
discussed the concept ofsiyasa in the previous chapter, is of prime importance. 
An attempt is made in this section to sketch in somewhat broad strokes an 
important aspect of the Mongolian political or constitutional system based on and 
referred to as the 'Great yasa\ Much of our primary source material for the 
Mongols and their polity remains the same as discussed in the previous chapter. 
Tarikh-i Jahan Gusha of Ala al-din Ata Mulk b. Baha al-din Muhammad al-
Juvaini (1226-1283) and Jami al-tawarikh of Rashid al-din Fadl-allah b. Imad al-
dawla Abil-Khair al-Hamadani (1247-1318) provide us insightful information on 
the issues of politics after the death of Chinggis Khan.^ ^ Juvaini wrote only a few 
years after Mongke's accession and the execution of most of the adult members of 
the lines of Ogedei and Chaghtai. Rashid al-din's work, similarly, dates from a 
time when the rivalry of the II Khan's and the Golden Horde was already of forty 
" Both these works were composed under the II Khan's by persons who ranked high among their 
administrative agents. Sec inlrodiiclion of Ala Mulk Juvvaini, Tarikh-i Jahan Gusha, J.A Boyle tr.. 
2 vols., iVlanchestcr, 1958, vol.!. I'or Kashid, see Rashid al-din, The Successors of Genghis Khan, 
J.A Boyle tr., London : Persian Heritage Series, 1971. 
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years' standing and thus contains much more vital information on the conflicts 
between different Chinggisid houses. The Jochids find their narration in the works 
of authors, who were not immediately concerned with Mongol history, namely the 
historians of Mamluk Egypt and Syria, some of \v'hom have already been 
introduced in the previous chapter, including al-Umari (1301-1349). Many details 
not found elsewhere, and which throw fresh light on issues of politics of the time 
within the imperial family may be gleaned from non-Islamic sources. The earliest 
of these is the Maghol un niiica tobcaan (Secret History of the Mongols), most of 
which was written around 1228 but which contains later additions and may have 
been doctored by the Toluids." 
1.1 The Siyasa and Mongolian Yasa: The Qverlappings 
Politically speaking, if on the one hand the Abbasid Caliphate was on the fringe of 
decline towards the beginning of thirteenth century, the Mongols under Chinggis 
Khan on the ether were exhibiting enough promise to overtake the Muslim lands 
and to substitute it with their own tribal system and canons. Having itself evolved 
from a tribal base, the Islamic political system was not utterly surprised to the 
tribal laws when the former interacted with the latter through military contacts. 
" See Aead Sh. Bira, "The "Mongol-un Niyuca Tobciyan" and the legend and folktale contacts of 
Nomadic people," International Association for Mongol Studies Bulletin 1 (1990). 
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Besides the similarities noticed in the rapidity of the conquest and in tribal 
origins, both Islam and the Mongol political system share some other similar 
characteristics. Whereas the military success of both depended on the ability of 
Prophet of Islam and Chinggis Khan in unifying multitudes of warring tribes under 
them, and also giving them a common cause to sustain that unity, there was also an 
infallible prescription, or code of conduct, the shariat andyasa, which defined and 
approved their siyasa or political systems. But while the Islamic siyosa had started 
to differentiate between divinely and temporal siyasa as has been discussed 
previously, the Mongol system still in its infancy had no such distinction. 
It is only when these two political systems interacted that the bewilderment arising 
primarily from the Muslim sources regarding shariat, siyasa and yasa started to 
appear. 
Having already discussed the features o^siyasa within the Islamic framework and 
its adaptation in the tenth and eleventh century, it seems important now to describe 
at some length Mongolian yasa and their polity before and during the time they 
came into contact with Muslim lands. It is actually \h\syasa which along with the 
legendary image of Chinggis Khan formed the core of scholarly studies. The 
debate on the yasa actually starts from the year 1206 when at the qurultai 
(assembly) Chinggis Khan allegedly framed some laws. But what was the 
importance of the year 1206? What were the reasons behind promulgation of some 
new laws by Chinggis Khan when there were already tribal laws and conventions? 
To find answers to these questions, let us begin by analysing the polity of Central 
Asia before the rise of Chinggis Khan. 
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Before the Mongolian conquest. Central Asia was divided into multitudes of 
tribes mainly Turkish. The Oghuz were living in the area between Caspian Sea and 
Farab, the Turkish name which was Qarachuk. In the eleventh century they were 
living in Isfljab Sayram in the Syr Darya region and in the steppes north 
of this river. '^' With the spread of Islam among the Oghuz some of them started to 
appear sedentary. The sedentary Oghuz did not participate on a large scale in the 
political activity and migrations of the nomadic conquest. 
The Kirghiz lived in the region of the Abaqan River beyond the Kokmen 
Mountains also known as Sayan Mountains. Thereafter, they invaded the Uighur 
ahd and took the region of the Orkhon River. 
The Chighil were living in the north west of Issik Kol. Gradually acquiring more 
importance they became a separate and independent tribe in the eleventh century. 
The Yaghma were living in the region of Kashgar. The leaders of this tribe bore 
the title of Bughral. The title led Barthold to believe that the Kara Khanids 
belonged to the Yaghma. The Karhik, Argii and Tuhsi were living in the Chu 
valley." 
Thus, by the time of Mongolian invasion. Central Asia was already the land of 
Turk. However, as a result of the Arab invasion, non-Turkish people had long 
^^ For geographical local and description of various tribes, see Rene Grousset, The Empire of the 
Sleppes: A History of Central Asia, tr. Naomi Walford, London: Rutgers University Press, 1999. 
" Ibid. 
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dominated the western part of it. This invasion had had the effect of putting the 
Turics into contact with Islam and they had the opportunity to learn the principles 
of Islam in more detail. 
The Mongols themselves were divided into various tribes known probably as dada 
and not as 'Mongol' or 'Mong-gu'.^'' Kerait, the most influential tribe in the area 
is just one example, which in turn was itself a combination of various tribes." As 
is most often the case in a tribal set-up these sub tribes had their own rulers and 
leaders.^ * Chinggis Khan's father, Yesugai was a chief of the Kiyat clan with the 
modest title of'ba'atur' or 'baghatur'. ^^ 
The Mongol society was based on obok system, which recognised as relatives other 
clans who have descended from the same ancestor, and therefore inter-marriage 
among such clans was forbidden. A group of relatives of the same clans were 
called 'yasun' (bone). °^ These tribal people were differentiated on the basis of 
'yasuri' and 'omogh'' (clan).*'' Clans were grouped into tribes known as nigen and 
Yuan Chao I'l Sim, Ihc Sccici llnluiy oj Mongol D^muly, Kwei Wci Sun ti Aligaih 
Department ot History, 1957, p 12. 
According to the testimony of Meng Hu the word 'Mongol' was an official term only known to the 
common people. Thus, theie is no other way than to conclude 'Dada' to be identified with the 
"Mong-gu" or 'Mongols' of Chinese woids 
57 Fogen Isenbike, Flexibility and Limilaliom in Steppe Foimotion The Kerait Khanate and 
Chinggis Khan, Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1988, p.l24. 
^'Ibid; p. 127. 
' ' Rene Grousset, The Empire of the Steppes A Histoiy of Central Asia, pp. 198-99. 
'^ E.D Phillips, The Mongols, London: Thames and Hudson, 1969, p.26. 
*'Togen Isenbike, Flexibility and Lim:tations in Steppe Formation The Kerait Khanate and 
Chinggis Khan, p 27 
tribes into an ulus or people or state.^ ^ In the twelth century, the Mongols were 
divided into n any ulus, which according to Vladimirtsov, signifies both tribe and 
small nation/''' The Mongols on the basis of their living standard were 
theoretically divided into the pastoral tribe of the steppe, and the hunting and 
fishing tribes of the forest.^ '' 
Barthold and Vladimirtsov are of the opinion that pastoral tribe was the richer 
group and led by a very influential aristocracy, whose leaders bore the titles of 
Baghatur or Ba 'atur (valiant), Noyan (chie*), and Sechan (wise). This aristocracy 
wielded influence over these classes, namely, the warrior or faithful- free men 
called Nokud, the commoners (Qarachu), and the slaves {Bogul). This category of 
slaves (Bogul) comprised not only of individual slaves but also conquered tribes 
who became slaves of the victorious one.^ ^ According to Juvaini, these tribes 
regarded raiding, violence, immoral activities as deeds that represent manliness.^ * 
Among the nomads 'chieftainship' was an important but an adhoc institution based 
on 'free choice of chief for the convenience of the tribe to solve their disputes and 
to act as leaders in case of wars. We also get reference of another institution of 
"- li.O I'liillips, 7/ic Mongols, p.26. 
" Cited in Rene Grousset, The Empire of the Sleppes: A History of Central Asia, p. 193. 
^ Ibid; p. 194. 
"ibid; p.195. 
'^Ata Muii< Juvaini, Tarikh-i Jahan Gusha, l,p.21. 
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'anda' or sworn brotherhood' prevalent in steppe.^ ^ This particular institution 
played pivotal role in cementing the bonds between two tribes. This is how 
Chinggis Khan, secured the support of anda-Jamuqa, who with the passing of time 
became his archrival.^ * Vladimirtsov and Barthold write that Temuchin (Chinggis) 
got support of the 'steppe aristocracy' and Jamuqa that of the common people or 
'Qarachu'. '^^  We also get reference of Chinggis ki an's father Yesugai, who had 
similar relationship (anda) with Toghril (Kerait chief), who helped Chinggis Khan 
in his difficult times and was respected by the latter as his father. Besides, a band 
of few men might attach themselves as 'nokut' or personal followers to a noted 
chief These nokuts were helpful than a kinsman, especially to a rising chief who 
needed follower with absolute devotion towards him. 
The chiefs in Mongol society were highly respected and their orders were carried 
on especially during wars. In normal circumstances, however, we hardly get 
reference of any interference of chief in the life of people. The promise of 
submission in battle was taken seriously; and any case of defiance led to 
confiscation of their wealth obtained from loot and plunder.^ " Within this tradition 
of independent rule and rulers, the social structure of the tribes had acquired 
" D.O Morgan, The Mongols, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986, pp.59-60; V.V. Bartliold, 
/'()///• S/iuiic'.s on the llisioiy ofCcnirnl Asia, V.T. Minor.sky tr.. 3 vols.. Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1956, I. 
p.32; li.D. I'iiiilips, Tht' Mongols, p.27. 
^^ Temuchin got separated from Jamuqa due to negative interpretation by his chief wife Bortei of 
Jamuqa's phrase. For further details see Togen Isenbike. For some scholars the difference of 
opinion brought their separation. Bortei seems to dislike Jamuqa according to Secret History. 
'''' Boris I Vladimirtsov, T/ic Life of Genghis Kiian, Boston: Houghton Mifllin, 1930, p.33. 
The Secret History of the Mongols, tr. Francis Woodman Cleaves, Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1982, pp.54-55 & 81-82. 
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hierarchal form. In normal times, the power of chief was limited, but that power 
too was seen collectively beonging to the family rather than a personal 
possession/' When a chief died his effective successor might well be from his 
family who had succeeded in wiping out other contenders/^ The leaders of these 
tribes were referred as Khan and the tribes were known as Khanates. Thus, the 
steppe people were quite familiar with the titles such as Khan and giir Khan but the 
institution of Khaqan established by Chinggis Khan was something not known till 
that time. 
Temuchin made his mark as a valiant military commander even though most of his 
early raids and fighting were either to take revenge from Tartars who were 
responsible fo • the death of his father or from the merkits who kidnapped his wife. 
He exhibited his profound military and political skills, and by exploiting various 
tribal institutic>ns he was able to get support from many tribes.^^ 
Chinggis Khan in spite of all these achievements was considered merely a 'chief. 
He became Khaqan, at a later date after a discussion in a Mongol assembly on the 
problems faced by them. Juzyani writes that after a serious discussion, they came 
to the conclusion that the absence of a strong ruler was the cause of their 
" D.O. Morgan, The Mongols, p.40. 
J.F Fletcher, "Tuico-Mongolian Monarchic Traditions in the Ottoman Empire," Harvard 
Ukranian Studies, 3-4(1979-80), pp.236-251. 
" To take revenge of his father's death (for which Tartars were responsible), he joined hands with 
Keraits. The basis of this alliance was 'andaship' (a relation which existed between Toghril- Kerait 
leader and his father Yesugai) as already discussed. In due course, Chinggis virtually exterminated 
the Tatars. However, we get instances of individual Tatars in his service, for e.g. 'Shigi Qutuqu', 
who was adopted by Chinggis Khan's mother as her son when his tribe was destroyed. 
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misfortune/'' This was probably the qurultai of 1206. By this time Chinggis 
Khan had become famous by his wars and conquests. Thus, all concurred in his 
name and lock an oath and dxlared Temuchin as their Khan with the title of 
'Chinggis'." 
The qurultai of 1206, as already stated, assumes great significance. Not only 
Temuchin acquired the title of Chinggis Khan and Khaqan but also allegedly 
promulgated 7a.y<3 or yasaq which came to be cal'ed in English the "Great code of 
Chinggis Khan" or "Great law of Chinggis Khan." Allegedly, it is this law which 
formed the basis of rule and provided legitimacy to rulers in Central Asia and was 
followed so fervently as to match the importance of shariat among the Muslim 
rulers. 
Consider the following observation and understanding of the term siyasa by the 
Egyptian historian ai-Maqrizi (1364-1442) in WxsKitab al-Khitat: 
Thoust should know that the public at our time, nay, 
since the establishment of Mamluk sultanate in Egypt 
and Syria, is of the opinion that the ordinances of the 
law (al-ahkam) are divided into two branches: the 
ordinances of the shariat (hukm al- shariat) and the 
ordinances (hukm) of the siyasa This is the 
original meaning of siyasa in the language. Later it was 
7-4 Minhaj-i Siraj Juzyani, Tabaqai-i Nasiri, Major H.G Raverty tr., New Delhi: Oriental Books 
RepiintCo.. 197C. Vol.2, p.937. 
7'lic Sc'crc'l History ofllii; Mongol Dyiuisly, Kwci Wei Sun Ir., p.88. 
^j^Acc. No 
applied to the code which had been termed tor the 
observance of the rules of decency and propriety, of 
public inlcrcsl and of good order. There are two kinds 
or.v/i'c/.sY/: a just (adila) siycisd which punishes duly the 
criminal oppressor, and which is part of the sacred law 
{shuriat). There are people who know it and there are 
people who do not know it. Numerous books were 
written on the siyasa shariat. The other kind is the 
iniquitous siyasa {zalima), which the sharial forbids. 
But the siyasa which the people of our time speak has 
nothing to do with this. It is nothing but a Mongol 
word, the original form of which is yasa, which the 
people of Egypt distorted by the adding the letter sin at 
its beginning.^ 
What could easily be deduced from the above passage from Kitab al-Khitat is that 
while Maqrizi acknowledges and recognise deviances from shariat as a form of 
siyasa, he also affirms that in the fourteenth/fifteenth century this deviance from 
shariat was an attribution of siyasa. This was probably the Mongol yasa, which 
obviously ran contrary to the Islamic shariat. Thus, the non-shariat part of siyasa, 
which according to Maqrizi was initially "applied to the code which had been 
formed for the observance of the rules of decency and propriety, of public interest 
and of good order," and which assumingly, was later extended to all temporal 
'"' Cited from David Ayalon, "The Great Yasa of Chinggis Khan: A Re-examination (Part A)." 
Stiidia Islamica 33 (1971), p. 105. 
56 
issues, was nothing but tiie Mongolian yasa. It is particularly in this context 
that we have two meaning of siyasa: siyasa al-adila and siyasa al-zalima, the latter 
applied to the non- shariat part, and fantastically over-shadowed with Mongolian 
yasaJ^ 
Putting into context the above passage from Maqrizi regarding the alleged 
corruption of yasa into siyasa, it is also noticed that the information is apparently 
prejudiced on the role of hajibs (chamberlain) particularly and initially within the 
Mamluk administrative and political set-up, and later on to other 'Islamic' 
monarchical set-up. The above passage quoted is from the section entitled "On the 
office of the hajib" from Kitab al-Khitat in which Maqrizi's grievances against the 
intrusion of hajibs into the domain of shariat is quite obvious. Maqrizi moans 
over the growing powers of the hujjabs resulting in the over-shadowing of qadis: 
The hajibs nowadays thus judge everybody from 
amongst the population, be he dignified or humble, and 
irrespective of whether the case is Shar'i or siyasi 
according to their false allegation. If a qadi would try to 
take away a litigant from the court of the hajib he 
would not be able to do so At the beginning the 
judgement of the hajibs were called the judgements of 
the siyasa. This is a Satanic word the origin of which 
most people of our time do not know and which they 
utter negligently, and indifferently, saying: chis matter 
77 See William Popper tr. History of Egypt, 1382-1469 from Arabic Annals of Abdul Mahasin ibn 
Taghribirdi, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954. 
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is not included in tiie domain of the shariat and 
constitutes part of the ^/yaio judgement.''* 
Thereafter, Maqrizi explains the meaning and definitions of siyasa which was 
limited to the domain of shariat. He also informs us that how initially the 
juridical matters were tried and decided by the qadis in the light o^shariat and the 
matters which were not within the domain of shariat were left to the hajibs. In this 
sense, the rules of shariat were observed and the justice and prosperity prevailed. 
Maqrizi, thereafter, informs us that this justice and prosperity prevailed until 1403-
1404 where after the hajibs violated the sacred domains. Maqrizi writes: 
Since the time of afflictions which took place in the 
year 1403-1404 onwards, the hajibs became in 
numerous and they violated the inviolable and passed 
abitrarily iniquitous judgements, which caused the 
extinction of light of the true religion." 
David Ayalon is of the opinion that the corruption of yasa and siyasa is probably 
justified at some points, but he refused to admit that siyasa in the context of 
Islamic polity was restricted only to^a^a, the laws of the Mongols. What appears 
from the analysis and discussion on the evolution of Islamic siyasa in the 
'* Cited from David Ayalon, "The Great Yasa of Chinggis Khan: A Reexamination (Part 
C2),"Studia Islamica, Voi.38, 1973, pp.107-108. 
" Ibid 
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preceding section maices it abundantly clear that David Ayalon is only partly 
right. It has already been discussed that the Islamic polity and administration did 
start to distinguish between the two forms of siyasa: one governed by shariat 
{siyasa al-adila) and the other which remained out of its precincts. The latter dealt 
with those issues which might have contradicted shariat but were essential to 
preserve the authority of the ruler, such as inflicting capital punishments on 
Muslim rebels. With the diminishing of power and authority of the khailfa, these 
two kinds of siyasa were tried by the qadis and hajibs respectively, and it 
constituted siyasa as a whole monolithic block. Up to this point Ayalon appears to 
be right, but his statement that siyasa al-zalima, the non-shariat part of siyasa was 
not always the Mongolian yasa appears to be far fetched. To be on a safer side, 
one could well conclude that it might or might not be the case. With the increase 
in the domain of the judicial as well as administrative matters, the siyasa might 
have incorporated the provisions of yasa. 
It is quite interesting, to note that Maqrizi is not our only source on siyasa-yasa 
issue. It repeatedly occurs in the sources of the thirteenth and fourteenth centurj'. 
Ibn Khaldun, for example, replaces the word yasa into siyasa while copying from 
al-Umari's passage on Chinggis Khan. Thus, what was yasa al-Kabira in al-Umari 
becomes siyasa al-Kabira in the history of Ibn Khaldun. At another place, Ibn 
Khaldun, speaking on particular adherence of the Mongols of the Chaghtaid 
kingdom and of Mongol and China to X\\cyasa calls it the siyasa of Chinggis Khan. 
Yet another Mamluk historian, Ibn Taghribirdi also calls siyasa as nothing but the 
corruption of the Mongolian wovd yasa. 
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However, the reasons given both by Ibn Taghribirdi and Maqrizi for the 
corruption of the;^a^a to siyasa are not only insensitive but also not fully reliable. 
Consider the following reason given by Ibn Taghribirdi: 
Chinggis Khan was the originator of the Tora and 
yasaq. Tora in the Turkish language is teaching, 
doctrine, and yasaq is the two word phrase si and yasa. 
The term si is Persian and means three. The term yasa is 
Turkish-Mongolian and means tartib. Thus, the whole 
word means three tartibs. The reason for this 
appealation was that Chinggis Khan divided his Empire 
into three parts, allotting each part to one of his three 
sons. At the same time he bequeathed on them 
commandments from which the Turks do not deviate up 
to our time, in spite of their great numbers and in spite 
of their adherence to different religions. And thus they 
started saying si-yasa, namely, the three tartibs which 
Chinggis Khan established. The Turks then omitted the 
first of the two parts and said yasa for a long time. Then 
they SQ.\(^ yasaq instead, and this form of the word lasted 
upto nowadays. The term siyasa spread to other realms, 
and reached even Egypt and Syria. The people of these 
two countries, however, found it difficult to pronounce 
that term properly, and they said, instead, siyasa, in 
conformity with the way the Arabs corrupt the words 
from foreign languages.*" 
Ibid. 
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Despite the rationales advanced by our historians that question the reliability of 
their authority on Mongols, besides the oversimplification of the reason of turning 
the Mongolian yasa into siyasa, there could be little doubt in asserting that there 
was at least some connection between the two. Siyasa within the Muslim context 
knew only the shariat part and whatever was over and beyond that was only 
accepted if it was aimed at delivering 'justice', which brings peace and prosperity 
to the kingdoms. The adherence or even slight borrowing of the system developed 
by a non-Muslim, like iht yasa of Chinggis Khan was not only blasphemous but 
also renders the Muslim who adopts it as heretic and tyrant. 
The important point here is the issue of'justice', particulary in regards to the duties 
or aims of the ruler, as has already been discussed in the previous section. It is this 
whole concept of 'justice' within the Islamic concept of siyasa that played such an 
important part in understanding the evolution of the political structure, not only in 
the administrative set-up of the sixteenth century Mughals of South Asia, but also 
in the rest ot the medieval Muslim monarchies. It is around this concept of 
'justice' that two of our issues of prime concern discussed in the previous section 
find their answer, namely, the purpose of siyasa, and the means to attain it. 
However, before we dwell on this issue of'justice' at length In next chapter, a brief 
discussion of the Mongolian ^ 'o^a at this pomt is quite important because this term 
was interchangeably used with siyasa in our sources. 
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1.2 The Legend and Veracity of Yosa-i Chinssisi 
The Mongolian polity as it was adopted in Central Asia was based on 'Great^a^a' 
believed to be promulgated by Chinggis Khan. However, during the course of 
time many Islamic historians confused that code with siyasa. Whether Chinggis 
Khan himself promulgated these laws, what in essence were the basic 
characteristic features of these laws and whether these laws were written in a form 
of document has been a matter of much scholarly debate, which is worth re-
capping here. 
The contents of yasa-i Chinggisi and its implications on the polity have been 
discussed by a number of modern historians and most of them are of the view that 
Chinggis Khan himself framed them. However, we find no authentic copies of this 
so-called >'Oia in any of the contemporary sources to prove its originality. In early 
Chinese work;, like the 'Secret History' and some Persian sources and Travellers' 
accounts we get a reference of a 'Blue Book' in which the decrees issued were 
recorded. Similarly, we get reference of yasa in a number of contemporary 
sources, which acted as a binding force on Mongol people. This would mean that 
the existence of yasa in the form In which modern historians considered it is highly 
doubtful. A fresh examination of i\\Q yasa and itc content seems important before 
examining the implications of the conclusion drawn on the contents of the _yo.sa. 
'^ Rashiduddin Fazlullah refers to Chinggis Khan's code as yasak. However, a close study of the 
details clearly indicates that the reference is about re-establishing of ancient laws with new ones. 
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The earliest source on yasa is Juvaini, the mid-thirteenth century writer who-
compiled his work about thirty years after Chinggis Khan's death. At the 
beginning of his very large work, Juvaini has a section entitled, "The Regulations 
(Qawaid)" which Chinggis Khan set forth after his rise to the power, and \hQyasas 
(ordinances) which he instituted. In this somewhat rambling chapter, Juvaini tells 
his readers that Chinggis Khan established a rule for every occasion and a 
regulation for every circumstance while for every crime he fixed a penalty. 
Further Juvaini says, Chinggis Khan ordered that these >'05fls and ordinances were 
to be written down on scrolls and these scrolls were to be called the Great yasa 
book (yasanaiiia-i biizurg). Juvaini never saw, nor does he say he saw, the scroll 
or scrolls, nor is there any record of anyone else ever having seen them. David 
Ayalon has taken great pain and has gone into details to prove this.*^ Despite this 
much of our present day information on yasa is based on the evidences provided 
by Juvaini. Further, Juvaini describe Mongol customs and things which Chinggis 
Khan prescribed but does not actually say that these were the part of yasanama-i 
buzurg. He prefaces his remarks about them with the reassurance that many of 
these ordinances are in accordance with the shariat, the Muslim law, and among 
them he includes the hunt, the way in which the personal guard of the Khan were 
organised, how the army was to be inspected, penalties for unauthorised leave, and 
a system of post and various matters of taxation. He does not say when this 
Yasanama-i buzurg was promulgated or under what circumstances. 
" See Ayalon, "The Great Yasa of Chinggis Khan: A Re-examination (Part A)." 
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With the passage of time other writers borrowed heavily from Juvaini regarding 
yasa, often without aclcnowledgment and embellished and augmented his not very 
telling remarks. Not only did the later writers choose to systematise his data into 
what they imagined the Great yasa to be, they also gave a time and place when it 
was promulgated. This tradition of augmenting and systematising the very scanty 
and unsystematic evidence of Juvaini found its way into European scholarship in 
1710 with the publication of Petis De La Croix's, "History of Genghis Khan", first 
in French and then twelve years later in English. The author describes the great 
assembly or qiiriillai of 1206 at which the Mongol Temuchin was given or adopted 
the title of Chinggis Khan meaning "Oceanic Ruler." Petis De La Croix then goes 
on to list Iwcnly-two provisions ol the I'n.sv;.'" 
The formulation by Petis De La Croix that Chinggis Khan deliberately 
promulgated a constitutional code in 1206 pretty much held sway in the scholarly 
community until the 1970's. De Rachewiltz used Ch'en's work to suggest a very 
plausible modification of David Morgan's thesis that there was no great code 
promulgated by Chinggis Khan. The Chinese sources do point clearly to a Great 
yasa which was promulgated according to them in 1229 at the accession of Ogedai 
and it is De Rachewiltz reasonable contention that Ogedai not only publicly 
declared that he would uphold his father's decrees or yasas but also formally 
proclaim in essence a formal promulgation of them. 
83 As quoted in D.O. Morgan, The Great Yasa ofChinngis Khan.. 
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In the 1970's this formulation of great code with several revisions turned out to 
be a house of cards that came tumbling down when David Ayalon, a specialist on 
the history of Egypt in the Mamluk period began a critical examination of the 
sources on the yasa. In a series of articles, he showed that all the Islamic sources, 
Persian and Arabic alike had come from the section from Juvaini cited above with 
the addition of their own imaginative creations. In an article published in 1986, 
David Morgan took Ayalon's work a step further to raise the question about the 
very existence of a great yasa of Chinggis Khan.*'* Juvaini certainly refers to 
Yasanama-i bitzurg but gives no evidence of having seen them. The Mongol 
Secret History written about 1230 is another source for yasa but it makes no 
mention of such a code. It is indeed surprising, as both Ayalon and Morgan points 
out that a work so important to Chinggis Khan and his successors should have left 
out any reference to such a code. It does, however, make several uses of the word 
yasa in the following contexts, as a rulers directive, as a legally binding precedent 
and as norm; tive law the infringement of which entails usually severe capital 
punishment. 
David Morgan also suggests that there was undoubtedly a body of unwritten 
Mongol customary law.*^  Juvaini says that Mongol youths learned reading and 
writing from the Uighurs, in order to draw up the code of the yasa or to codify 
Mongol laws, whose observance was not only obligatory on the inhabitants of the 
"•* See D.O. Morgan, The Great Yasa of Chinggis Khan. 
" D.O Morgan, The Mongols, pp.98-99. 
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empire but also on Khaqans themselves.*^ This leaves us with no doubt that 
yasa in some form (oral); were codified by Chinggis Khan by whose efforts 
Mongol learnt reading and writing from the Uighurs. 
The exact date of the codification of yasa was not known but it is commonly 
assumed that Chinggis probably codified them at the qurultai of 1206.*^  Petis de-
la Croix in his 'Historic Du Genghizcan' published in 1710, gives the description 
of qurultai in which Chinggis Khan declared that he thought "to add some laws to 
the already existing ones" which he desired and commanded his people to 
observe.** On the basis of the evidences cited above, we can safely assume that 
yasa-i Chinggiii comprised of existing laws as well as laws framed by Chinggis 
Khan himself. The only thing that can be attributed to Chinggis Khan would be its 
codification in a proper and ordered form and kept in a treasury for consultation on 
all-important matters. 
As regards to the contents of the>'asa, a study of Juvaini and other sources reveals 
that it discusses the matters related to state-^raft, administration, army 
organisation, warfare, social life and etiquettes in which old Turko-Mongol 
'* AtaMulk Juvaini, Tarikh-i Jahan Gusha,\, p. 25. 
" D. O. Morgan, "The Great Yasa of Chinggis Khan and Mongol Law in the Il-Khanate," Bulletin 
of School of Oriental and African studies, 49(1986), pp. 163-76. 
See Rene Grousset, The Empire of the Steppes: A History of Central Asia; Patricia Crone writes 
that when a new steppe empire is inaugurated, the conqueror will usually mark the foundation of his 
polity by the promulgation of laws (Slave on Horses, p.20). 
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customs were preserved.^ ^ Chinggis Khan entrusted the supervision of certain 
important matters to 'Shigi Qutugu' (a Tatar and adopted brother of Chinggis) and 
also gave him power of judgement over all his people and made him chief judge.'° 
He also asked him to note all the decisions related to the distribution of booty and 
wealth; and also to record the judicial matter in a 'koko debter' (blue register). It 
was further ordered that anyone who changes it should be guilty. The most 
important thing to be noticed is that the word yasa was not used, though it appears 
in the book in the form of 'order' or 'decree'. We also find that Shigi Qutugu was 
entrusted with the judicial matters and the distribution of inhabitants among the 
Mongol royal house.^' This apparently had nothing to do with general legal code; 
in fact they were the "orders" and "commands" to solve various disputes. 
Prof Cleaves gives a new direction to the whole controversy of the yasa by 
attributing it to Ogedei rather than to Chinggis Khan on the basis of information 
collected from Chinese sources.^ ^ Juvaini further complicates the issue by saying 
that Chaghtai was chosen by his father to administer and enforce yasa-wo siyasat 
(rules and regulations laid down for political set up) not the gr^aX yasa of Chinggis 
Khan.''' This statement of Juvaini Indicates ihdXyasa continued to evolve and were 
not only regulations which were issued by Chinggis Khan. Juzyani is of the view 
^' Ata Mulk Juvaini, Tarikh-i Jahan Gusha, 1, pp.23-34; The Secret History of the Mongol Dynasty, 
Kei Wei Sun tr., pp.22-23. 
^ D.O Morgan, The Mongols, p.97. 
" Ata Mulic Juvaini, Tarikh-i Jahan Gusha,], pp.23-34 
'^ F.W Cleaves, "The Fifteen Palace Poems," HistoricalJournal of Asiatic Society. 20, 1957. 
'^  Ata Mulk Juvaini, Tarikh-i Jahan Gusha,\, p.40. Juvaini further complicates the issue by saying 
that Chaghtai was chosen by his father to administer and enforce_yaia wa-siyasat. 
67 
that these ahkams^'^ were actually hukms and farmans which were referred as 
yasa by the Mongols.'^ Thus, it becomes quite clear that Xh^styasas were actually 
decrees issued on specific issues from time to time. For instance-decrees issued 
after assuming the position of Khaqan. It has already been discussed that yasas 
existed much before the advent of Chinggis Khan. The important question here is 
to examine whether tiiesc ycisci or yasas were followed by Chinggis and his 
successors and to what extent? 
Ogedei Khan, after his accession, first of all made 3iyasa that such ordinance and 
commands as had previously been issued by Chinggis Khan should be complied.^ ^ 
Further, Juvaini refers to the second Qundtai in which Ogedei Khan before setting 
up for the conquest of Khitai called a council to confirm the old and nQV^^yasas and 
Ordinances.^' Guyuk Khan also after his accession, made yasa that just as 
previous Khan at the time of his accession, had upheld the>'asas of his father, i.e., 
Chinggis Khan without any change; in the same manner his own father's 
(Ogedei's)^^^^^ should be kept immune from the contingencies of redundancy and 
deficiency.^ * Moreover, when Ogedei was elected Khan in 1229 one of the first 
problems confronting him was the dispute over a plundering expedition despatched 
lie rcfciTcd lo Chinggis Kliair.s pioliibilion of telling lies, eommitting adultery, washing hands in 
running water and so forth. 
*' Juzyani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, 2, p. 1108. 
'^ Ata Mulk Juvaini, Tarikh-iJahan Gusha, 1, p. 189. 
" ib id , 1, p. 196. 
'* Ibid., p.256. 
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by Tolui during the interregnum, without authorisation by all the princes.'' 
Ogedei in accordance with his nature settled it in customary fashion, promulgated 
yasa by which past offences were pardoned and forgotten.'°° These instances 
make it abundantly clear thai yasas were 'edicts' or 'decrees' issued by 'Mongol' 
rulers keeping in view the old 'Turko-Mongol tradition'. It was the existing 
custom of steppe society to promulgate yasas, which was followed by Chinggis 
Khan and his successors. It can be safely assumed that the yasa was a gradually 
evolving body of custom or traditions that started developing long before the rise 
of Chinggis Khan and even continued long after him. 
The above references make it clear that new yasas continued to be promulgated by 
later Great Khan's but the yasas made by Chinggis Khan were also retained. 
Moreover, interesting thing to note is that no where we get reference of keeper of 
yasa; Shiqi Qutugu was yarghuchi and it may be possible that his decisions were 
records kept in records to solve cases of further generations.'°' Thus, it is quite 
clear from the above discussion that Mongols followed some kind of regulations 
for carrying out administration and the observance of social etiquettes before 
Chinggis Khan came to power in oral form which was later on codified by him, 
and it seems that the codified version v^dsyasa. 
'^ Peter Jackson, "The Dissolution of the Mongol Empire," Central Asiatic Journal. 22. 1978, p. 
197. 
'°° Rashid ai-DIn, The Successor of Genghis Khan, pp.32-33. 
"" D. 0. Morgan, The Mongols, p. 99. 
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In the preceding pages references have been cited in which several Chinggisid 
princes remarked that they strictly followed the yasa of Chinggis Khan. It seems 
that this position was only theoretical since in actual practice the same Chinggisid 
princes on ceitain occasion deviated from the established traditions. For example, 
Chinggis Khan defied the yasa or old Mongol tradition by nominating Ogedei 
Khan (his third son) as his successor. Although, Juvalni clearly mentions that 
according to yasa only deceased Khan's youngest son by his chief wife could 
succeed.'°^ Secondly, yasas continued to be promulgated by a number of 
Chinggisid rulers, which again suggests that Chic^gis Khan's yasas were not the 
only regulations followed by these rulers. Thirdly, in one of Chinggis Khan's>'a5a 
it was explicitly mentioned that only rulers will be addressed by the title of Khan 
or qaan and all other members of the royal family, however, important they may 
be, will be addressed by their proper names only.'"'' Thus, the title of Khaqan or 
qaan was reserved for those who become rulers but his brothers and relatives were 
to be called simply by their proper names. But we came across several instances 
where deviations from this law are noticed. For instance Batu, the eldest son of 
Jochi, was referred as Khan despite the fact that he was not the ruler.'"^ Similiarly, 
Ogedei nominated his grandson, Shiremun, as his successor'"^ who was described 
as T'ai-Tseu (Prince Imperial) - a title reserved for the heir apparent but his claims 
'"^  Ata Mulk Juvaini, Tarlkh-i Jahan Giisha, 2, p.549. 
' " Ibid, 1, pp. 26-27; Spuler Bertold, The History of the Mongols, Tr. by Helga and Stuart 
Drummond, Beikely: California University Press, 1972, p. 40. 
""' Mansura Hai Jer, "The Sovereign in the Timurid State," Turcica, vol.8, no.2, 1976, p.77. 
'"' Rashid al-Din, The Successor of Genghis Khan, pp.120, 180 and 201. 
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got no consideration and Guyuk Khan ascended the throne with the help of his 
mother Toregene Khatun. This was yet another instance of the open violation of 
Chinggis Khan's ^ma. Qublai Khan made war on his brother Esan Buqa (an heir 
for the throne) after the death of the Great Khan Mangu Khan in 1259. Moreover, 
he became Khaqan without the consent of the royal family. This act was also 
contrary to traditions established by Chinggis Khan, which required the whole 
family to participate in the election of its head. 
The important element that needs to be highlighted and focussed upon here is the 
one that had already been introduced by Juvaini in 1260, and is central to the 
tension over the evolution ofsiyasa concept as well as to the legacy of yasa. This 
is what we called the "old Sharia of the Arabs", the Islamic way or Islamic law, 
obedience to and regard for which is the touclistone in literary sources of the 
justice and goodness of a ruler. In the 1260's, when Juvaini said that these 
ordinances of Chinggis Khan were in harmony with the shariat he wanted his 
readers to know that the regulations were the regulations of a good ruler. Here, 
however, Qashani wants his readers to understand that i\\Qyasa of Chinggis Khan 
is antithetical to the shariat, its adherents are Islam's enemies, and its enemies are 
Islam's heroes. This particular dichotomy, that is between ^a^a and shariat, and 
its relation to the two forms of siyasa— that is al-adil and al-zalim converges only 
on one form, which is 'justice'. This issue of 'justice' in itself defines the 
'legitimacy' of a ruler and the basic purpose of his rule, and formed a pivotal part 
in the fourteenth and fifteenth century concept of siyasa or medieval, polity as will 
be discussed in the next chapter. 
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1.3 The Succession Crisis; Legitimacy and Siyasa after 
Chinggis Khan 
Even if Chinggis Kiian was able to promulgate a quasi legislative code (yasa) 
binding on all the Central Asian people of his times, and if some secondary works 
are to be considered, for all times, it remains an interesting proposition to see and 
examine the situation of his legacy in legitimizing the succession of his male 
family members, especially his sons, over a massive conquered area as well as on 
' overwhelmingly nomadic people after his death in 1227. The Mongol tribal laws 
acknowledged the suzerainty of the tribe who elected its leader, while conquered 
area remained the property of the whole family. Some scholars are of the view that 
Chinggis Khan divided his conquered areas among his four sons, while others 
conclude that he nominated Ogedei, his third son against the tribal laws which 
recognised succession by the youngest son from the chief wife.'*^ These principles 
and laws were already in conflict with the law of primogeniture whereby Chinggis 
eldest son Jochi should have inherited his father's original seat (ordo). 
There existed enough contradictions in the issues of succession and inheritance. It 
is evident from the fact that all the four sons of Chinggis Khan, namely, Jochi, 
Chaghtai, Ogedei and Tolui had estranged relationship even before the death of 
Chinggis Khan. The conquest of Khwarizm in 1221 had been impeded by a 
quarrel between his two elder sons, Jochi and Chaghtai, and after the fall of its 
'"^  See Ata Mulk Juvaini, Tarikh-i Jahan Gusha, 2, p.549. 
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capital Urgench in that year, they, together with Ogedei, are alleged to have tried 
to withhold from their father his share of the plunde-.'°^ On the basis of such 
information some scholars have concluded that the Central Asian polity as 
bequeathed by Chinggis Khan rendered the position of sovereign extremely 
weak.'°^ 
While reserving the judgement on such conclusion, one might simply refer to the 
antiquated Persian Sassanian kingship practices, noted as one of the strongest, and 
which inevitably were incorporated from time to time by different rulers across 
time and space. Despite known for strong and well rooted position of sovereign as 
well as, succession, Sassanian Empire was also not free from the succession wars. 
After the death of Shapur I and the brief reign of his eldest son Hormizd-Ardashir, 
two other sons of Shapur, Bahram and Narseh contended for the throne. It is quite 
significant to note that the throne passed to Bahram, that is, to the senior member 
of the clan and not the son of Hormizd-Ardashir. Later on as a result of bitter 
conflict among the group of nobles at the court and in particular through the efforts 
of high priest, Kartir, who strove to put his own prot6g6 on the throne in disregard 
of the family law the Sassanian throne was given to Bahram's son, Bahram-II, by 
passing the claim of the senior member of the family, Narseh. This led to a revolt 
"' The estrangement in relationship and the conflict is mentioned alone by Juvaini. See Ibid., 2, 
p.549. 
This has been a conclusion by majority of the historians of Mughal South Asia. See Mansura 
Haider, "The Mongol Traditions and Their Survival in Central Asia (XIV - XV Centuries)," Central 
Asiatic Journal, 28, 1984; Khan, "The Turko-Mongol Theory of Kingship"; Tripathi, "The Turko-
Mongol Theory of Kingship." 
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raised by Narseh in 293, after Bahrain's death, under the banner of legitism for 
the restoration of the throne to its lawful occupant.'^' 
The opposite situation occurred in the second period of crisis, at the end of the 70's 
of the fourth century after the death of Shapur-Il. The eldest of the clan, Ardshir-
ll,_came to the throne, but Shapur-II's son, Shapur-III, who took Ardshir-II's place 
hastened to proclaim, in inscriptions, the 'legitimacy' of his rule and the whole 
event. At a later date, of great significance was the struggle for the throne that 
took place in the stormy period of the revolt led by Bistam, who was connected 
with the ruling clan, but in the maternal line. 
These three examples clearly state that despite having a sound and strong theory 
and practice of centralisation and 'sovereignty, the Sassanian Empire witnessed 
succession revolts, mainly under the banner of 'legitimacy' to rule. The same 
kinds of incidents are repeated again, at a much later period from Ottoman Empire, 
where the ruler was regarded as Caliph, at least from the time of Sulaiman I."° 
What is noteworthy, from these instances is the fact that all the banner of revolt in 
the succession during Sassanian period, or as matter of general fact, were raised in 
the name of 'legitimacy'. Thus, if the same crisis appeared after the death of a 
strong ruler like Chinggis Khan, one needs to probe further in to the finer nuances 
'° ' The court party was trying to put Bahram-Il's son, Bahram-IU on the throne. For details see 
V.G. Lukonin, "Political, Social and Administrative Institutions: Taxes and Trade," in The 
Cambridge History of Iran .Cambridge, 1968. 
For a good understanding of the succession crisis and politics in the Ottoman Empire, see Jane 
Hathaway, The Politics of Households in Ottoman Egypt: The Rise of the Qazdaglis, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997; Peirce, Imperial Harem. 
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of the nature of Mongol polity rather then simplifying the conclusions on the 
basic tribal laws. 
A closer study of the Mongol polity during its early period reveals two startling 
facts. First during the entire span of Chinggis Khan, most of his army and 
population nimained nomadio, thus requiring large grazing fields for the 
sustenance of that army. Secondly, acquisition of large conquered areas 
necessitated a sedentary mode of policies, which might not work in conformity to 
the Mongol tribal laws of inheritance. Also, the military combats in the west 
brought Mongols closer to the Islamic system of rule and its theoretical 
perspectives on the legitimacy of its ruler/leadtr Thus, in order to succeed to 
Chinggis Khan's Empire, his four sons should fulfil one or all of the criteria in 
order to pose themselves as his legitimate successor. Now let us examine the 
position of the four sons of Chinggis Khan in regard to legitimate succession at the 
death of the latter. Firstly, as per the tribal laws by virtue of being the youngest 
son, Tolui could pose as a legitimate successor. Secondly, by virtue of being the 
eldest, Jochi was also a legitimate successor. Chinggis Khan wiUed his throne to 
Ogedei, the third in line who could also claim legitimacy to rule on the basis of the 
"will" of the preceding ruler. Lastly, Chaghtai could also claim the throne on the 
basis of his strict adherence to the yasa of Chinggis Khan, which also provided 
him 'legitimacy' to rule. 
Thus, as is evident from above on the death of Chinggis Khan all of his four sons 
were equally well placed to succeed. This was a dangerous predicament, since it 
ensured high politics, parties and factions within the ruling elites. The history 
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from the Islamic lands proved that during such times 'legitimacies' are and 
could be manufactured, thus ensuring rise in the status of priestly and military 
leaders. The priestly class, in particular were extremely important agent in 
manufacturing legitimacy, especially if it had to be elevated to a divine status. 
Chinggis Khan had himself resorted to this manufacturing despite his military and 
political genius."' This is exactly what happened after the death of Chinggis Khan. 
Since all of his sons perceived themselves as legitimate successors to Chinggis 
Khan, the politics and struggle was just inevitable. 
The claims of Jochi (before the death of Chinggis Khan) as a legitimate successor 
were being challenged by his own brothers. It is most likely that what underlay 
Jochi's disturbed relations with his younger brothers was his own questionable 
'legitimacy'. He had been born soon after his mother's release from the captivity 
of Chinggis Khan's enemies, the nierkits, and therefore, his parentage was always 
questioned. Rashid al-din writes that Jochi was taunted with the circumstances of 
his birth by his younger brothers. It is because of this nefarion propaganda that 
despite being aldest and well-qualified, neither Jochi (who predeceased his father), 
nor his son Batu were able to claim the throne. 
' " The high priest of Chinggis Khan, Gokchu elevated his position to a divine status. Here also, he 
seems to have spread the idea (thereafter held by his descendants) that Chinggis conquests fulfilled 
a pre-ordained destiny. Rene Grousset, apart from political calculations, a certain religious factor 
was present to favour this election, which by him is borne out by the declaration of shaman 
Gokchu, who actively supported Chinggis Khan. Ghurchi said, "Heaven and earth after consultation 
have appointed Temuchin to be the Lord of dominion. 1 am carrying this power to him." See Rene 
Grousset, The Empire of the Steppes: A History of Central Asia. 
76 
The will of Chinggis Khan, however, was finally upheld when after a period of 
two years of his death, Ogedie in the qurultai of 1229 was finally elected as Khan. 
But after Ogedie's death in 1241, there was a period of regency of another five 
years. These two intervals of regency in between saw a steep rise in the powers of 
the nobility. It also witnessed rise in the power of the priestly class, which by this 
time also included Islamic clergy. A precedent was thus set in motion where not 
only every surviving member of the deceased 'sovereign' could hope to attain 
sovereignty, but even a member of the ruling elites could also by manufacturing 
one could attain that position. The principle of 'legitimacy' to rule acquired new 
meanings after the death of Chinggis Khan in the siyasa. It became a necessary 
obligation for a claimant to prove his 'legitimacy'. This was easier for a surviving 
male off-springs for they claimed their 'legitimacy' on the basis of'royal blood', 
but it was ncl difllcult cither for any military genius, like Timur who could get the 
'legitimacy' manufactured, as will be discussed in detail in the subsequent section. 
CHAPTER-TWO 
f vdc. Nf 
Xegitimacy^ and Legacy Paradigms; The EvolVfiigj i^^ sfl 
Structure 
It has been discussed in Introduction as well as in the previous chapter as to how 
and why the issue of 'legitimacy' of the ruler or a ruling house gradually 
constituted an important issue in medieval politics or siyasa, and what role it 
played in defining and managing politics. Early shariat legitimacy' to rule, being 
grounded in the office of caliph was challenged quite early by the dynastic 
monarchies and sultanates. Later, it received its death blow with the onset of 
military and political career of Chinggis Khan but not before it set the issue of 
personal/dynastic legacy as 'legitimacy' to rule and govern. This was a paradigm 
shift in the notions of siyasa. An attempt will be made in this chapter to explore 
this particular issue of 'legitimacy' vis-a-viz legacy, its conflict as well as 
harmonisation in defining the structure of medieval siyasa after the death of 
Chinggis Khan and also during the time of Timur. 
2.1 'Legitimacy' and Siyasa under Timur 
How strongly the issue of'legitimacy' figured in siyasa after the death of Chinggis 
Khan has been documented in previous sections. However, this 'legitimacy' could 
also be easily manufactured not only by the surviving members of the ruler and 
prominent nobles, but also by the clergy. Thus, during fourteenth century when 
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the Chinggisid Empire was divided into a number of confederacies (ulus), it 
became quite easy for Timur, a valiant military leader to assume the status of 
'sovereign', if not through titles then definitely through practical working. 
Timur or Tamerlane who rose to power, about a century after Chinggis Khan on 
the ruins of the Mongol world was a native of Tranoxiana, the heart land of 
Chaghtai ulus (confederation of Chinggis' second son). Born in 1336 in the Barlas 
tribe, Timur was a descendant of a commander in Chinggis Khan's army. The old 
Chaghtai Khanate by this time was split into two - Transoxiana and Moghulistan, 
under different branches of the royal family."^ 
The Mongol empire fell into pieces much before Timur's rise. However, the 
turbulent chiefs continued to owe their allegiance to the Chinggisid race allegedly 
according to the law ofyo^a."^ Almost every amir maintained a tame Chinggisid 
Khan in his province to prevent rebellion, being essential to legitimize once rule 
and to sanctify kingdom by Chinggisid law. Such strong was the legacy of 
Chinggis Khan. 
Hence, if Timur had to legitimize his rule he had to devise ways to link himself to 
Chinggissid line. Besides, to strengthen his position, he had also to satisfy the 
ulemas and other different powerful groups. 
"^ Grousset, The Empire of the Steppes: A History of Central Asia, p.342. 
"•' M. Prawdin, The Mongol Empire: Its Rise and Legacy, Eden and Cedar Paul tr, London: George 
&UnwinLtd., 1940, p. 412. 
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After assuming power, therefore, Timur raised his own candidate to the dignity 
of Khan; firstly Suyurghatmish (1370-88) and then his son Mahmud (1388-
1403)."'* Being conscious of his weak position, Timur used to take Khan along 
with him to avoid any risk of political upheaval. Besides, he established 
matrimonial relations with the Chinggisid family too. Timur's chief wife Saray 
Mulk Khanam was the daughter of Khan (Chaghtai), of Mawarannahr. He 
afterwards got married to Tavakkul Khanam, a royal maiden by Khizr Khwaja 
Khan (a Chinggisid)."^ He even married the mother of Suyurghatmish (Khan)— 
his puppet Khan^^ He also married the daughter of Qamaruddin (the Mongol 
King) to safeguard his interests, as he was his neighbour. According to Ibn Arab 
Shah, both of them use to follow the same religion (i.e. the laws of Chinggis 
Khan)."^ He adopted the title gurgen (son-in-law) to legitimize his position as a 
ruler and to provide legitimacy to his dynasty. He also married his sons in 
Chinggisid fam ly and the title gargen repeatedly appears in his coins."* Still he 
was unsure of his position because he did not belong to royal family. Therefore, he 
too showed his close connection with the Chinggisid family by claiming that his 
ancestor 'Qarachar' was Chaghtai's 'chief advisor', the latter being the most 
"'' Barthold, Four Studies on the History of Central Asia, 2, p.25; M. Prawdin, The Mongol 
Empire: Its Rise and Legacy, p.438. 
' " Mirza Haider Dughlat, Tarikh-i Rashidi, E.D Ross tr, Patna: Academicia, 1973, p.52; Barthold, 
Four Studies on the History of Central Asia, 2, p.25 &31. 
"* See Ibn Khaldun, Ibn Khaldun and Tamerlane, Walter J. Fischel tr, Berkeley: California 
University Press,1952. Also see Syed Jamaluddin, "Political Significance of the Matrimonial 
Alliances of Amir Timur," Proceedings of Indian History Congress, 1978, pp.915-923. 
Ahmad Ibn Arab Shah, Tamerlane or Timur The Great Amir, J.H Saunders tr., London: Luzac & 
Co., 1936, p. 18. 
' " Lane Poole, The Coinage of Bukhara (Transoxiana in the British Museum), London: 1882, 
pp.28-29. 
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favoured son of Chinggis Khan and preserver of yasa; 'Qarachar' apparently 
was given the charge of matters related to state-craft, which automatically made 
him (Timur) responsible for yasa. Adoptions of modest titles like amir, kalan, 
buzurg etc. were also a step in this direction for which Timur not only gave 
justification to his people, but also pushed the argument beyond his jurisdiction."' 
Ibn Arab Shan writes: 
He entitled himself with Timur, the Great Amir, 
although under his sway were ruler and subject alike; 
and he Khan, was in bondage like a centipede in mud, 
and he was like the Khalifs of the time in regard of the 
sultans.'2° 
Throughout his career, Timur used and emphasized the 'legitimacy' of the 
Chaghtaid house and his followers too continued this tradition to identify 
themselves as upholder of Chinggisid order. But this was not sufficient for one to 
continue in power. Therefore, he tried to attract the loyalty of ulus and to act as a 
'sovereign' and made government entirely dependent on him, which afterwards 
became one of the causes for the decline of the Timurid Empire soon after his 
death. He even declared himself as continuator and heir of Chinggis Khan and 
'''' Khaldun, Ibn Khaldiin and Tamerlane, pp.444-445. 
120 Arab Shah, Tamerlane or Timur: The Great Amir, p. 13. 
Chaghtai but also at the same time kept puppet Chinggisid to legitimize his rule. 
In 1388, he clearly adopted the title of .yw/Zow.'^ ' 
Timur was able to create charismatic inspiration not only on the Turko-Mongol 
world but also in Islamic sphere. As Barthold observes, "The Empire created by 
Timur was a unique combination of the Turko-Mongolian political and military 
system with the elements of Muslim, mainly Persian culture."'^^ R.P Tripathi is 
also of the view that Timur's theory of kingship was the blending of Turko-
Mongolian traditions.'^'' It is said that such ai| assumption holds various lacunae 
as it is yet to be fully established that to what extent these traditions were on the 
Timurid structure.'" '^' By thirteenth century, Mongols including Chaghtaid^ had 
embraced Islam.'^ ^ Later, by the turn of the century, the Chaghtaids began to 
regard themselves as Turks while still claiming the title and lineage of Chaghtai 
descendants of Chinggis.'^ ^ Timur was proud to call himself a Twr^than Mongol 
even for his ancestors.'^^ Prawdin remarks, "Tamerlane's dream was to be a new, 
Moslem JengF iz Khan."'^ * 
'^'Grousset, The Empire of the Steppes: A History of Central A'ia., p.416. 
'^ ^ Barthold, Four Studies on the History of Central Asia, 2, p.l. 
' " R.P Tripathi, Some Aspects of Muslim Administration, Allahabad: Central Book Depot,1978, 
p.8. 
'^ '' Khan, "The Turko-Mongol Theory of Kingship," pp.3-4. 
' " Dughlat, Tarikh-i Rashidi, p.22. 
'^ * Husain Yusuf Two studies in Early Mughal History, Shimla: Shimla Institute of Advanced 
Study, 1976,pp.5-6. 
' " Ibid., p.6. 
'^ *Prawdin, The Mongol Empire: Its Rise and Legacy, p.438. 
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This was not the only method deployed by him to become a new Chinggis Khan. 
Timur also tried to show heavenly support and his lineage with men of renowned 
stature. In an interview with Ibn Khaldun, Timur told that his mother was a 
descendant of Manuchehr (a Persian hero).'^' Ibn Arab Shah suggested that she 
was a descendant of Chinggis Khan.'''° According to Malfuzat-i Timuri Timur 
emphasized heavenly favour. However, some scholars raised doubt over the 
authenticity of MalfuzalP^ But this fact of divine or heavenly support can be seen 
in the accounts of Ibn Arab Shah. Timur, according to him, even dated the 
beginning of divine support from one of the lowest period of his early career in 
which he received wound in the raid in Sistan.'^ ^ It is very clearly mentioned in 
Ibn Arab Shah that when Timur was born, his hands were full of fresh blood.'" 
Ibn Arab Shah's remarks are noteworthy as it shows his similarity with Chinggis 
Khan, who allegedly was born with blood in his fists too. Like Chinggis Khan, 
Timur also claimed some supernatural powers for himself Timur once remarked to 
his companions: 
My grand mother, who was skilled in augury and 
divination, saw in sleep a vision, which she expounded 
'^' Khaldun, Ibn Khaldun and Tamerlane, p.2. 
"" Arab Shah, Tamerlane or Timur: The Great Amir, p.37. 
'•^ ' It is said thai the document is written during the time of Shah Jahan in the sixteenth century. If it 
is so, then also one thing is clear that the political set up of central Asia during seventeenth century 
is like that and the traditions of the fourteenth century continued until its compilation and thereafter. 
'^ ^ Arab Shah, Tamerlane or Timur: The Great Amir, p.5. 
'"lbid,p.l. 
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as foreshadowing to her one among her sons and 
grandsons, who would conquer territories and bring 
men into subjection and be the Lord of the age. And I 
am that man and now fit time has came is at hand and 
came near. Pledge yourselves therefore to my back, 
arm, flanks and hands and never desert me. '^ '' 
By this prophecy, Timur tried to show himself as divine being and even took the 
oath in the same pattern as taken by Chinggis. His claims of divine favour carry 
out an echo of Chinggisid divine claims, that is, Timur claimed to have ascended to 
heaven on a ladder, which appeared from the sky.'^ ^ In Tarikh-i Rashidi also, 
Timur's dreams were seen as a gift of prophecy after which his fortunes 
multiplied.'^ ^ 
Various instances can be cited in reference to his Islamic inclinations. Barthold is 
of the opinion that shariat was used by Timur to gain his political goal.'^' He 
styled his puppet Khan as an Islamic monarch {Padshah-i Islam). He was very 
generous towards the descendants of Prophet (the Sayyids) and iilemas. Barthold 
observes, "Apart from Timur's own descendants, the Sayyids were perhaps the 
only people in Timur's kingdom whose life was regarded as inviolate."'^ ^ To 
consolidate his power he developed friendship with the religious groups and 
''""Arab Shah, Tamerlane or Timur: The Great Amir, pp.4-5, 14. 
' " Ibid., pp.4-5. 
'"" Dughlat. Tankh-i Rashidi, p.23. 
' " Bai-lhold, hour Sltuties on ihe History ofCenlrcilAsia, 2, p.22. 
'^ « Ibid. 
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personages.'''^ Whatever be his aim one thing is clear that he used shariat to 
solve cases. The contemporary sources suggest considerable influence of Islam on 
Timur. He wrote a letter to the Sultan of Herat, which began with a saying of 
Prophet.'''° Another example, which could be cited here, is that Timur and Amir 
Husayn had taken an oath to keep their friendship eternal in the name of the 
blessed spirit of Shaikh Shamsuddin Kular.''" Moreover, when their relations 
were strained Amir Husayn sent Khizr Khazandar to Timur along with the same 
copy of Quran on which they had previously taken oath of friendship.''*^ On 
another occasion he sought the help of'Ulema and Mashaikhs'^'^^ through which 
peace was ensured between them. It is said that he conferred great authority on 
Sayyid Barka by appointing him Governor, and even gave hereditary privileges to 
him and his successors.''*'' Before his final encounter with Amir Husayn, Timur 
asked for the blessings of Sayyid Baraka.'"*^  Timur acknowledged Sayyid Baraka's 
aid for his success.'''^ After his success over him, Timur sought an oath of 
adherence from the Turkish amirs in the presence of the Sayyids. ''^  In India, he 
met Shaikh Farid Ganj-i Shakar.'''* Timur regarded himself as a "soldier of Allah, 
'•" Mansura Haider, "Timui's Religious Policy," Proceedings of the Indian HisloryCongress, 1976, 
p.426. 
'"""Arab Shah, Tamerlane or Timur: Tlie Great Amir, p.20. 
'•" l)i iehl;i l. T<irikh-i Raihidi. |i.2<S. 
'•*" S.A Yazdi Zafarnamah. cd. Muhammad Abbasi, 2 volumes, sh.1357/1957, Tehran, 1, p.l23. 
"^ Ibid; p. 167. 
''*'' Arab Shah, Tamerlane or Timur: Tlie Great Amir, p. 15. 
'"^  Ibid., p. 194. 
" " Ibid., p. 20. 
""lbid.,p.210. 
"* Ibid., pp.25-27. 
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created out of his wrath."''*' In Persian sources, Timur was depicted as a 
"shadow of the Ahnighty." Even considerable influence was exerted by the 
ulemas in the matters of state and religion. During Timur's reign, ulemas held 
different offices, and sometimes guided him to "spare the citizens of the conquered 
areas from plunder and massacre."'^ He encouraged his amirs to give patronage 
to ulemas and others brought from the conquered Muslim lands.'^' It is also 
alleged that ^very day after administrative business, the learned men used to 
assemble in his presence to have discussions over issues of shariat. 
Timur is also said to have carried a portable mosque in all his campaigns.'^ ^ Yazdi 
in his Zafarnama depicts Timur as extremely religious and God fearing person. It 
is clearly mentioned, in one of the inscriptions of his palace, that the kingdom 
belongs to God and he is the shadow of God on Cu-lh. Yazdi, however, adds that 
in marriage ceremonies after the religious part was over, they used to have feast? 
according to the Mongol custom in which wine and drinks were openly served. 
Otherwise in daily life, for enforcement of shariat there were muhtasib. The 
""lbid.,p.9]. 
''"Ibid., pp.312-313. 
'^' Ibid.,pp.l61-162. 
'^ ^ Ruv Gonzalez de Clavijo, Narrative of the Spanish Embassy to the Court of Timur at 
Samarqand in the Years 1403-1406, Guy Le Strange tr, London: Broadway Travellers Series, 1928, 
p.272. 
'^' Husain Yusuf, TwoStudies in Early Mughal History, p. 17. 
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drinking habit of women is also mentioned.'^'' This shows contradictions on his 
part as far as Islamic laws were concerned. 
2.2 The Chinggisid Legacy and 'Legitimacy' to Rule 
If during the time of Timur shariat became an important tool for legitimizing the 
rule of a ruler, and also for obtaining the vital support of the religious class, one 
might wonder what had become of that position of the legacy of Chinggis Khan 
that previously provided legitimacy to rule. Interestingly, we find that yasa was 
not totally in vogue. Our sources fortunately points towards number of examples 
to prove that Chinggissid customs, mdud'mg yasa were instrumental in providing 
'legitimacy', in framing laws and in governance too. 
We can notice in this context, the use of Chinggisid titles like beg, bahadur, noyan, 
and the administrative terminology such as tumen, qoshun, and the offices, like 
that of darugha.^^^ Besides this, the Chinggisid traditions and methodology of 
government spread far beyond the frontiers of Mongol Empire. Not just the sons 
of the deceased Khan, but also by his brothers, uncles, cousins, nephews, and other 
relations could inherit the chieftainship from the line of Chaghtaids, like other 
Chinggisid dynasties with considerable influences on the tribes.'^^ Of course. 
' " Ibid, p. 18. 
'^' For further details see Zahiruddin Babar, Babarnama (Memoirs of Babar), Annette Susannah 
Beveridge tr., London: Luzac & Co., 1922; Dughlat, Tarikh-i Rashidi. 
''* For more del 
Mughal History. 
tails, see Juvaini, Tarikh-i Jahan Gitsha; Husain Yusuf, Two Studies in Early 
87 
there are some exceptional references; for instance Timur raised Suyurghatmisli 
to tiie position of Mongol Khan who happeneu to be Ogedeyid rather than 
Chaghtaid.'^'' The keeping of puppet Khan was not an innovation of Timur. 
Before him Mongols too were raised to this position, being considered as 
legitimate heir of the throne. Qazaghan after gaining power on Chaghtai ulus 
maintained a Chinggisid puppet Khan to establish the legitimacy of his rule in 
1346-47'^ * who was later on put to death by Qazaghan, and Buyun Quli became 
new Khan (Chaghtayid). His son Abdullah killed his father's Khan, Buyun Quli 
Khan and made new Khan of his choice. Even he tried to build Samarqand as his 
capital, which cost him with his position and life, succeeded Qazaghan. In 1358, 
Hajji Beg Barlas installed Buyun Suldus as an amir of the ulus after killing 
'Abdallah and his kins. Taking advantage of such political crisis and instability 
Tughlaq Timur, a descendant of Chaghtai Khan and the Padishah ofJete,^^"^ led an 
invasion to Transoxiana in March 1360. 
Tughlaq Timur who was raised to the position of Khaqan was very much inclined 
towards Islam. Once he encountered a Shaikh while hunting and was impressed by 
him, promising that if he will ever become Khan, he will become Mussalman if the 
'^' Grousset, The Empire of the Steppes: A History of Central Asia., p.343; Beatrice Forbes Manz, 
"Tamerlane and the Symbolism of Sovereignty," Iranian studies, 21, 1988. Persian sources are 
silent about tiiis and only refer to the appointment of KItan, as restoiation of Chinggisid order. 
" ' According to the Mongol tradition only the descendants of Chinggis Khan could adopt the title 
of Khan, and aspire to become sovereign. It seems because of this Qazaghan contended himself 
with the title of 'beg' or '•amir', and never tried to establish a permanent seat for his kingdom in a 
true nomadic fashion, he used to change his station. S.A Yazdi, Zafarnamah, 1, Calcutta, 1887, 
p.38. 
The Chaghtaids of Transoxiana called their enemies, the Moghuls as 'Jete'. See Dughlat, 
Tari/ch-i Rashidi, p. 75. 
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former will come to him. However, Shaikh died and when latter's son reminded 
this promise, he not only accepted faith but also even asked his nobles to do so. In 
this way 160,000 people became Mussalman.'^ ° But at the same time, it is 
significant to note that he gave orders for Amir Buyun Suldus to be killed 
according to the code of the Mongols.'^' Haji Beg Barlas fled to Khurasan as he 
was not in a position to resist the invasion. Tughlaq Timur entrusted the task of 
conquered territories to his son Ilyas Khwaja Oghlan and returned to his own seat 
of government. Amir Bulaji Tughlaq (who has been mentioned as having raised 
Tughlaq Timur Khan, to the position of Khan) sought nine privileges for himself 
from the Khan, which was granted to his ancestors by Chinggis Khan. Mirza 
Haider Dughlat writes that these nine privileges were contained in & firman issued 
under the seal of Tughlaq Timur Khan, which he saw with his own eyes.'" On 
the basis of above references, it can be assumed that this practice of giving nine 
privileges, a Chinngisid custom, was followed at that time too. 
The above event brought Timur into limelight for the first time. He expressed his 
allegiance to Mongol Khan who conferred on him the title of Tuman- i Amir-
Qarachar}^ In April 1361, Tughlaq Timur Khan again invaded Khurasan leading 
to rise in fortune of Timur as he took the advantage of Hajji Beg Barlas' absence 
and assumed the leadership of his clan and received favours from the Mongol 
'*°lbid.,pp.l3-15. 
'*' Ibid., p.22. 
'*^  Ibid., p.23.He even writes that his family too got these privileges. 
163 
'*^  Barthold, Four Studies on the History of Central Asia, 2, p. 14. 
Ibid., p.55. 
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Khan on the recommendation of one of his amir who requested the Khan to 
restore to Timur the territory which was his right of inheritance.'^^ Soon, he came 
in to conflict with Tughlaq Timur when latter took the decision of subjugating the 
tribal leaders of the Chaghtai iiliis and in order to do so, launched a powerful attack 
on them. Timur in this critical situation joined hands with Amir Husayn, the 
nephew of Abdallah. It was the time when Timur started to build himself as a 
sovereign. He saw a dream, which he looked as a good omen and a sign of 
heavenly favour.""^ Both Amir Husayn and Timur collected amirs and crushed 
Mongols but the need of the hour was to establish a strong centralized government; 
and for that one single authority was necessary to prevent the state from falling 
into disorder. Mirza Haider Dughlat quotes a couplet to highlight that the world 
without a leader is like a body without a head, and such a body is worthless even 
from the dust of the road.'^ ^ No one was ready to submit to either of them (Husayn 
and Timur).'^" Therefore, they appointed Qabul Shah Oghlan as puppet Khan, and 
all the mighty rulers and proud princes at once bent their knees nine times in 
obeisance to him.'^ ^ Bending of knees nine times which was Mongol tradition 
continued even in the time of Timurids and later under Mughals too. 
Having discussed at some length the continuation of tura during Timur's time, it 
seems important to briefly study the application of tura during Shahrukh's 
' " Dughlat, Tarikh-i Rashidi, p. 19. 
""lbid.,p.27. 
1 
168 , 
"-' Ibid. 
' ibid., p.30. 
'*'lbid., p.31. 
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(Timur's son) reign. Shahrukh generally preferred shariat over tura to win over 
the support of various groups. There are instances when he tried to legalise his 
claims on the basis of both 'Islamic and Iraniar. traditions'.'^" Ibn Arab Shah 
wrote ihaiyasa was completely given up during Shahrukh's reign.''" Yazdi who 
wrote in Shahrukh's time, tried to portray the image of Timur as a true Muslim 
because by this time shariat had superseded tura}^^ He designated himself as 
Khaqan and discontinued the practice of appointing Mongol Khans}^^ However, 
he continued to maintain Chinggisid connection by identifying Timurid dynasty as 
a successor to Il-Khanids (a successor Chinggisid dynasty). A.Z.V Togan, on the 
contrary is of the view that Shahrukh continued to followed yasa throughout his 
reign and the intrest shown to shariat law was of only secondary nature.'^'' 
However, Ibn Arabshah writes: 
It is said that Shahrukh repealed the laws of Jenghiz 
Khan, and ordained that they should make his rule flow 
along the streams of the law of Islam, but this I do not 
consider true, since it is considered among them as the 
purest religion and true faith and if it is happened that 
he should summon his chief men and doctors to his 
palace and closing the door look upon them from his 
170 Beatrice Forbes Manz, "The Legacy of Amir Timur," Asian Art Spring (1989), p.26. 
' " Arab Shah, Tamerlane or Timur: The Great Amir, p.299. 
"" Bartiioid, Four Studies on the History of Central Asia, 2, p.22. 
"^ Under Shahrukh there was no nominal Khan. 
"'* Manz, "The Legacy of Amir Timur,"p.26. 
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throne and propose to them anything of this sort, truly 
they would flee like asses to the gal^s.'^ ^ 
From the above, it appears that although Shahrukh tried to establish himself as an 
independent Timurid ruler avoiding even nominal allegiance to Mongol Khaqan 
but apparently because of social and cultural pressures, Chinggisid connections 
could not be completely avoided. 
Shahrukh's son Ulugh beg, however, followed more closely the practice of Amir 
Timur and called himself gw/-ge« (son in law), a title neither taken by Shahrukh nor 
by any of his sons.'^^ Ulugh Beg's regime witnessed a constant struggle between 
shariat and tura. He also maintained a nominal Chinggisid prince as Khaqan but 
coins were issued in the name of Shahrukh and on\y yarligs were published in the 
name of Khaqan. Satuq Khan held the title of Khan in Samarqand but the real 
power was in the hands of Ulugh Beg. Shotly afterwards, he sent him to 
Moghulistan and proclaimed another Khan in his place.'" However, in the coins 
as well as in khiitba, the name of the Khan along with Ulugh Beg was included. 
Ulugh Beg also discontinued the practice of Khaqan accompanying the Timurid 
ruler in wars. The Khan was confined in llic Hayal-i K/iaiii (Khan's enclosure).''' 
" ' Arab Shah, Tamerlane or Timur: The Great Amir, p. 299. 
"* He formed matrimonial alliances with the Mongol family. Barthold, Four Studies on the History 
of Central Asia, 2, p.86. 
' " Dughlat, Tarikh-i Rashidi, pp.71-72. 
"* Barthold, Four Studies on the History of Central Asia, 2, p.85. 
" ' Dughlat, Tarikh-i Rashidi, p.83. 
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However, Ul Jgh Beg is also said to have expressed his desire to learn yasa.^^^ 
Nevertheless, Ulugh Beg's reign was dominated by Khwaja Ahrar's influence.'^ ' 
Thus, the trac ition started by Timur of using both Turko-Mongol and .Islamic codes 
side by side continued in the reign of his successor too, but with the passing of 
time the shariat law got precedence over tura and gradually the usage of tura was 
confined to social etiquettes. Ulugh Beg and his son Abdul Aziz were killed by 
Ulugh Beg's another son Abdul Latif who was more religious than his 
predecessor. 
After the death of Shams-i Jahan (son of Khizr Khwaja, a Chaghtai), his brother 
Muhammad Khan ascended the throne. He sent an embassy to Shahrukh 
expressing his submission to him, but he continued to create problems in 
Mawarannahr by supporting the rebel amirs.'*^ Mirza Haider Dughlat writes that 
Muhammad Khan took strong measures to make Mughals follow Islam.'*'' In 
1420, according to Tarikh-i Rashidi there was feud a between Vais Khan and Shir 
Muhammad Oghlan, the son of Muhammad Khan. In the time of Shahrukh, 
Khudaidad (son of Amir Bulaji) was the head of the Mongol amirs, for whom it 
was not known that he was on whose side but was in touch with Ulugh Beg who at 
the time ruled Mawarranahr in his father's name.'*^ Barthold observes that 
probably after instigated by Khudaidad; Ulugh Beg took an expedition to 
'^' Mansura Haider, Medieval Central Asia, p. 197. 
'^ ^ Barthold writes that he was given the title o^Khan (in the inscription of 834/1434-35). 
'"•' Barthold, l'\nir Sliulies on Ilia llixloiy o/CunlrolAsia, 1, p.l44. 
'"" Dughlat, Tarikh-i Rashidi, p.58; Barthold, Four Studies on the History of Central Asia, I, p. 145 
'*' Barthold, Four Studies on the History of Central Asia, 1, p.l45. 
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Moghiilistan.'^'' However, campaign was called off on assurance of submission 
by Mongol amirs. After the death of Shir Muhammad, Vais Khan came into power 
but his reign was marked with incursions of the eastern heathen Mongols.'*^ Vais 
Khan fought sixty-one battles with Qalmaqs, in which once he won, twice was 
taken as prisoner and even was forced to marry his sister to them,'** and later was 
killed in battle with Satuq Khan. Vais Khan was taken as prisoner in battle with 
Qalmaqs and brought before Isan Taishi who thought to himself, "if he is really a 
descendant of Chinggis Khan, he will not do me an obeisance, but will look upon 
me as an inferior." Therefore, Isan Taishi dismounted and advanced with respect 
towards the Khan, the latter turned his face and did not raise his hands. 
Afterwards, when Khan was asked that why he has not shown obeisance he replied 
that for a Mussalman it is not right to do homage to an infidel, so he didn't salute 
to him.'*' After his death, the Mongol amirs were divided into two factions, one 
group wishing Khanate for Vais Khan's eldest son Yunus Khan, and other that for 
his second son Esan Buqa in which the latter's group gained power. Therefore, 
Yunus Khan along with his supporters went to Mawarranahr from where he was 
sent to Persia by Ulugh Beg."° In the early yea-'s of Esan Buqa's reign, some 
Mongol amirs enjoyed complete independence. 
"* Ibid. 
'*'lbid.,p.l46. 
'** Dughlat, Tarikh-i Rashidi, pp. 65-67. 
" ' Ibid., p.65. 
Babar, Babarnama (Memoirs of Babar); Barthold, Four Studies on the History of Central 
Asia,\,pp.\Al-\A%. 
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Thus, it is clear from the above discussion that the status of Timur, despite his 
low sounding titles did not put any limitations on his absolute powers, which he 
exercised unabated. It is probably because of these reasons that after his death his 
name (the name of Amir Timur) itself provided 'legitimacy' to rule. 
2.3 The Timurid Legacy and 'Legitimacy' 
With the accession of Abu Said Mirza, son of Miran Shah (Son of Timur) and 
grandfather of Babar some very significant changes had taken place in the Timurid 
polity. Abu Said Mirza started taking direct interest in the internal affairs of the 
Mongol Khans. The 'legitimacy' provided by the legacy of Timur provided him 
the necessary groundwork. 
After taking possession of Khurasan, Abu Said Mirza intended' upon taking 
possession of Iraq but faced strong resistance from Esan Buqa. The latter placed 
his brother (Yunus Khan) as Khan and made many compacts and agreements with 
him. Abu Said explained to him that his appointment to the position of Khan was 
a political necessity'^' and pointed that his position will remain the same that the 
Khans had during the reign of Timur. Abu Said also emphasized that it was he 
who raised him to the position of Khan from the life of poverty.''^ As things had 
changed, therefore, he asked Yunus Khan to lay all his former pretensions behind 
191 
'« Ibid. 
Dughlat, Tarikh-i Rashidi, pp.83-84. 
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and to establish a bond of friendship between them.'''' He also obtained from 
him a pledge that he would give up his claim of Mawarannahr."'* 
R.P Tripathi is of the view that Abu Said went a step further when he asked Yunus 
Khan to lay all his pretensions behind"^ by which he meant that from now on no 
previous allegiance given to Chinggisids by the Timurids would be followed. He 
also advised the Khan to address him as a friend in communications and avoid 
using the language that the Khans earlier used in their correspondence with the 
Mirzas. He made these conditions applicable on his successors as well. ''^ Abu 
Said also established matrimonial alliances by marrying his three sons with Yunus 
Khan's three daughters.' 
Abu Said also maintained close relationship with Khwaja Ubaidullah Ahrar, the 
leading Naqshbandi saint of Central Asia who is believed to have prophesied Abu 
Said's success and acted as his spiritual guide. In the letters of Khwaja Ahrar we 
find that he used Abu Said as role model and upholder of shariat for future 
generations. In one of the letters, addressed to Abu Said Khwaja Ahrar wrote, "to 
remove the evils of the customs of strangers {sharr-i rusum biganegan) from the 
region of Mavarannahr, we request your majesty to direct [your] noble resolve to 
"'ibid., p. 172. 
""ibid.pp.US-MP. 
" ' R. P. Tripathi. Some Aspects of Muslim Administration, Allahabad: Central Boole Depot, 1978, 
p. 109. 
"*lbid. 
"'Ibid. 
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removing the evils of the customs of foreigners from that region [Khurasan]."''^ 
Jo- Ann Gross writes that Khwaja's twenty-one letters focuses on the preservation 
and spread of shariat throughout the Timurid domain and the eradication of 
infidels and their customs.'^ ^ 
Appeals were made by him to Timurids to follow the Islamic laws instead of 
Turko-Mongolian customs?°° In a number of letters, Khwaja Ahrar had expressed 
his contempt for the custom of strangers {sharr-i rusum biganegan), which in all 
likely hood was the tura, or yasa of Chinggis. In his dealings, Yunus Khan 
preferred shariat to Chinggisid custom and this was so well known that Khwaja 
Ahrar wrote letters to neighbouring Muslims, saying: "We have seen Sultan Yunus 
Khan, and ii is unlawful to molest the tribe whose chief is so good a 
Mussalman."^°' At another place he said, "I have seen Yunus Khan, and the 
Mongols and the subject of such a Padishah not to be carried off captives. They are 
people of Islam."^°^ From this time we hardly get any refrence of Mongols being 
sold as slaves in Mavarranahr and Khorasan.^ "'' In spite of being a Mongol, Yunus 
Khan was keen towards establishing himself in a town instead of leading a 
nomadic life, the reason for which he was inclined towards religion. He realised 
See, The Letters of Khwaja 'Ubayd Allah Ahrar and His Associates, Asom Urunbaev and Jo-
Ann Gross tr. Leiden, 2002. 
"'Ibid., p.33. 
'""Ibid., p.35. 
'^" Ibid., p. 156. 
'"^ Ibid., p.98. 
'°' Ibid. 
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that without permanent settlement his goal of making his subjects true Muslims 
could not be achieved.'"'' 
But Yunus Khan was very ambitious; as soon as he strengthened his position he 
started making efforts to enlarge his possessions. Even before Abu Said's death in 
1469, Yunus had resumed his raids upon the Timurid possession; as he had his 
eyes on Farghana.^ "^ By 1472, he almost brought the entire area, which was under 
the control of Esan Buqa and united the entire rgion into single unit. He utilized 
the feuds among the sons of Abu Said for increasing his fortunes. After his death 
in 1487, the f/Iongols according to their custom placed his eldest son Mahmud on 
throne.^ °^ But Mahmud failed to maintain the prestige of his house because of his 
incompetence. He replaced five of the great amirs, each of whom was the head a 
department.^"' He also failed in his attempt to capture Samarqand. 
After the death of Abu Said, his kingdom according to Chinggisid custom was 
divided among his four sons. Sultan Ahmad Mirza who was the eldest got 
Samarqand and Bukhara; Mahmud Mirza got Badakhshan and the surrounding 
region of Hindukush, Asfera, Tirmiz and Hisar in the Amu Darya basin, Ulugh 
Beg got Kabul and Ghazni while the youngest among them Umar Shaikh was 
conferred Farghana. The region of Khurasan was under Sultan Husain Mirza 
Baiqara, another great grandson of Amir Timur. Umar Shaikh's relation with his 
"^^  Ibid, p. 156; Barthold, Four Studies on the Histoiy of Central Asia, 2, p. 150. 
""' Barthold, Four Studies on the History of Central Asia, 2, p. 150. 
^°^ Dughlat, Tarikh-i Rashidi, p. 156. 
' " ib id . , p. 119. 
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brother Ahmad Mirza was bitter due to his interest in Samarqand for which he 
also paid AJchsi as price to Yunus Khan. Babur referred Ahmad Mirza as a very 
sporting Padishah, the liice of which had not been seen since Ulugh Beg Mirza.^ °^  
Samarqand always remained very prestigious and aspired by not only Chinggisids 
but by Timurids too. Babur writes that his father, Umar Shaikh led army into 
Samarqand various times but sometimes he was beaten and sometimes he was 
forced to retire against his wiil.^°' According to Babur, besides Andijan, his father 
Umar Shaikh had in his possession for sometime Tashkent and Sairam, which his 
elder brother Ahmad Mirza had assigned to him. He also held Shahrukhiya, which 
he captured for some times. But the rift among the sons of Abu Said was used by 
Yunus Khan to strengthen his position. Being an elder member of the family he 
offered to mediate and as a price got possession of the territories of Sairam and 
Tashkent. 
Before the advent of Babur on the screen of Central Asia, the conditions were 
rather chaotic The sons of Abu Said were constantly fighting among themselves 
for enlarging their territories. The relation between Umar Shaikh and his elder 
brother Ahmad Mirza were at its worst. To solve their disputes, they took the help 
of Mongol Khan who as mentioned above took heavy price in the form of 
territorial concessions. The nobility at this time became quite strong and posed a 
great threat to the stability of the Timurid state They not only acted as king-
°^* Babar, Babarnama (Memoirs ofBabar) ,1, p.35. 
""Ibid, pp. 12-13. 
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makers but some among them even aspired to become king. For example the 
Timurid princes became mere puppets in the hands of Khusrau Shah. '^° As a 
matter of I'act, in their anxiety to have a large following of influential people, these 
rulers admitted and promoted unworthy and contentious nobles of Hisar, Tirmiz 
and Tar to very high positions.^" 
2.4 Sovereign, Legitimacy and the Changing Notions of Siyasa 
The above discussion makes it clear that by the turn of the fifteenth century; 
'legitimacy' was an important vehicle for the sons and ambitious nobles to gain 
access to sovereignty. This 'legitimacy' was often manufactured, If the aspirant 
was not of 'royal blood', through panegyrist and clergy, and also quite often by 
forming matrimonial alliances. The role of political marriages (like that of Timur 
himself) or the support of popular ulemas (like Ubaidullah Ahrar) in providing 
necessary 'legitimacy' to rule has already been discussed. However, such alliances 
and moves made both the nobility and the ulema quite powerful and some times 
even acquired the position 'king makers'. Thus, it is not surprising that during the 
period under review, we find steep rise in court politics ensuing from the rise in the 
power of the clergy and the nobility, ft remains important to assess the position of 
'sovereign' urider this changing notions of siyasa, whereby what it mattered in the 
'^^  He blinded Sultan Masud Mirza and placed Baisunghaar Mirza in Hisar, 
^" Babar, Babarnama (Memoirs ofBabar), 1, p.326. 
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end was 'movers and shakers' and the entire court apparently was reduced to a 
'chess board'. 
We may begin our discussion by assessing the status of Timus as a 'sovereign'in 
the circumstances and at the time where apparently the political ambitions of every 
noble, apparently were very high. Some scholars suggested that Timur was not an 
absolute 'sovereign' as he and his descendents accepted the nominal over lordship 
of Chinggisids.^'^ To say so seems incorrect, as it was Timur who sat on raised 
dais and received homage while the Mongol Khan, simply took up his place among 
Timur's courtiers."'^ It is important to observe the meeting between Ibn khaldun 
and Timur where Khan, whom Timur represented as king and (himself as his 
representative), was standing behind Timur with other courtiers.^''' Timur at the 
great qurultai in 1404 named Pir Muhammad (grandson) as his successor and 
asked foreign ambassador to pay obeisance to him.^ '^  The nomination of an heir in 
his lifetime was an action taken like that of Chinngis Khan. Timur at this qurultai 
also emphasised his position as a sovereign because by this time he had given up 
the practice of maintaining puppet Khans?^^ In his reception to Clavijo, he also 
'^^  Khan "The Turko-Mongol Theory of Kingship," p.7. 
'^^  Clavijo, Narrative of the Spanish Embassy, p.254; For details see Barthold, Four Studies on the 
History of Central Asia, 2, p.25 
"''' Khaldun, /bn Khaldun and Tanicrlanc. p.37 
•'^  Clavijo, Narrative of the Spanish Embassy, p.22I 
After the death of Sultan Mahmud, Timur continued to rule in the name of deceased Sultan. 
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echoed the universalistic claims of earlier Mongol Khan's by referring to the 
'King of Spain' as his son.^''' 
Timur was the pivot of administrative affairs and campaigns without any 
interference of Khan or any other Mongol chief He without the slightest 
hesitation always received honours due to the Mongol Khan?' He considered 
himself as "the inheritor and the continuer of the Empire of the Chaghtay Ulus." '^^  
Thus, there is no shadow of doubt over the absolute authority of Timur and this can 
be primarily the reason for Timur to be content with the title o^ amir. Moreover, 
there was never any assertion of authority by the puppet Khan, nor he ever exerted 
any influence in state affairs. However, it is also true that Timur was insecure in 
his position not because of any individual threat but because of the political 
situation of the time and respect for Chinggisid lineage. Otherwise, Timur was an 
absolute monarch having all the realms of administration and political power in his 
hands. The author of Tarikh-i Rashidi clarly mentions that from the time of Amir 
Timur to that of Abu Said the custom of keeping Chaghtaid on the throne with the 
title of the King was followed who was nothing more than a prisoner.^ ^*' Besides, 
we hardly get any reference to suggest that Timur ever shared his powers as a king 
with Khan. The Mongol Khan at the court of Timur" was merely a nominal 
figurehead with no powers at all. Rulers of the conquered territories, who have 
' " Clavijo, Narrative of the Spanish Embassy, p.22l,- Yusuf, Two Studies in Early Mughal History, 
p.l3. 
^" Barthold, Four Studies on the History of Central Asia , 2, p.25 ; Yusuf, Two Studies in Early 
Mugliai History, p.7. 
^" Hooiviiam Hilda, Tamberlane the Conqueror, p.86. 
^^ ° Dughlat, Tarikh-i Rashidi, p. 172; ArabShah, Tamerlane or Timur: The Great Amir, p. 13 
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recognised the suzerainty of Timur, recited the name of the Timur and not of 
his puppet Khan in khutba. 
In spite of all this, Timurid Empire began to collapse after Timur's death because 
of his lack of trust in functionaries of his government. The power, which he 
gathered so diligently, was primarily personal, centred on him. Timur followed 
Chinggisid pattern of'division of Empire' of the separate ulus, firstly with himself 
as the head of Empire, and afterwards to be ruled by his appointed successor as 
head. Since he hardly gave any real powers to any of his sons or grandsons, soon 
after his death (1405) a war of succession started among his sons in complete 
disregard of iiis will, in favour of Pir Muhammad—his grandson and this 
became the regular feature of the Timurid Empire thereafter. 
After Timur, 'legitimacy' was almost entirely transferred to the Timurid line. 
Anyone who could claim any legitimate connection to Timur was able to contest 
for the throne. Eventually, none of Timur's offsprings was able to succeed to 
Timur's throne. Instead, several kingdoms sprang from Timur's domain. 
Establishment of Mughal Empire in India under Babur, which shall be taken in 
detail in the next chapter, was simply an end result of the kind of politics that 
aroused the ambitions of every single person who could claim 'legitimacy', either 
through blood connection or through manufacturing. 
Khizr Khan - ruler of Hindustan continued to recognise the suzerainty of Timur, whose name 
was recited in the Khutba and to whom used to send tribute. 
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CHAPTER-THREE 
Legitimacy and Justice; Babur and the Rise of Defiant 
Nobility 
Babur's expeditions into Hindustan from his 'temporary' base at Kabul 
successfully culminated in A.D 1526 at Panipat. Ibrahim Lodi, the Afghan ruler of 
Delhi suffered humiliating defeat at the hands of Babur's army. The former being 
killed in the battle at Panipat, Babur's crowing to the throne of Hindustan, was a 
mere formality. Thus, Babur's long 'cherished ambition' of conquering 
Hindustan, at last had come true. The conquest of Hindustan by Babur had 
remarkable significance and consequences. It marked the establishment of 
Mughal dynasty in India, as well as provided a base for this particular Central 
Asian family to acquire 'sovereign' status, which in any case appears to be a 
daunting task in their homeland and, thus, has to be pursued elsewhere.^ ^^ This 
chapter explores some of the reasons for the Mughal conquest of Hindustan and its 
significance. 
^^ ^ The name 'Mughal' is derived from the word 'Mongol'. Babur, the founder of Mughal Empire in 
South Asia was a Central Asian and a descendant of two great Empire builders of Central Asia, 
namely Chinggis Khan, and Amir Timur, better known as Tamerlame. For a complete study on 
Chinggis Khan and the division of his kingdom, see Juvaini, Tarikh-iJahan Giisha, tr. J.A.Boyle as 
History of World Conquerors, 2 vols., Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1958. For Timur's 
rise to the power, see Mirza Haider Dughlat, Tarikh-i Rashidi. Also see, Beatrice Forbes Manz, The 
Rise and Rule of Tamerlane, Great Britain, 1989. For Babur and his ancestors see, Baburnama 
(Memoirs of Babur). However, the translator suggests that the name 'Mughal' applied to the dynasty 
of Babur in South Asia is a misnomer (see vol.1, p.l58). 
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3.1 'Legitimacy* and Its Predicaments; Babur's Conquest of 
Hindustan 
The seventeenth century chronicles record an interesting event under the year 
1574. "At that time Tsar Ivan Vasil'evich enthroned Simeon Bekbulatovich as 
Tsar in Moscow and crowned him with the crown of the Tsars, and called himself 
(simply) Ivan of Moscow; he left the city and lived in Petrovka. All the offices of 
stardom he passed to Simeon and he himself rode simply, like a boyar with shafts, 
and whenever he comes to Tsar Simeon, he sits at a distance from the Tsar's place, 
together with the boyars."^^^ Who was this Simeon Bekbulatovich? He was a 
genuine Chinggissid, a descendant of Orda, the eldest son of Jochi, who was the 
eldest son of Chinggis Khan. Such important was the legacy of Chinggis Khan, in 
providing legitimacy to rule, which after him was equally granted to Timur. 
The legacy providing 'legitimacy'to rule certainly was not a problem for the 
Mughal dynasty under Babur which claimed its ancestry from the two great 
conquerors of Central Asia Chinggis Khan and Amir Timur. This ancestral 
'legitimacy' however, was also enjoyed by several other princes in Central Asia 
such as the Shaibanids who traced their descent from Jochi's son Shaiban, or the 
Ashtarkhanids (who traced their descent from another son of Jochi, Toqay Timur). 
The most obvious, and of course bitter outcome of these numerous ambitious 
princes claiming highest form of legitimacy can be witnessed from their conflicts, 
"^•' See For details "Moscow, the Golden Horde, and the Kazan Khanate from a polycultural point of 
view," Slavic Review 26 (1967). 
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to gain foothold In Central Asia, especially among the Mughals and the 
Shalbanids. It was these conflicts that ousted the former not only from Samarqand 
but from Central Asia as well. 
The history of Babur right from the time of his succession to the principality of 
Farghana in 1494, at the tender age of eleven years to his conquest of Hindustan 
bares witness to numerous poitical crises, which at times threatened not only his 
political position but also even his life. This crisis continued in some form even 
after his conquest of India. The continuation of the predicaments of the 
Islamic/Muslim tradition which at the death of a ruler, and often during his life 
time gave rise to number of 'legitimate' claimants inspired princes of the same 
'blood' to claim the throne, have been posing serious problem to the rulers. 
The Baburnama is full of intimate details of a number of conspiracies hatched 
against him. One such conspiracy mentioned was an attempt to displace Babur and 
enthrone his younger brother Jahangir Mirza by one of his well-reputed noble 
Hasan-i Yaqub soon after his accession. There was also an incident where Ibrahim 
Saru captured the Afsara fort and read the khutba in the name of Baisunghar 
Mirza.^ '^' Besides that his uncles, Sultan Ahmad Mirza and Mahmud Khan 
invaded Farghana soon after his accession and compelled him to accept their 
"•'' Babar, Babarrama (Memoirs ofBabaij, 1, pp. 43 & 52. 
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subordination.""^ Several otiier references of similar nature may be found in 
not only Babur's memoirs but also in other contemporary accounts. 
Babur was forced not only to adopt an attitude of re-conciliation but also to bow 
down to this 'legitimacy' principle, indicating the towering position of all blood 
relatives hovering around the position of a 'sovereign' is evident from the fact that 
in spite of taking stern and bold action against Mahmud Khan, he went to meet him 
and knelt before him. The tradition as well as metaphor of kneeling within Central 
Asian political principles was attribution of higher authority to the one who was 
knealt to, and various incidences from Babur's memoirs confirms this conclusion. 
The incident and rationale of the meeting is recorded in Baburnama in the 
following sentences: 
It occurred to me that if since I was so close, I went and 
waited on him (Mahmud Khan), he being, as it were, 
my father and my elder brother, and if by gone 
resentments were laid aside, it would be good hearing 
and seeing for far and near.^ ^^  
The bitter relations of Babur with his relatives fioparently were over the small 
principality of Andijan. Besides Mahmud Khan, it was also the strong desire of 
Auzun Hasan and Sultan Ahmad Tambal to take up the possession of Andijan and 
Akhsi for Jahangir Mirza and the latter even took to the recourse of revolting 
225 
"^ Ibid., p.54. 
Ibid., pp. 30-31. 
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against Babur.^ '^' It proved disastrous for Babur when he moved out of 
Samarqand to save Andijan because in the process of saving Andijan he lost both 
the places. 
if the haughtiness of Babur's uncles were not enough to reduce his position to the 
lowest pedestal then there were also his nobles who were also prepared to 
challenge his authority. As a matter of fact, due to the pressure of his nobles Babur 
had to make peace with Jahangir Mirza. Babur writes in his memoirs: 
Those two (Auzun Hasan and Ahmad Tambal) however 
were our two great begs; if we gave no ear to their 
words and if we did not make peace, other things from 
them were probable! It had to be! Peace was made in 
this fashion; the districts on the Akhsi side of the 
Khujand water were to depend on Jahangir, those 
on the Andijan side, one me; Auzkirt was to be left in 
my jurisdiction when the districts were 
settled and I and Jahangir made our agreement, we 
should march together against Samarqand; and when I 
was in possession of Samarqand, Andijan was to be 
given to Jahangir.^ ^* 
227 
''' Ibid. 
Ibid., p.87. 
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Several other nobles also like All Dost Taghai and his son Muhammad Dost 
flouted Babur's authority by "behaving like Sultans."^^' 
Being aware of the crisis developing due to the priciple of legitimacy, Babur now 
laid more emphasis on his Timurid heritage and the hereditary right of the 
soverign. In his letter to Sultan Said, regarding seccession in Badakhshan, he gave 
importance to the 'hereditary rights of the heirs'. His explicit and eloquent 
statement after the second conquest of Samarqand in A.D. 1501 points towards the 
language game of maneuvering, harnessing and tilting the legitimacy principle to 
his own favour. Apparently being proud of the victory at Samarqand, Babur 
writes: 
Samarqand for nearly one hundred and forty years had 
been the capital of our dynasty. An alien, and of what 
stamp! An Auzbeg foe had taken possession of it! It had 
slipped from our hands; God gave it again!^ ^° 
After regaining Samarqand, Babur compares himself with Sultan Husain Mirza 
who took Herat. Here comparison was of age, experience as well as the respective 
position of the individuals. Babur was nineteen year old, whereas Sultan Husain 
was thirty-two years old. Sultan Husain was an experienced general whereas his 
opponents were inexperienced. On the other hand, Babur was inexperienced 
whereas his opponent Shaibani Khan was a seasoned military campaigner. 
^^'Ibid., p. 119. 
^^''Ibid, p. 134. 
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However, he adds that it is not to undermine the reputation of anybody or to 
magnify himself but to narrate the fact. 
The loss of Samarqand to Shaibani Khan after a very short span was again the 
result of oscillatory loyalty of his blood relations, namely Sultan Husain Mirza, 
who conspired with the latter giving little regard for his blood relation. The result 
of the battle of Sar-i Pul between Shaibani Khan and Babur was thus pretty 
obvious and Samarqand was lost again. After the death of Sultan Husain Mirza, 
Babur regarded himself as the most superior of all the 'legitimate' relatives. His 
call for respect and obedience from Badi-uz-zaman Mirza was on the pretext that 
he was the most able of all the surviving Timurids, and had sat on the throne of 
Timur (Samaiqand) twice. However, Babur always remained very kind towards 
his blood relations and other members of Chaghtai dynasty and helped them in 
their time of distress despite their unfavourable attitude towards him. '^" It seems 
he adopted this particular attitude because of the importance given to such 
relationship in the sixteenth century. However, Babur himself had to face very 
strong opposition from his relations and ultimately was pushed out of his 
homeland. Fortunately, he succeeded in establishing himself in Kabul. U is 
significant to note that Babur had to suffer because of his close connection with the 
'house of Timur'. In Samarqand, there were several other princes having similar 
relationships with Timur and all of them claimed themselves as legitimate 
successors of the Timurid kingdom. In the struggle that continued between Babur 
" ' Babar, Babarnama (Memoirs ofBabar), 1, p.318. 
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and his blood relations for quite some time for the throne of Samarqand, Babur 
was ultimately defeated and expelled by them who vs/ere also legitimate successors 
of Timur. The impact of this 'legitimacy' paradigm in medieval siyasa was unique 
and hardly ever happened with such intensity. 
Although after being expelled from Central Asia Babur established himself at 
Kabul in 1504, it took him another fifteen long years before fmally making his 
attempts to conquer Hindustan. Thus, arguments that Babur, immediately after the 
conquest of Kabul had started making plans for conquering Hindustan, supported 
by a statement from his own memoirs, needs to be perilously scrutinized. Writing 
about his early expedition on Hindustan after the battle of Panipat, Babur notes that 
his desire, right from the time when Kabul was conquered, was to acquire the 
territories of Hindustan. ^ '^ Two questions thus arise out from this scenario. First, 
why did Babur desire to conquer Hindustan when he always preferred to establish 
his rule over Samarqand and Farghana? Secondly, if the conquest and acquisition 
of Hindustan had been looming in Babur's mind, ever since the conquest of Kabul, 
why did Babur delay the proceedings for Hindustan for fifteen years? Moreover in 
these fifteen years, Babur continuously tried to regain a foothold in Central Asia 
and never thought, for even once, about the conquest of Hindustan. The long gaps 
in Babur's memoirs furtiicr complicated the whole issue. 
232 Ibid., 2, pp. 478-479. 
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The answers to the above questions could partially be answered from the 
political traditions and structure in Central Asia. It has already been stated that 
Babur desired for sovereignty a completely mastery over Samarqand and 
Farghana. Besides acquisition of territories, the term 'sovereignty', according to 
political theorists, also encompasses 'recognition' from the other rulers, in Babur's 
case, the other warring parties for Samarqand and Farghana. Thus, even if these 
territories were acquired, it was extremely difficult to sustain the power, because 
the other claimants continued to make efforts to recover these territories. 
Evidently, the capture of Samarqand, as well as its subsequent loss within a short 
time not only by Babur, but also by other contenders' points towards the above 
justification. This game of'gain and losses' of Samarqand, in turn again questions 
the qualification of the term legitimacy in the whole concept of 'sovereignty'. 
Despite winning Samarqand, Babur was hardly recognized as a 'sovereign' ruler 
by the other warring parties. His own troops remained dissatisfied. His begs and 
amirs always threatened his commands because of his own weak position and 
partly because of the prevailing political conditions in Central Asia that did not 
allow any one to get acquire the status of'sovereign'. 
Babur's conquest of Hindustan apparently was more to a necessity than to the 
choice. Far off from his homeland and with a different political structure of 
Hindustan, Babur could perhaps effectively rule as a sovereign. Providing 
justification for the delay in the conquest of Hindustan, Babur again blames his 
begs by stating that they always stopped him from moving in that direction. Babur 
in his memoirs writes: 
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My desire for Hindustan had been constant, but owing 
sometimes to the feeble counsels of begs, sometimes to 
the non- accompaniment of elder and young brethren, a 
move on Hindustan had not been practicable and its 
territories had remained unsubdued. At length, no such 
obstacles were left; no beg great or small an opposing 
word ^" 
Babur's daughter, Gulbadan Begum, writing from her sour memories also 
highlights this fact in Humayunnama. She writes: 
He (Babur) had always desired to go into Hindustan, 
and had not carried out his wish because of the feeble 
counsels of his amirs and the non-agreement of his 
brothers. When at length these were gone, and there 
remained no amirs such as could argue against it, he 
accomplished his desire.^ '^' 
The lamentations of both Babur and particularly of her daughter against the 
attitude of the Central Asian nobles as hurdles in former attaining the status of 
sovereign, highlights the desire of the Mughals to acquire 'sovereign' status than 
the mere acquisition of some territories, even when it could only be realized in a 
'far-off country. This is particularly evident from Gulbadan Begam, who at the 
=" Ibid. 
•^''' Begum, Humayunnama, p.91. 
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time of her writing was actually witness to the real status of a 'sovereign', a 
Padishah, embodied in the person of her nephew Akbar, whose every word, was 
final and a 'decree', and was obeyed and followed by everyone. Thus the situation 
during Akbar's reign, a time when Gulbadan was writing her memoirs left her 
perhaps, with no choice but to lament on the condition of his father during that 
phase of his life. 
This reference of his desire to conquer Hindustan also indicates that now he was in 
a position to assert his authority and act as strong ruler. In Central Asia whenever 
through grit and determination he tried to establish himself as strong ruler, his 
nobles instead of supporting him put forth such conditions which could hardly 
permit him to act as 'sovereign'. Not only, they took undue advantage of his 
young age and in-experience and on occasions through the machinations of these 
elements he had to submit before his nobles like Tambal and Ali-Dost. After the 
conquest of Kabul, Babur tried to assert his position by dismissing recalcitrant 
nobles such as Qambar Ali and Baqi Chaghniani. It appears that by the time Babur 
decided to proceed on his conquest of India he had acquired sfficient powers to 
bring his nobility under his control. Thus, when Babur decided to proceed on an 
expedition to Bajaur, in 1519, none of his begs opposed the move. 
Whatever be the reasons behind his conquest of Hindustan, it is important to notice 
that he never forgot to emphasize the fact that Hindustan was once held by the 
Timurids and therefore, he had a right to reconquer it. He never considered it as an 
alien land. There are other references in his memoir, which strengthens the 
discourse carried above. From Bajaur, Babur moved towards Bhira, which was 
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under Daulat Khan Lodi and was a boundary between the kingdom of Kabul 
and Lodi Empire. In his memoirs, Babur writes: 
We had turned off from Bajaur with Bhira in our 
thoughts. Ever since we came into Kabul it had been in 
my mind to move on Hindustan, but this had not been 
done for a variety of reasons.^ "^ ^ 
Babur further adds: 
\s it was always in my heart to possess Hindustan, and 
as these several countries, Bhira, Khush-ab, Chin-ab 
and Chiniut had once been held by the Turk, I pictured 
them as my own and was resolved to get them into my 
hands, whether peacefully or by force. For these 
reasons it being imperative to treat these aill men well, 
the following orders was given: — Do not hurt or harm 
to the flocks and herds of these people, or even to their 
cotton-ends and broken needles! '^'^  
He further writes that picturing these countries as our own (once occupied by the 
Turk), there was no over-running or plundering.'^ ^^ Equating Bhira with 
Samarqand and allowing it the same sanctity makes the discourse even more 
interesting. Babur disallowed the looting of Bhira and asked his army not to ill-
•^'^  Babar, Babarnama (Memoirs ofBabar), 1, pp.377-378. 
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" ' Ibid., p.384. 
Ibid., p.380. 
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treat its inhabitants. This statement of Babur echoes similar to the orders given 
after gaining Samarqand. Thus, the impression, which Babur was giving to his 
nobility, was that Hindustan was their homeland. 
It is also significant to note that from Bhira, Babur sent an envoy to Delhi with a 
message in which he asked Ibrahim Lodi to hand him over all those territories 
which were once held by the Timurids.^ ''* Apparently, Babur laid claim over these 
territories as a direct descendant of Timur and thus a rightful claimant having 
hereditary rights of succession. 
It may be pointed that as soon as Babur had proceeded on his conquest of 
Hindustan, in 1519, he was contacted by a numb.T of influential Indian nobles 
especially of Sikander Lodi who were unhappy with Ibrahim Lodi and promised to 
support him in his campaign. In reply, Babur assured them of 'protection and 
favour'.^''' However, the earlier expeditions were not very successful because of 
problems in Kabul that used to crop up from time to time and the uncooperative 
attitude of his Indian allies specially Daulat Khan and Alam Khan. Babur had 
promised to help Alam Khan, on the condition that while he would succeed to the 
thron of Agra, Lahore and the entire area west of it will become part of Babur's 
kingdom of Kabul.^ ''° But he deserted Babur at the crucial moment and the 
campaign failed. However, when Aalam Khan went to seek his help again in a 
- ' ' Ibid., pp.384-385. 
" ' Babar, Babarnama (Memoirs o/Babar),], pp.175-176; Afzal Husain, The Nobility Under Akbar 
andJahangir: A Study of Family Groups, New Delhi:,Manohar, 1999, p.2. 
•^""Babar, Babarnama (Memoirs of Babar), 1, p.444. 
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'wretched condition' Babiir received iiim favourably. Mohibul Hasan writes 
that Babur did so because he wanted to use him as a pawn in forthcoming struggle 
with Ibrahim?"" 
It has been argued that Babur's inability to establish himself at home in Central 
Asia stemmed from his failure to gather sufficient support base among either of the 
two groups, which could have ensured his power: the most urbanized Timurids and 
the remnants of the semi-nomadic Mongols. Where as Babur's Uzbek rival, 
Shaibani Khan sought to strengthen his TImurid 'legitimacy' by marrying Babur's 
maternal aunt, two daughters of his maternal step-uncles, Babur's own sister, and 
arranged to have other members of his family to enter into similar marriages. 
As a true Chinggisid, the Uzbek rulers also enjoyed a claim to 'legitimacy'. In 
Central Asia, they were the major force to be reckoned with for three and a half 
centuries, and a constant concern to neighbours on all sides including the Mughals, 
the Safavids, the Russian Tsars, and the Ming Chinese. The contemporary 
accounts, including the celebrated Tazkira-i Muqim Khani portrays the Uzbeks as 
patrons and protectors of the Timurids during I'le Uzbek ascendancy in the 
fifteenth century. The Mughals' sense of superiority over their Uzbek rivals to the 
northwest is clear, however. The official illusion hinted at in the Mughal 
chronicles is that the Mughals were still the true and legitimate masters of Central 
'"' Mohibbul Hasan, Babar: Founder of Mughal Empire in India, Delhi: Manohar Publications, 
1985, p.59. 
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Asia but hidirg their military debacles, portray that they were content to let the 
Uzbetcs 'house sit' for them there as long as order was maintained?''^ 
Timur was the prime role model and reference point for the achievements of Babur 
as well as for his successors. The legitimacy of the Mughals both in their own 
eyes and in the eyes of others rested on their lineal descent from Timur. At a 
remove of five generations, Babur was one among a number of Timur's 
descendants who were struggling to hold on to the splintering remnants of the 
Timurid Empire in Central Asia at the end of the fifteenth century. He was the 
only one to establish a power base in the sixteenth century, in India, which two 
centuries earlier had been conquered by Timur. This conquest of Timur however 
was short lived. The genealogical emphasis on Central Asian legends was, thus a 
necessity for Babur. Naturally he emphasized his descent from Timur, for whom, 
rather surprisingly; he usually employs in his memoirs no higher title than beg}'^^ 
His seal in India also had his descent traced up to Timur. 
The major pedicament before Babur, however was to justify his claim on 
'Hindustan' which he refers to as the part and parcel of his ancestors (Timur), but 
he found it hard to justify the massacre during his invasion of 1397-1399. The 
duality involved in emphasizing the genealogical links to Timur (Sahib-i Qiran), 
the World Conqueror to reinforce the Indian Timurlds' dynastic prestige and claim 
"^^  Babar, Babarnama (Memoirs ofBabar),\, p. 14. 
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to royalty, on the one hand, and confronting the reality of the negative image of 
Timur in India, on the other, ensued another twist to the already complex medieval 
concept of siyasa. The attempts of Babur and his son and successor Humayun in 
formalizing and giving shape to their administration could well be attempted to 
understand from the point of view of the issue of'justice' that increasingly formed 
the basis of medieval monarchy, and often alone provided 'legitimacy' to rule. 
3.2 Babur's Concept of Justice in Siyasa: The Evolution of 
Mughal Politics 
The principle of'legitimacy' during the rule of Sultans of Delhi (1206-1526) for 
some time worked quite well in India. The llbari Turks (1210-1290) believed that 
none except the descendant of Iltutmish had the right to rule. It was only under 
the Khalji Sultans (1290-1320) that the concept of 'legitimacy' was relegated to 
the concept of 'right to rule' on the strength of military power .so//(sword). The 
right to rule by the strength of sword was neither considered very ideal for 
establishing a dynastic monarchy nor could be considered a legitimate government. 
Thus, to provide legitimacy, to such a form of government the concept of justice or 
good governance was emphasised. To neutralise the negative image of Timur in 
India Babur found the concept of justice or good government as a very convenient 
tool. It seems that thereafter the concept of justice got the precedence over the 
principle of legitimacy. 
It would perhaps be misleading to conclude that it was Babur who introduced the 
concept of 'justice' in the political framework for the first time in India. It has 
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already been discussed, in the first chapter that the concept of 'justice' was 
rigorously emphasized in the works of political theorists during the medieval 
period. The Islamic literary genre of'advice to kings' or 'mirrors for princes' was 
not just the self-referential pastime of a frustrated class of scribes but an influential 
expression of values widely held by ruling groups and populations in the Islamic 
world.^''' 
The raison d'etre for Kingship was maintenance of peace and dispension of 
'justice' as emphasized in the treatises of the period. The thirteenth century Indian 
poet and historian Amir Khusru compares a ruler to a shepherd and says that if a 
shepherd is drunk or negligent his herd would find a place in the stomach of 
wolves. A king was duty bound to ensure peaceful and satisfactory conditions for 
both the rich and the poor. Yusuf Gada in his Tuhfa-i Nasaih (1393) is of the view 
that the exercise of property rights is subordinate tv. duty and to morality.^ ''^  The 
extent to which the duty of a ruler with regard to dispensation of 'justice' was 
emphasized may be gauged from the remarks of Zia Barani who wrote that 
kingship could co-exist with infidelity but not with injustice. The objective and 
duty oi sultan is to deliver 'justice' irrespective of caste and class. 'Justice' here 
meant not only equality before the law or adherence to it, but also ensures the 
'^"' Linda Darling, "Do Justice, Do Justice, For that is Paradise": Middle Eastern Advice for Indian 
Muslim Rulers," Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, 22, no. 1 & 2, 
2002, p.3. 
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prosperity of agrarian society and protection of life and property of the 
common people?''^ 
Babur and his successor as already mentioned traced their descent from Timur, 
founder of one of the largest empire in Central Asia after Chinggis Khan. Under 
the influence of the Timurid ideas of 'legitimacy', based on dynastic continuity, 
Babur struggled to replace the Delhi Sultanate's rule by swords {saif) strength with 
dynastic legitimacy. Besides that he also gave importance to the concept of 
'justice' which also formed a part of the Timurid political heritage. 
Linda Darling in a recent research argues that the early Mughals, including Babur, 
did not rely on this principle of 'justice' but on the contrary were dependent on the 
legitimizing paradigm of politics. She writes: 
Despite their Timurid connection, the early Mughal 
emperors rarely alluded directly to the circle of justice, 
but it contributed to the intellectual foundation of one of 
their favourite activities, the planting of gardens.^ ''^  
At another place, she concludes that the circle of justice was not an important 
legitimizing factor under the early Mughals.^ ''* However, my understanding on 
the basis of the reading of the source material is just contrary to the above finding. 
'•*' Ibid., p.8 
^'' Ibid. 
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As a matter of fact not only the circle of 'justice' was a legitimizing factor but 
it also played an important role in the affairs of administration; although it must be 
confessed that during Babur's time it was in the evolutionary stage. 
It has already been argued that despite Babur's descent from Timur that provided 
him the 'legitimacy' to rule India, it was still difficult for him to neutralize his 
negative image of massacre ordered by him duri.r^ his invasion of India in 1392. 
Thus, perhaps the only option left for him was to reinforce the principle of'justice' 
that was already in practice in many other parts of the world. Babur's own literary 
taste contributed immensely in this aspect. Among his favourite readings were 
Firdausi's Shahnama and the Khamsas of Nizami and Amir Khusru. He carried 
his ancestor's copy of the Shahnama from Herat to India, and passed it on to his 
descendants. '^'^  It was after discussion with Babur that Ikhtiyar al-Husayni wrote 
his summary of TusVs Akhlaq-i Humayuni, which elucidated the principles of ruler 
ship over the peasant using Tusi's concepts of balance and harmony.^ ^° It is quite 
well known that all these works were full of stories and anecdotes emphasizing the 
notions of 'justice'.^^'. 
'^* See for details Babar, Babarnama (Memoirs ofBabar). 
-'° Muhammad Abdul Ghani, A Hisloiy of Persian Language and Literature at the Mughal Court, 
Allahabad : Indian Press, 1929, p.43. 
" ' A point also accepted by Linda Darling 
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The office of sadr was created even during the brief period of Babur's rule 
when other important offices were absent?^^ The various Madad-i Mash grants 
given to ulema and Sufi saints by Babur also points towards the increasing 
emphasis on 'justice'. He strongly criticizes Sultan Husain Mirza Baiqara's 
wasteful and extravagant administrative system due to which the peasants and 
soldiers remained thoroughly dissatishficd. But as very little work on Babur's 
administrative system had been done, these aspects have not been emphasised by 
modern historians. However, whatever little evidence we have, it clearly indicates 
that he gave more importance to the rule of'justice' than to the rule of'sword' and 
the principle of legitimacy. 
3.3 Legitimacy and Justice' Conflict: Crisis During Babur's Reign 
It seems that with the emphasis on the principle of legitimacy as a tool for 
assumption to the office of sultan, a number of princes and even nobles laid claim 
to the position of sovereign and in Central Asia Babur had witnessed that it had led 
to perpetual conflict among princes on that account. Therefore, he thought it fit 
now to lay more emphasis on 'justice' and on treatment of nobles with leniency 
even if sometimes they disobeyed him. 
Now, we find that to pacify them he assigned revenues of large territories along 
with huge amount of gifts in cash and valuables. After the capture of Agra almost 
^" Shaikh Zain was the sadr during the reign of Babur. See Yog Raj Malhotra, Babur's Nobility 
and Administration in Hindustan, p.l22. 
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every beg was given huge amount of money. Babur writes that begs were 
given ten, eight, seven or six lakhs according to their ranks. He also sent gifts to 
those who were in Central Asia such as Prince Mirza Kamran, Muhammad Zaman 
Mirza, Hindal, and Askari and his other relatives in Samarqand, Kabul, Khurasan 
and Kashgar were showered with monetary and titular gifts. Gifts were even sent 
to nobility and soldiery in Kabul and to relatives in Iraq. Similiarly, offerings were 
also sent to holy men of Samarqand, Khurasan and Mecca-Medina. Babur writes 
that every person in Kabul, Khost and Badakhshan got one Shahrukhi (gold coin) 
irrespective of their age, sex, and status.^ '^' Besides his desire to favour his nobles 
and relatives with huge treasuries that he got at Agra and Delhi, Babur also wanted 
to tell his relations in Central Asia that he had established himself as an absolute 
ruler and he was looking for their assistance in consolidating his conquest in an 
alien land. Gulbadan Begum writes that he sent letters to them in this connection: 
We shall take into full favour all who enter our service, 
and especially such as served our father and grandfather 
and ancestors. If such will come to us, they will receive 
fitting benefits. Whoever there may be of the families of 
Sahib Qiran and Chengez Khan, let them turn towards 
our court. The most High has given us sovereignty in 
Hindustan, let them came that we may see prosperity 
together.^ '^* 
253 Babar, Babarnama (Memoirs ofBabar), 2, pp.522-523. 
^^* Begum, Humayunnama. p.97. 
124 
Besides that from the above it is also quite clear that Babur was trying to assert 
that he was superior to all other Timurid princes who were present in India as well 
as in Central Asia. 
We also notice that right from his first invasion in 1519, Babur considered 
Hindustan as a Timurid possession and therefore asked his army to treat the 
inhabitants of Bhira leniently. He also entered into alliance with local Afghan 
chiefs to expel Ibrahim Lodi. However, when he found that Daulat Khan Lodi had 
broken the terms of the treaty reached between them, he took very strong action 
against him. In his memoirs he writes: 
I called thee Father, I showed thee more honour and 
respect than you couldst have asked. Thee and thy sons 
1 saved from door-to- door life amongst the Baluchis. 
Thy family and thy haram I freed from Ibrahim's 
prison-house. Three krors I gave thee on Tatar Khan's 
lands. What ill sayest thou I have done thee, that thus 
shouldst hang a sword on thy either side, lead an army 
out, fall on lands of ours, and stir strife and trouble?^^^ 
It may aso be pointed out that for the first time he took such harsh action against a 
high noble. Probably by this action he wanted to send signals to his other Indian 
collaboraters that if they would try to create problems for him, they would be given 
exemplery punishment. However, he remained suspicious towards them and still 
'^^  Babar, Babarnama (Memoirs ofBabar), 2, p.459. 
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placed more reliance on his Central Asian nobles despite their poor track 
record in Samarqand and Kabul. 
Babur also proved to be an able adminstrator right from the beginning of his Indian 
campaign of conquest. Soon after the conquest of Bajaur, he appointed Khwaja 
Kalan to look after its administration. After a year, Khwaja Kalan was called back 
and Shah Mir Husain Qarluq was appointed in his place.^ ^* Similarly, after the 
occupation of Bhira, Hindu Beg was appointed there. Khushab was given to the 
governorship of Shah Hasan and Chenab was given to Husain Ikzak.^ '^' Even an 
envoy was despatched from Bhira to the court of Ibrahim Lodi.^ ^* Similarly, 
appointments were made after the conquest of Lahore, Dipalpur, Jalandhar and 
Sultanpur. Although, his conquest shortlived but it clearly indicated that Babur 
was quite serious in his Indian conquest. After gaining victory in the battle of 
Panipat, Babur took steps to consolidate his power in the regions once held by 
Ibrahim Lodi. He admitted in his service almost all those Afghan chiefs who 
agreed to accept his over lordship and also assigned them those territories which 
they already held under Ibrahim Lodi. He also appointed Wall Qizil as shiqdar 
and Dost Mughol as diwan to look after the administration of Delhi.^ '^ 
'^* Ibid., l,pp.367-70& 422. 
" ' Ibid., p.386. 
" ' Ibid., pp.384-385. 
" ' Ibid.,2, p.466. 
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3.4 Defiant Nobility and the Position of 'Sovereign* 
Babur's conquest of Hindustan was still unfinished in 1526. Except Agra and 
Delhi, the rest of Hindustan was not under his sway. Besides, the hostility of the 
people of Agra and Delhi towards the Mughals and the rebellions in the 
surrounding areas further compounded his problems. Moreover, Babur had to face 
the discontent of his army who were not ready to stay in Hindustan anymore. 
Babur was greatly hurt with the attitude of his nobles especially of those whom he 
had raised to higher ranks. He expected atleast from them as he had mentioned in 
his memoirs, 'whatever 1 went these at my side would they be.' But it may be 
pointed out that attitude of the nobles was not rebellious, they refused to stay 
simply because they had no interest in Babur's enterprise -establishment of an 
empire in an alien land. But as mentioned above he had a well thought out plan of 
establishing an empire in India, and as the project was almost complete he was 
determined to fulfil at all cost. Babur's writes: 
On these accounts the greater part of the begs and best 
braves became unwilling to stay in Hindustan, indeed set 
their faces for leaving it. It is no reproach to old and 
experienced begs if they speak of such matters; even if 
they do so, this man (Babur) has enough sense and 
reason to get at what is honest or what is mutinous in 
their representations, to distinguish between loss and 
gain.... what recommends the expression of distasteful 
opinions by men of little tanding?....this last time of 
riding out from Kabul, a few men of little standard had 
just been made begs; what I looked for them was that if I 
went through fire and water and came out again, they 
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would have gone in with me unhesitatingly, and with me 
have come out, that wherever I went, there at my side 
v/ould they be,— not that they would speak against my 
purpose, not that they would turn back from any task or 
great affair on which, all counseling, all consenting, we 
had resolved, so long as the counsel was abandoned. 
Badly as these new beg behaved. Secretary Ahmadi and 
Treasurer Wall behaved still worse, Khwaja Kalan had 
done well in the march out from Kabul, in Ibrahim's 
defeat and until Agra was occupied; he had spoken bold 
words and shewn ambitious views. But a few days after 
the capture of Agra, all his views changed, —^the one 
zealous for departure at any price was Khwaja Kalan.^^ 
From the above, it becomes quite clear that Babur's nobles— both seniors and the 
ones raised by him to the status of beg at the time of his campaign to India were 
unwilling to stay in Hindustan. They were determined to leave India not as a part 
of any design against Babur but because of hot climate, unhospitable conditions 
and prolonged stay from their homes. The vast majority of nobles who 
accompanied Babur in the campaign probably never thought that Babur would 
establish an Empire in India. They thought like Amir Timur after the conquest, 
they will return to their homeland laden with huge booty. But Babur from the very 
beginning had other ideas. He was not satishfied with his position in Kabul but 
apparently he had not shared his views even with his close associates. 
•''" lbid,2, p.524. 
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The departure of some of his close friends and associates created very 
dangerous situation for Babur. Although as mentioned above the vast majority of 
his army had stayed on. However, the departure of some very senior nobles and 
the information of Rana Sangram Singh's march towards Agra as the head of a 
large with a large army to confront him completely devastated Babur's army. In 
his memoirs, Babur writes about the state of affairs in his camp at this juncture. 
Babur himself was greatly perturbed by this action of Rana Sangram Singh. Babur 
writes: 
In these days, as has been mentioned, (our people) great 
and small, had been made very anxious and timid by 
past occurrences. No manly word or brave counsel was 
heard from any one so ever. What bold speech was 
there from the wazirs who are to speak out (dighuchi), 
or from the amirs who will devour the land (wilayat-
yighuchi)? None had advice to give, none a bold plan 
of his own to expound.'^ '^ 
The situation was so bad that Babur was compelled to discuss the matter with his 
nobles. Nizamuddin writes that the vast majority of his nobles advised him to 
retire to Punjab with a great portion of the army after strengthening some of the 
forts and wait there for some supernatural power.^ ^^ 
In his memoirs, Babur also n-entions that he summoned all 'begs' and after a 
discussion he found that most of them were completely demoralised and were not 
'^^ ' Ibid, p.556. 
^" Nizamuddin Ahmad, Tabaqal-i Akbari, Brajendra Nat^ De tr., 3 vols. Delhi : Low Price 
Publication, 1992,2, pp.36-37. 
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prepared to fight against the Rajputs. Therefore, to raise their morale he made 
a spirited speech which run as follows: 
Begs and Braves! "Better than life with a bad name, is 
death with a good one. "God the most high has allotted 
to us such happiness and has created for us such good 
fortune that we die as martyrs, we kill as avengers of 
His cause. Therefore must each of you take oath upon 
His Holy Word that he will not think of turning his face 
from this foe, or withdraw from this deadly encounter 
so long as life is not rent from his body." All those 
present, beg and retainer, great and small, took the holy 
book joyfully into their hands and made vow and 
compact to this purport. The plan was perfect; it 
worked admirably for those near and afar, for seers and 
hearers, for friend and foe. 
Gulbadan Begum also writes that Babur addressed his begs and by his forceful 
pleadings convinced them for waging a war. She further adds that 'his army-men 
not only agreed to it but also swore by the divorce of their wives on the Holy book 
to fight till the last breath of their life.'^^ 
The Nizamudc in Ahmad and Rizqullah Mushtaqi, the author of Waqiat-i Miishtaqi 
also give more or less the same version of this event but both of them assert that 
'he gave a call for Jehad. Nizamuddin writes: 
^" Babar, Babarnama (Memoirs ofBabaij, 2, pp.556-557. 
^" Begum, Humayunnama, p. 99; Rushbrook William, Empire Builder, p. 148. 
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It is time that we sliould lay our hearts on martyrdom." 
And he gave a shout of "Jihad". Thus, all took oath on 
Holy book.^ ^^  
Mushtaqi is more specific when he quotes Babur: 
1 had to fight tills battle against the infidels. Where 
should we go (avoiding the battle). If we achieve 
v'ictory, we shall become Ghazi (holy warrior), 
otherwise we shall attain to martyrdom. It never 
behoves us that we shall attain to martyrdom. It never 
behoves us that we turn our back on the battle field." 
Then, took their oath on Holy Quran?^^ 
To portray himself as a good Muslim and upholder of the shariat, just before the 
battle of Khanva he declared that he was giving up drinking of wine and all 
forbidden things such as gold and silver vassals were broken and distributed 
among needy which was also done by his followers.^ *^ Several other steps were 
also taken up in this direction at the same time. He remitted tamgha or stamp-tax 
to gain the favour of Mussalmans.^'^^ 
^" Ahmad, Tabaqat-i Akbari, 2, pp.37-38. 
*^* Shaikh Rizqullah Mushtaqui, Waqiat-i Mushtaqi, tr. I.H. Sidd^qui, New Delhi: I.C.H.R, 1993, 
p.117. 
^*' Babar, Babarnama (Memoirs ofBabar), 2, p.552; Begum, Humayunnama, pp.99-100. 
^*' Begum, Hur.iayunnama, pp.99-ICO; Mohibbui Hasan, p.89. 
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But it is quite significant to note that several local Muslim chiefs, inspite of 
Babur's attempt to declare this battle as a wai between infidels and Muslims, 
continued to support Rana Sangram Singh and were killed fighting against Babur's 
army. However, Babur after this victory assumed the title of Ghazi^^^ and in the 
fathnama he was styled asfath-i-padshah-i-Islam}^°. 
The victory at Khanva was of great significance— Rana Sanga's defeat in a way 
was practically the end of any formidable resistance from the side of Rajputs. And 
secondly, we find Babur for the first using a new tool 'religion' to garner the 
support of the Muslim including his own nobles under his leadership as a defender 
of the faith. 
For the people of North India, these titles (Ghazi, Padshah-I Islam) were much 
more significant than a Timurid who was remembered here only as an invader 
failed to establish a strong dynasty. By adding these titles, his prestige as a ruler 
considerably improved among the contemporary ruling dynasties. However, he 
did not ignore to emphasise his Chinggisid-Timurid connection; after this victory 
he also assumed the title of Khaqan. Besides that, he still continued to give 
importance to Tura-i Chinggisi. In his memoirs, he remarked: 
Our forefathers through a long space of time, had 
respected the Chingiz-Tura (ordinance) doing nothing 
^^ * Babar, Babarnama (Memoirs ofBabar),!, pp.559-560. 
"" Ibid., pp.574-575. 
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opposed to it, whether in aseembly or court, in sittings 
down or rising ups. Though it has no divine authority 
so that a man obeys it of necessity, still good rules of 
conduct must be obeyed by whom-so ever they are left; 
just in the same way that, if a forefather have done ill, 
his ill must be changed for good.^ '^ 
Apparently this positive refernce to tura could have been because of the presence 
of a number of his Mongol relations and over whelming number of Turanis in his 
ruing clas. However, now Babur came to real'se that to establish a strong 
centralised empire in India and attain the position of a sovereign the total 
subordination of the nobility to the crown was of prime importance. His Central 
Asian nobility during his campaign had broadly cooperated with him but it seems 
he had doubts about their future behaviour especially after the campaigns of the 
conquest came to an end and the process of consolidation begins. Therefore, to 
counter them after Khanva, he decided to induct local elements in his nobility in a 
big way. All those Afghan chiefs who agreed to accept the subordination of the 
Mughals were not only admitted in service but were also confirmed in the areas 
which they had held earlier. Malik Dad Karrani, a prominent Afghan noble was 
not only pardoned but also assigned several parganas.^ ^^ Several prominent Indian 
Muslims who enjoyed important position under the Lodis were also admitted in 
imperial service. Prominent among them were Shaikh Guran, Firoz Khan, 
-" lbid,l,pp.298-299. 
"^ Ibid, 2, p.477; Afzal Husain, The Nobility under Akbar and Jahangir. p.2. 
133 
Mahmiid Khan Nuhani, Qazi Zia, Shaikh Bayazid, Path Khan Sarvvani, Nizam 
Khan, Tatar Khan, Muhammad Zaitun were also taken into the service. Similarly, 
a number of local chiefs both Hindus and Muslims were also inducted in his ruling 
class such as Raja of Kahlur, Sangur Khan Janjuha and Adam Khan Ghakkar?^^ 
According to one study out of 116 nobles, 31 were Hindustani including Afghans 
and Shaikhzadas in Babur's nobilty.^''' Afghans however, enjoyed the pre-eminent 
position. They have considerable share in total i.e., 28.7%, out of which 41.7% 
was held by Farmulis and Nohanis.^ ^^ 
By admitting Indians in his nobility, Babur believed that on the one hand he will be 
able to win the support and goodwill of the local people for the Mughal Empire 
and on the other with their cooperation he would be able to counter any disruptive 
activities of his Zwram nobles. 
After achieving two great victories at Panipat and Khanva and having decided to 
establish an empire in India, Babur wanted to enjoy unrestrained powers of die 
king. Apparently as mentioned above, to achieve the objective he also tried to alter 
the compositic n of his nobility and introduced significant administrartive reforms. 
However, his Central Asian mind-set about the relations of his nobles with the 
emperor based on the Tura-i Chinggisi hampered the growth and development of a 
'^^  Babar, Babarnama (Memoirs ofBabar), 2, pp.547-548; Abul Fazl, Akbarnama, 1, pp.195-196; 
A.R Khan, "Babur's Settlement of His Conquests in Hindustan, IHC, 1967, pp.207-20. 
^^* Afzal Husain, The Nobility Under Akbar andJahcngir, p.4. 
^" Tej Ram, " Babur's relations with the Nohani and Farmuli Afghans: A Study of his Nobility 
(1526-30), Proceedings of the Indian History Congress, 1980,n.231 
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strong monarchy. He still continued to invite nobles to advice him on 
important matters of state policies and sat with them in wine parties as friends. 
Not only that but also in his letters to Humayun, he asktd him to seek the advice of 
wise and experienced begs (especially Kalan Beg) and call meetings of brothers 
and begs twice a day as a rule. He further advised him to call meeting for every 
business and settle every issue that came to him in agreement with his advisers.^ ^* 
He still believed that the empire after him be divide among his sons, though the 
larger share should go to Humayun. Babur once said to have remarked: "the law 
had always been adhered to that when thou had six parts Kamran had five." This 
statement is certainly influenced by the Central Asian tradition ofdivision of the 
empire among sons. This desire of Babur in some was way obeyed by Humayun 
who after ascending the throne devided his empire among his brothers succeeded 
to the throne of industan after Babur's death in 1530. But this act of Humayun 
encouraged not only his brothers but also his other relations and a section of the 
nobility to chiillenge his position as an absolute soverign and on several occasions 
raised banner of revolt against his authority as will be discussed in the next section. 
He also came to the conclusion that for establishing a strong monarchy the 
principle of legitimacy was not enough. On the contrary he had seen that this 
principle had created more problems not only for him but to others also who were 
upholders of the principle of legitimacy. During h's Indian conquest he laid more 
emphasis on the principle of 'justice' and as the defender and upholder of Islamic 
"^ Babar, Babarnama (Memoirs ofBabar), 2, p.627. 
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shariat. Of course, the principle of 'legitimacy' remained an important ' 
element in his theory of sovereignty. His Chinggisid-Timurid connection helped 
him to get support of a large number of his relatives and clans men in his 
campaigns inspite of his repeated failures in his early years and thereafter in his 
Indian campaign as a direct descendant of Timur. 
136 
CHAPTER-FOUR 
Evolution of the Mughal Political Structure: The Reign of 
Humayun 
Much of the predicament with the son and successor of Babur, Humayun is due to 
the analysis of his reign, both by the contemporary, as well as modern historians 
who seeks to examine the latter's reign, either from the perspective of a military 
leader Babur, or from the perspective of a well established 'sovereign', Akbar. 
Gulbadan Begum, for example, provides glaring insight into the reign of his 
brother Humayun, but apparently, while writing during the reign of Akbar, she had 
a model of a well-established monarchy to revert back for the reign of Humayun. 
Jouhar Aftabchi, an ewe-bearer of Humayun, most often looked at the reign of 
Humayun from a model of a military leader provided by Babur, and often laments 
on the latter's catastrophic political decisions. The totalizing effect of the modern 
studies based on such contemporary accounts has been to present before the 
posterity the reign of Humayun as a period of complete political and military 
disasters. This image of Humayun's reign persists because the sources for the 
study of his reign so far have not been critically analysed. Besides, it is also 
unfortunate that Humayun's reign is always compared with that Babur and Akbar 
and never individually; this had also coloured our estimate of Humayun. 
Numerous researches in the recent years, no doubt, have questioned the validity of 
the studies conducted in isolation. However, such studies do affirm the need to 
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recognize the importance of the then socio-political circumstances of the time, 
which in any case necessitate and guide, as well as shape the destiny of a ruling 
monarch and his empire in any given time and space. For the reign of Humayun 
the above given analytical model assumes vital characteristics since it was a 
transitory phase in the annals of Mughal history in South Asia. The Mughal 
dominion in South Asia did move from its 'tribal' Central Asian characteristics 
under Humayun, but was yet to acquire the full-fledge status of an 'empire' 
emanating from an all powerful monarch, which was ever so evident during the 
reign of Akbar. The resulting confusion and political chaos so evident during the 
reign of Humayun, particularly military debacle at Chausa are all well-known 
hallmarks of a transitory phase, and, thus, needs to be studied carefully in its 
proper context. This chapter, thus, explores the reign of Humayun, the son and 
successor of Babur from the above methodology. The role played by his brothers, 
nobles and other factions in the political fate of the Mughals is analyzed from the 
point of view of predicaments of a political transitory phase. 
4.1 Evolution of Kineship 
During his brief rule of four years in Hindustan, Babur did try to give practicalities 
to his title of Padishah, trying to juggle between the political paradigms of 
'legitimacy' and 'justice', only to find a bitter resentment among his nobles. To 
establish himself as an absolute ruler over a ruling class, which was predominantly 
Turani was a daunting task before Babur. However, he was able to achieve this 
position by conquering Hindustan. But as the large numbers of his nobles were 
still Turanis, the Timurid tradition of Kingship still remained dominant. Inspite of 
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Babur's nomination of Humayun as his successor, Mir Khalifa a senior noble 
of Babur opposed not only Humayun's nomination but also that of his other 
brothers, namely Kamran, Askari and HindaP^' and conspired to enthrone Mahdi 
Khwaja the brother-in-law of Babur?^* The precedence given to this person over 
the sons of Babur indicated that a few among the ruling class still strongly 
believed, as enshrined in the^^a^o, that empire belongs to the ruling family and not 
to the ruler. This completely undermined the right of the Emperor to nominate his 
successor. Although the conspiracy failed but it clealy indicated that in the ruling 
class there were still a sizeable number of nobles who were of the view that Tura-i 
Chinggisi should continue to guide the Emperor in dealing with the nobles and in 
other matters of governance. But this attempt of a very senior noble clearly 
indicates that on the issue of succession, the will of the dying king was not final. 
However, the chroniclers by giving a description of Babur sacrificing his life for 
ailing Humayun still make an attempt to link the Mughal Empire in India to 
Central Asian monarchical traditions."' Babur had expressed his wish long before 
his death, to retire and to handover the kingdom to Humayun. Gulbadan writes 
that Babur before his death called his chiefs and said: 
^"Ahmad, Tabaqat-i Akbari, 2, p.42; Also see S. K. Banerjee, Humayun Badshah, London: Oxford 
University Press, 1983. 
^" Banerjee, Humayun Badshah, 1, p. 19. According to Nizamuddin Ahmad, Mahdi Khwaja was the 
son-in-law of Babur but Gulbadan Begum refers Mahdi Khwaja as his brother-in-Law, which 
seems more correct. See Begum, Humayunnama, p. 128. 
^" From a page of chinggisid history where a similar incident is narrated about Chinggis Khan. 
^^ ^ Begum, Humayunnama, pA^)!:. 
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For years it has been in heart to malce over my throne to 
Humayun Mirza and to retire By the divine grace I 
have obtained all things but the fulfillment of this wish 
in health of body. Now, when illness has laid me low, I 
charge you all to acknowledge Humayun in my stead. 
Fail not in loyalty to him. Be of one heart and one mind 
with him. I hope to God that Humayun also will bear 
liimscli'well towards men.""' 
Babur further said, "Humayun, I commit to God's keeping you and your brothers 
and all my kinsfolk and your brothers and all my kinsfolk and your people and my 
people; and all of these I confide to you."^ ^^  
However, despite the wish of Babur, Humayun's accession was not easy. Initially, 
death of Babur was concealed by disguising another person which had Humayun's 
approval. Gulbadan Begam writes that on the suggestion of Araish Khan, an amir 
of Hind another person was disguised as Babur and was placed on the throne.^ *^ 
It seems that because of these pressures Humayun agreed to divide his empire 
between his brothers. Although his sovereign status was not challenged by his 
brothers but it created different centres of powers. Kamran, who got the lion's 
"'lbid.,pp.l08-lC9, 
"Mbid.,p. 108. 
283 Ibid., p. 109 mentions the incidence in the following words, "It is not well to keep the death 
secret, because when such misfortunes befall kings in Hindustan, it is the custom of the bazar 
people to rob and steal; God forbid that the Mughals not knowing, they should come and loot the 
houses and dwelling-places. It would be best to dress someone in red and, and to set him on an 
elephant, and to let him proclaim that the Emperor Babar had became a dervish and has given his 
throne to the Emperor Humayun.' This, his Majesty ordered to be done." 
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share in the division, became so ambitious that he captured almost the whole of 
Punjab and Humayun had to concede to his request to officially handover these 
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territories. 
This action of Humayun on one hand indicated that he enjoyed complete authority 
as a ruler to assign territories to his brothers and nobles, and on the other, it also 
satisfied the ruling class because they realised that the Emperor had also 
considerations for Timurid traditions. This might have send signals across the 
Turanis that they have now a Padishah to reckon with, and not a military general 
that was dependent on the counsels of his lieutenants. 
Soon after ascending the throne, Humayun started taking keen interest in the affairs 
of the state and as a first step decided to curb the activities of rebellious elements 
in his kingdom. The leadership shown by Humayun in curbing the rebellions of 
Afghans, as well as, capturing the fort of Chunar from Jalal Khan, the son of Sher 
Khan, apparently showed advancement over the status of Padishah that was 
achieved by Babur. Soon thereafter he decided to capture Gujarat, because the ^ 
ruler of the kingdom Bahadur Shah had been giving shelter to Afghan rebels and 
other Mughal nobles who rebelled. He had become very ambitious and with the 
support of these elements was conspiring to launch an attack on Mughal 
^''' Mewat was conferred on Mirza Hindal; and the Punjab, Kabul and Qandahar to Mirza Kamran; 
and Sambhal was conferred on Mirza Askari. See Ahmad, Tabaqat-i Akbari., 2, p.45; Abul FazI, 
Akbarnama., I, p. 151 where Abul FazI mentions Alwar instead of Mewat and Badakhshan according to him 
was given to Mirza Sulaiman; Ishwari Prasad, The Life and Times of Humayun,Ca\c\Ma: Orient Longman, 
1955, p.42; Banerjee, Humayun Badshah, 1, p.28. 
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possessions. The Gujarat campaign of Humayun was a grand success. During 
the campaign Humayun showed his competence as great military commander and 
like a 'sovereign', subdued the country of Ahmadabad, while at the same time also 
dividing whole of Gujarat to his men.^ *^  The subjugation of Ahmadabad and its 
annexation signaled that the concept of 'sovereign' was gradually evolving. The 
powerful position, as well as stature occupied by Humayun did neutralize, at least 
to an extent, the defiant nobility, which now for some time have been creating 
hindrances in the path towards attaining a 'sovereign' status and position. The 
annexation of Gujarat was done against the advice and wishes of the Tiirani 
military leaders. Seldom previously Babur managed to act against the counsel of 
his military commanders, despite proclaiming himself as Padishah. 
After the conquest of Ahmedabad, it was annexed in the Empire, although majority 
of the nobles were against this move. Here again Humayun strongly asserted his 
position as an absolute sovereign taking decision independently which in his view 
was in the best interest of the Empire. 
If the conquest of Gujarat was a feather in his cap, its collapse was equally a great 
set back to his power and position as a sovereign. Thus, the annexation of Gujarat 
and that too against the general advice reaffirms the position and direction towards 
which the concept of Mughal 'sovereign' was progressing. It was the necessary 
^'' Ahmadabad was bestowed on Mirza Askari and Patan on Yadgar Nasir Mirza. According to 
Nizam-ud-din, Bahruch was given to Mir Hindu Beg and Baroda to Qasim Husain Sultan and 
Champener on Tardi Beg, but according to Gulbadan, Bahruch was conferred on Qasim Husain 
Sultan. See, Begi m, Humayunnama, pp 131-132 
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step taken by Humayun as the court of Gujarat by this time had the notorious 
position of providing refuge for the trouble makers of the Mughal dynasty?^^ The 
parcelling of different territories of Gujarat among his men apparently was also an 
attempt to carve out some sort of political system, which for some reasons could 
not be achieved by Babur.^" 
After returning to Delhi, however, when he came to know of the aggressive 
designs of Sher Khan, he again moved to swiftly to take action against him. 
Humayun at this juncture is said to have remarked, "The insolence of these 
Afghans exceeds all bounds; let us go and take Chunar from them"?^^ This is 
indicative of the fact that even after the Gujarat disaster, Humayun was not only 
confident of his military leadership but also of his nobility. The step above could 
only have been taken if the king is assured of his following and status, which for 
Humayun at this time seemingly was not a problem. On this strong note of 
confidence, it was not difficult for Humayun to conquer the fort of Chunar after 
which he conferred a number of promotions and bestowed honorary dresses on all 
chiefs.^ *^ These measures were like a 'sovereign', would do under these 
circumstances. It does not, thus appear that- Humayun was under any sort of 
pressure, and the newly carved Mughal dominion in South Asia, was progressing 
^'* Ishwari Prasad, The Life and Times of Humayun, p.67. 
^" Jouher Aftabchi, TIte Tezlcereh at Vakiat or Private Memoirs of the Moghul Emperor Humayun, Major 
Charles Stewart trans., Delhi: Idarah-i adabyiat-i Delhi, 1972 p.6. 
^'" Aftabchi, The Tezkereh al Vakiat or Private Memoirs of the Moghul Emperor Humayun, p.9. 
" Ibid., p.lO ; Begum, Humayunnama, p.133. 
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rapidly towards giving practical shapes to the mere theoretical adoption of the 
title of Padishah by Babur. 
Humayun as a powerful king also conveyed a strong message to Sher Khan 
through his ambassador asking him to send the umbrella, the throne, and the 
treasure of Bengal to him. He further asked Sher Khan to surrender the insignia of 
royalty and in exchange was offered any assignment of his choice.^'" Given the 
growing powers of Sher Khan by this time, it was a strong step taken by Humayun. 
Moreover, by asking the umbrella and throne of Bengal, Humayun was reiterating 
his status as the Padishah of Hindustan, and thus, justifying his claims to the 
insignia of royalty of small principalities. Symbolically, he also indirectly 
conveyed to Sher Khan, that he is not a Padishah. This strong message sent to 
Sher Khan further indicates Humayun's assertion of his authority as the ruler of 
Hindustan. It may also be pointed out that by and large the nobility also fully 
supported him in his entire campaign. The capture of Gaur further strengthened 
his position, and during his stay at Gaur it is alleged that he even claimed divine 
status. He generally distanced himself from the nobles and used to put a veil on 
his face. Whenever he appeared in public and removed his veil, the nobles used to 
say, "Light has shown forth".^'' 
Aftabchi, The Tezkereh at Vakiat or Private Memoirs of the Moghul Emperor Humayun, pp.11-12; 
Begum, Humayunnama, p.l33; Ishwari Prasad, The Life and Times of Humayun, p.lI9; Banerjee, 
Humayun Badshah, 2, pp.204-205. 
^" Abdul Qadir Badaoni, Mvntakhab-vt-Tenvarikh, tr. W. H. Lowe, 2 vols., Karachi: Karimsons, 
1976, 2, p.573. 
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It is well-known that Humayun's long stay in Bengal completely cut him off 
from his officials and led to negligence of the official business. On the other hand, 
Sher Khan continued to make arrangement to counter attack the Mughal position 
all along the route from Bengal to Jaunpur. Having come to know of these moves 
of Sher Khan the officials pressed Humayun to take action. The first important task 
before Humayun was to make a settlement of Bengal and to find a competent 
officer to look after affairs of Bengal. The situation in Bengal had gone so bad that 
Zahid Beg who was appointed to administer Bengal refused to accept it saying that 
the emperor could not find some place more pleasant than Bengal in which to do 
away with him. Thereafter, Jahangir Quli Beg with 5,000 horses was given the 
charge of Bengal and Humayun started towards Delhi.^ ^^ The returning journey of 
Humayun was complete disaster. Sher Khan completely defeated him at Chausa 
and the grand Mughal army perished. The Mughal Emperor himself was able to 
save his life with great difficulty. Humayun reached Agra only with handful of his 
soldiers. On his arrival, Kamran who was already in Agra met him with all 
sincerity and even offered to lead a campaign against Sher Khan. But Humayun, 
restrained him by saying, "No Sher Khan, defeated me, and I will have revenge of 
him." '^^  
It is rather difficult to explain this particular act of Humayun, but keeping in view 
such other actions it may be suggested that he wanted to raise the position of the 
Aftabchi, The Tezkereh al Vakiat or Private Memoirs of the Moghul Emperor Humayun,.p.3\; Abu! Fazl, 
Akbarnama, 1, p.341; Ishwari Prasad, The Life And Titties ofHutnayun, pp. 125-126. 
^" Aftabchi, The Tezkereh al Vakiat or Private memoirs of the Moghul Emperor Humayun, p.20. 
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sovereign. The principle of legitimacy had started creating problem for him; 
not only his brothers, several other Timurids such as Mirzas were challenging his 
position. His brothers, especially Kamran and Askari who on occasions challenged 
his position, were never able to get enough support to dislodge him. 
But with the defeat of grand Mughal army at Chausa, Humayun lost the confidence 
of his nobility. Stiious doubts were raised about his competence to defeat Sher 
Khan in the ensuing battle. Differences also arose between Kamran and Humayun 
and the former left Agra just before the battle of Kannauj with his entire army, 
leaving only a thousand troopers despite Humayun's pleadings. There was so 
much confusion in the Mughal camp at Agra that a large number of nobles sent 
their families along with Kamran. Sher Khan after his victory at Chausa crowned 
himself as Padishah of Hindustan and swiftly moved towards Agra to dislodge 
Humayun. In these adverse circumstances, Humayun fought a battle at Kannauj 
but once again he was completely defeated. Aftei this defeat the nobles 
completely lost confidence in Humayun. 
Thus, it is quite evident from the above review that Humayun during his initial ten 
years of rule did his best to exert his power and status among his nobles, as well as 
among other local chiefs and Rajas. No where it was evident, that he was reluctant 
in taking military expeditions and in the conquest of other areas. His efforts to 
brush aside the opinions of his nobles, especially Turanis did in fact promote his 
cause of a 'sovereign' ruler. 
146 
4.2 Organization of Administration; The Pre-rogatives of a 
'Sovereign' 
During the first ten years of his reign, Humayun not only acted as independent and 
powerful ruler but also was, to an extent, able to counter the principle of 'blood 
and legitimacy' which provided a sort of autonomy to the nobles, especially the 
male members of the ruling house. From time to time, Humayun bestowed grants, 
titles, awards and positions to his nobles. Although these bestowments were not 
on a considerable level, yet they point towards the fact that gradually the concept 
of Mughal kingship was evolving and the powers of a 'sovereign' was widening. 
We may recall here the distribution of the territories of Gujarat by Humayun to his 
men, as well as award of dresses of honour and gifts after the victory at Chunar.^ '^' 
On the one hand, these conferments were aimed at encouraging Humayun's nobilty 
for performing valiantly and loyally, and on the other hand they also implied to the 
nobles that there is a sovereign who rewards them for performing loyally. It 
helped in strengthening Humayun's position as a 'sovereign' among his nobles. 
In a similar stride, after the conquest of Gaur, the capital of Bengal, Humayun 
divided the province among his officers. '^^  This was an event of extreme 
importance. It app.iars that the division of the province of Bengal into assignments 
was an attempt on the part of Humayun to organize some sort of administration. 
^^ See Begum, Humayunnama, p.l33. 
^" Aftabchi, The Tezkereh al Vakiat or Private Men.oirs of the Moghul Emperor Humayun, p. 13. 
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Prior to this, there was hardly any attempt to organize the administration, 
although the concept of a Padishah was gradually evolving. Since the assignment 
system, as we understand it today, was both administrative and financial system, it 
appears that Humayun had started to organize his administration, as well as 
finances. Moreover, the appointment of Jahangir Quli as the governor of Bengal 
also points towards the fact that Humayun was indeed taking measures to organize 
his administration. Thus, the claim that Humayun was not an administrator is 
hardly borne out of fact. Around 1540, before the battle of Kannauj Humayun 
bestowed ranks and titles on all his principal officers and after his loss also did not 
hesitate to promote the officers. Similarly, Humayun promoted Bukshi Langha, a 
powerful zamindar with the title of Khan-i Jahan}'^^ Even he sent him banner and 
kettle drums, a horse and a head-to-foot dress, and in return asked for boats and 
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corn. 
The period of Humayun's stay in Bengal when he mostly shut himself up in his 
palace and withdrew from most of his nobles could also be understood as an 
administrative measure. Two of his measures during this period are recorded. One 
in which, he posed as the chief Muslim power and assessed the relative strength of 
the other Muslim kings. The other interesting manifestation of his idea was seen at 
Gaur, where he used to put a veil over his crown, and when he removed it, the 
'^^ ' Ibid., pp.28-29. 
^" Begum, Humayunnama, p. 148. 
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people used to say, "Light has shone forth!" '^* This expression led some 
people to believe that Humayun claimed divinity?^' It is also said that in Persia, 
he was taunted for his pretensions."""' 
Humayun also attempted several innovations, mainly to strengthen his position. 
Around 1533, he divided all his officials into three classes named &s Ahl-i Daulat, 
Ahl-i Saadat, and Ahl-i Miirad. The Emperor's brothers, relatives, his officers 
{umara), his ministers {wazirs) and his soldiers were termed as Ahl-i Daulat. The 
holy persons, the great sheikhs, sayyids, qodis, philosophers, poets, the judges, the 
nobles and worty people were called Ahl-i Saadat while young and handsome men, 
clever musicians and sweet singers were classed as Ahl-i Murad. Days of the week 
were divided and were allotted to these departments.'"'' 
Khwand Amir also records another system of categorization of these three 
departments of the nobility, including King. He believed that just as the Sun was 
the centre of the material world, similarly the King, v/hose destiny was closely 
associated with the great luminary, was the centre of the human world. The 
servants of the state were divided into twelve classes, each class being indicated by 
an arrow of which he himself was the centre. The twelfth arrow, made of the 
purest gold, was reserved for the quiver of the King and no one else was to share it 
'^* Abdul Qadir Badaoni, Muntakhab-ut-Tawarlkh, 2, p.573. 
^'^ R.P Tripathi, Some Aspects of Muslim Administration, p.l 17; Banerjee, Humayun Badshah, 2, 
p.335. 
'^* Cited from R.P Tripathi, Some Aspects of Muslim Administration, p. 117. 
^°' Khwandmir, Qanun-i Humayuni, pp.25-26. 
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with him, the eleventh for his brothers and other relations and those nobles who 
bore the title of sultan; the tenth for the sheikh and other learned sayyids, the ninth 
for the great nobles, the eighth for the intimate courtiers, the seventh for other 
officers, the sixth for the head of the Afghan clan and the Uzbeks, the fifth for the 
military officers, the fourth for the treasurers, the third for the soldiers, the second 
for the menial servants, and the first for the watch man and the camel drivers. 
Each class had the possession of these arrows, one being granted to the highest 
member, another to the middle and the third to the lowest.^ °^ Another innovation 
of Humayun was attempted towards re-organization of administrative affairs. He 
divided the entire administration or administrative divisions into four departments, 
corresponding to the four elements, viz., the atashi (fire), the hawai (air), the abi 
(water), and the khaki (earth) and appointed a minister for each of the 
department.^ ''^  
Humayun also introduced the system of wearing of different dresses for the 
different days of the week. ^^'^ As Humayun once in the hour of victory wore a red 
robe for three days to express his rage and ordered city of Mandu to be plundered. 
On the fourth day, he changed his dress into green after listening to ustad Manjhu, 
the musician."'°^ 
'"^ Khwandmir, Qcnun-i Humayuni, pp.31-32; R.P Tripathi, Some Aspects of Muslim Administration, pp.116-
117; Banerjee, Humcfyim Badshah, 2, pp.336-337. 
^" Khwandmir, Qanun-i Humayuni, p.35; Banerjee, Humayun Badshah, 2, pp.336-337. 
""Ibid., pp.51-53. 
^°^ Banerjee, Humayun Badshah, 1, p. 134 and 2, p.338; Ishwari Prasad, The Life and Times of 
Humayun, p.76. 
150 
The conferring of titles and ranks on tlie days of festivities, as practised by the 
Kings of Persia, was also adopted by Humayun. On the occasion of Nauroz 
(Persian New Year), Jalal Khan was granted the colours and kettle drums.^ "^  
Kettle drums, usually the prerogative of a king, were also given to the most trusted 
servants. Symbolically, it confirmed the status of a 'sovereign'which had the 
rights to bestow these high favours on the nobles. Similarly, Nadim Beg the 
husband of the favourite foster mother of Akbar, Maham Anga, on the same day 
was given the King's seal.^ °^ In the same fashion, other nobles were rewarded 
with the titles. 
It is significant to note that it was Humayun who introduced weighing ceremony of 
the sovereign on his birthday in 1534 A.D."'°* He was the one who introduced 
taslim and kornish?'^'^ 
Another important innovation of Bishat-i-Nishat (carpet of mirth) done by him 
needs to be discussed in detail as well. It was a round carpet divided into circles of 
different colours corresponding to the orbits of the planets, and the number of 
elemental spheres, and was made of valuable stuff. Gold colour circle was 
reserved for the Emperor to represent himself as the 'centre of power', like Sun. 
Each section of the people was made to sit in accordance with one of the seven 
planets appropriate to it, in the circle to which it corresponds. Each of the seven 
Khwandmir, Qanun-i Humayuni, p.70. 
"" lbid.,70. 
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Khwandmir, Qanun-i Humayuni, p.74. 
•"" Banerjee, Humayun Badshah.l, p.342. 
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circles was fu -ther divided into two hundred grades, so that there are fourteen 
hundred seats in total.'''° 
All these innovations were aimed at elevating the position of king among his 
nobles and the members of his house. A minute analysis of the above reforms of 
Humayun actually confirms that under the given political circumstances they 
helped in elevating the position of king among various other ambitious nobles who 
probably wanted to share the powers with the king. 
Thus, by 1540 Humayun through his military conducts and other symbolic acts did 
try to give a shape and meaning, not only to Mughal kingship but also to Mughal 
administration. Despite the claims in some of the modern text books that 
Humayun was not an administrator, or for that matter, had little time or genius to 
organize his administration is hardly supported by evidences. 
4.3 The Brawl for Power and the Clash of Interests 
During 1530-1540, while Humayun was trying to give meaning to his appellation 
of a Padishah, his efforts were continuously challenged by his ambitious and 
stubborn Turani chiefs. After the conquest of Gujrat, the nobles instigated Prince 
Askari after their counsel of handing over Gujarat to Sultan Bahadur as its deputy 
was turned down by Humayun. Aftabchi writes: 
' ' ° Khwandmir, Qanun-i Humaymi, p.80-81; Abul Fazl, Akbarnama, 1, pp.649-650. 
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When the counsellors found that the King was displeased, 
and would not listen to their advice, they instigated Prince 
Askari to march off with his division of army, and to give 
out that he was going to seize upon the province of 
Delhi;" 
This is also corroborated by Nizamuddin Ahmad that Amir Hindu beg incited 
Mirza Askari to liave the public prayer read and coin struck in his own name to 
which Mirza have not agreed.^ '^  This is perhaps not the only evidence to prove 
that the nobles were provocative enough to gain their ends but there are many other 
examples which show their seditious nature on different occasion. When Mirza 
Askari arrived near Champener, Tardi beg who was posted there shut himself in 
the fort and sent message to the Emperor that Askari is hostile and keen to take 
Agra and to become emperor.'" •^  
About the same time, Muhammad Zaman Mirza, taking advantage of Emperor's 
absence from the capital, rebelled.^'" Muhammad Zaman Mirza was the grandson 
of Sultan Husain of Herat, and married his cousin Masuma, a stepsister of 
Humayun and showed himself as a capable general in Babur's campaign.^ '^  He 
being a descendant of Timur, thus, claimed blood relationship with the 'House of 
Humayun'. J ouhar Aftabchi writes: 
' ' ' Aftabchi, The Tezkereh al Vakiat or Private Memoirs of the Moghul Emperor Humayun, pp.6-7. 
^^^ Ahmad. Tabaqat-i Akbari, 2, p.60. 
" ' lb id . ,p .61. 
^"' Ibid., p.65. 
' " S.R. Sliarma, Mughal Empire in India, Agra: Educational Publisiiers, 1934, p.38. 
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During the period that the King was employed in 
subduing the province of Gujarat, Muhammad Zaman 
Sultan, (a descendant of Timur, and favourite of the late 
Emperor) taking advantage of his majesty's absence, 
gained possession of the countries situated on the north-
east side of the Ganges, and fixed his own residence at 
Belgram, but dispatched his son Aleg Mirza, with a 
considerable force to seize on the provinces of Jaunpur, 
Kurra and Manikpur. '^^  
Thus, it is not as if Humayun's efforts were going unnoticed or unchallenged. It 
again goes to his credit that despite the hostilities shown by his chiefs, as well as 
by other adversaries, Humayun was gradually exerting his position. His pardoning 
of Muhammad Sultan and other chiefs could be well understood in the light of 
above circumstances, where despite all odds Humayun was trying to exert his 
position. Naturally, pardon was a king's prerogative to win over the seditious 
section ofpeojle. 
The incident after the conquest of Bengal evidently points towards the solemnity of 
the predicament, the clash of the interests of Humayun as a Padishah, and his 
nobles, as well as latter's enduring efforts towards attaining absolute power and 
status. Humayun, after much deliberation, reached at the conclusion of appointing 
•"* Aftabchi, TTie Tezkereh at Vakiat or Private memoirs of the Moghul Emperor Humayun, p.7; Also see, 
Begum, Humayunnama, p.l\2. 
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Zahid Khan, who for long has been expecting promotion, as the governor of 
Bengal. However, the nobility, so used to disobeying the commands of emperors 
that Zahid Khan plainly refused the offer.^" However, Humayun, it appears was 
not prepared to let the matter pass, as would have normally happened during the 
reign of Babur. Instead, Humayun showed extreme anger and ordered for Zahid 
Khan's execution. The latter finding shelter and ultimate intercession from the 
harem could not also change Humayun's decision and was forced to take refuge in 
Agra, where Mirza Hindal was present.'"* According to the testimony of Gulbadan 
Begum, this person was one among those who incited Hindal to rebel against 
Humayun.^" Despite the displeasure shown by the nobility towards the 
annexation of Champaner, Humayun preferred to annex Gujarat and appointed 
Tardi Beg as its governor.''^ *' Hindal had already shown signs of dissension, while 
Kamran could hardly be trusted. Mirza Askari in state of drunkenness referred 
himself as Padishah and when objected by Ghazanfar (his foster brother), Mirza 
Askari put him in prison. But he anyhow escaped to Sultan Bahadur and gave clue 
of the internal condition of the Mughals who were keen to go back from Gujarat on 
the very first opportunity.''^' His nobles went a step further and tried to instigate 
Askari to march off with his division. Moreover, Yadgar Nasir Mirza went to 
Champaner secretly to covet it but Terdi Beg refused to comply with him and sent 
' " Aflabchi, The Tezkereh al Vakiat or Private Memoirs of the Moghul Emperor Humayun, p.31; Abul 
FazI, Akbarnama, 1, p.341; Ishwari Prasad, The Life And Times of Humayun, pp. 125-126. 
'^* Aftabchi, The Tezkereh al Vakiat or Private Memoirs of the Moghul Emperor Humayun, p.31. 
' " Begum, Humayunnama,p.\34;Ahm^d,Tabaqat-iAkbari,2,p.66. 
Aftabchi, The Tezkereh al Vakiat or Private Memoirs of the Moghul Emperor Humayun, p.6. 
^^ ' Ahmad, Tabaqat-i Akbari, 2, p.59. 
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the information to Humayun.^ ^^ Prince Askari, on whom the Emperor relied 
too, provided him respite from the nuisance of Sher Khan but asked for a price 
when he should have done it as a duty.^ ^^  
The circumstances were, however, moving differently indifferent to the causes 
of Humayun. Sher Khan remained defiant and proclaimed himself as the 
Podishab?^^ The nobles of Humayun were apathetic owing to their declining 
status and position, manifested in their counsel being repeatedly turned down by 
the powerful growing Emperor. Under these difficult circumstances and in the 
battle of nerves, Humayun seemed to have lost some focus. He now began to turn 
for counsels from his nobles. Defeat at the hands of Sher Khan made Humayun 
more vulnerable to the counsels, rather than taking independent decisions. At 
every stage when Sher Khan was making inroads, Humayun was calling upon his 
nobles to form unanimous mode of action.^ ^^ 
Apparently, this might appear to be a strategically wrong move on the part of 
Humayun. However, given the situation when adversaries occupied a strong hold, 
it was best to win over the nobility by making them feel important, which under 
the given circumstances could easily be achieved by asking their counsel. This is 
what Humayun exactly did. Before making any important move or before taking 
any important decision Humayun ensured that every one of his nobles was taken 
^" Ibid., p.7. 
' ' ' Aftabchi, The Tezkereh al Vakial or Private Memoirs of the Moghul Emperor Humayun, pp. 14-15. 
' " lbid.,p.l5. 
' " Aftabchi, The Tezkereh al Vakiat or Private Memoirs of the Moghul Emperor Humayun, pp. 15-16. 
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into confidence. It was probably owing to this that the humiliating treaty of 
Bengal with Sher Khan was concluded. In this connection Jouhar writes, "At first 
the King would not consent to this measure, but at length was obliged to comply 
with his insolent demands, and peace was accordingly concluded.""'^ ^ 
But the situation in the camp became so bad that Humayun's brother's and nobles 
started to quarrel with eacii other for extremely trivial matters. Much of this 
quarrel was owing to ego and self pride. Yadgar Mirza and Askari, for example, 
physically intimidated each other, while after suffering humiliating defeat from 
Sher Khan the army was returning to Agra. The overall condition of Humayun, 
and the entire situation, as elucidated above, is most brilliantly summed up in the 
words of Hunayun himself. On hearing the fight between Yadgar Mirza and 
Askari on the issue of chasing the robbers, Humayun remarked, 
They better have vented their spite on the robbers than 
on each other, what has happened canno^ be recalled, 
but let us hear no more of it.^ ^^  
To add insult to the injury, an attempt to murder Humayun also took place.^ ^* 
Kamran also decided to return to Lahore.^ ^^ Prince Hindal and Yadgar Mirza 
"•^  It was probably owing to these bad counsels that this treaty was concluded when Mughals had an edge. 
Chunar, ultimately was given back to Sher Khan; See Aftabchi, The Tezkereh al Vakiat or Private Memoirs of 
the Moghul Emperor Humayun, p. 17. 
' " Aftabchi, The Tezkereh al Vakiat or Private Memoirs of the Moghul Emperor Humayun, p.23. 
" ' lbid.,p.24. 
'^' Ahmad, Tabaqat-i Akbari, 2, p.71. 
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quitted the army.^ ''^  While Humayun was struggling to cope with Sher Khan, a 
large number of nobles and the switching loyalties of his nobles, Shah Husain 
Sultan of Thatta revolted and also assumed the title of PadishahP^ He was also a 
descendant of Timur. 
Two successive defeats at the hands of Sher Khan along with quarrel between the 
Princes, and desertion of the nobility gave a tremendous jolt to the confidence 
of Humayun. He started to lose control over the situation. The experienced 
campaigner like Tardi Beg and Munim Khan could have been of some assistance 
to him but they also behaved indifferently. On a number of occasions where these 
two senior campaigners, not only fought with each other, but also did not leave any 
stone unturned to humiliate their emperor Humayun. Tardi Beg, for example, 
refused to lend his horse to Humayun, and at another place refused to lend his 
boat."^ 
All the initiatives taken by him to streamline the administration or strengthen the 
position of the king had collapsed. The priorities now began to change drastically 
as Humayun, who earlier was acting independently and taking bold initiatives, was 
now struggling to survive. He had hardly any money to pay to his army and 
' '" Aftabchi, The Tezkereh al Vakiat or Private Memoirs of the Moghul Enperor Humayun, p.27. 
" ' lbid.,p.29. 
•'•'^  Aftabchi, The Tezkereh al Vakiat or Private Memoirs of the Moghul Emperor Humayun, p.33. 
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consequently most of them have left him. Humayun made a Mughal write off 
his debt by providing him water.^ "^' 
During this period of grave crisis the Mughal harem as an institution also tried to 
exert its influence. It has already been discussed how the harem interceded for 
Zahid Khan but was firmly dealt with by Humayun. However, things were 
different now as Humayun was not at all powerful. His liking for Hamida Banu, 
whom he saw at Hindal's house, initiated resentment not only from the lady, but 
also from Hindal.^ '^* Earlier, Yadgar Mirza allegedly supported Shah Husain of 
Thatta on the promise of the marriage of latter's daughter with him.''''^  These 
growing insinuations of harem into politics had far reaching implications in the 
annals of Mughal history, particularly in the evolution of the structure of Mughal 
polity, as will be discussed at appropriate places. 
4.4 The Wandering 'Sovereign*; Persian Insinuation on Mughal 
Re-conquest of Status and Territories 
The Mughal concept o f sovereignty' and efforts of its emperor Humayun towards 
the 'evolution' of some sort of political structure received serious set back after 
military debacles and political blunders, especially after the defeat at Chausa. 
Stressed out by the attitude of his brothers and kinsmen, as well as by the military 
"' Ibid.p.37. 
"" Aftabchi, The Tezkereh al Vakial or Private Memoirs of the Moghul Emperor Humayun, p.31. 
335 Ibid., pp.34-35. 
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losses, Humayun was forced to leave Hindustan. He was even refused to pass 
through Kabul by Kamran on the pretext that it was given by Babur to his 
mother.''^ ^ The second blow to him was that his name was dropped from the 
khutba at Qandahar by Hindal on the insistence of Kamran.''^ ^ Within a span of 
few years an apparently strong military leader, Humayun began to show signs of 
feebleness, manifested not only in frequent counsels being sought before making 
any iiiiporUint move, but on occasion even compromising his position as a 
'sovereign'. One might, for instance cite the attitude of his senior noble Tardi Beg 
during the days of wandering when the latter refused to provide water to royal 
horses, or foi' that matter Rushan Kuka who demanded back his horse from 
Hamida Banu, which he had earlier lent. 
If these two instances do not highlight the true impact of the loss of prestige, 
status, honour and position of 'sovereign' after the defeat from Afghans, the very 
fact that Mirza Askari was sent by Mirza Kamran to imprison Humayun at 
Qandhar might well do. The desolate Padishah had to abandon his infant son 
Akbar and was forced to move into Persian territories. 
Humayun's stay in Persia, courtesy to the hospitality of Shah, not only provided 
much needed respite to Humayun, but also changed the course, trajectory, as well 
as complexion of Mughal political structure. 
"* Begum, Humayunnama, p. 147. 
"'ibid., pp. 161-162. 
"* Ahmad, Tabaqat-i Akbari, 2, p.86. 
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The polity, as it evolved and developed after Humayun's re-conquest of 
Hindustan took concrete shapes under his son and successor Akbar, and found 
permanency for at least until the end of the reign of Shah Jahan in 1658. This 
section explores the importance of Humayun's stay in Persia in the over-all 
evolution of Mughal political structure. However, before reaching any 
conclusions, some important aspects needs to be considered. What was the status 
of a wandering erstwhile Sunni Mughal 'sovereign' in Shia Persia? Why Shah 
Tahmasp extended his support to Humayun? Where were Kamran and the issue of 
the tussle for Qandhar placed? What Persian insinuation did Humayun carry with 
him to Hindustan? An attempt will be made to find answers to some of these 
questions which might be helpful in assessing the comprehensive impact of 
Humayun's stay in Persia. 
All the three historians, namely Jouhar Aftabchi, Bayazid Bayat and Gulbadan 
Begum speaks in very clear terms that Humayun was accorded a very high status 
in Persia by Shah Tahmasp right from the time when the former entered Herat. If 
Jouhar is to be believed then Shah Tahmasp had written to every person of the city 
of Herat to welcome Humayun."'''^  At Herat, a large crowd led by Prince Sultan 
Muhammad, the eighth son of Shah Tahmasp, welcomed Humayun, with the 
directions that Humayun should proceed to Mashhad to meet Shah. 
Aftabchi, The Tezkereh al Vakiat or Private Memoirs of the Moghul Emperor Humayun, p.59; 
Sukumar Ray, Humayun in Persia, Calcutta: The Asiatic Society, 2002, pp. 8-9. 
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Humayun Finally met Shah Tahmasp, but not at Mashshad. Time and again 
letters came arriving to Humayun to proceed to different cities in order to meet 
Shah. Thus, Humayun had to travel to Mashhad and then to Qazvin through major 
cities of Persia, like Nishapur, Subzwar and Ders.^ '*° Humayun spent ample time 
in these cities where he not only witnessed the prosperity of the dominions of Shah 
of Persia, but also his grand following among the masses. 
There could be many reasons as to why the meeting between Shah and Humayun 
was delayed for such a long time, and why the venue kept on changing. It might 
be because perhaps Shah wanted to give some rest to Humayun after knowing 
about his recent difficult times, or perhaps he wanted Humayun to get himself 
accustomed to Persian Shia tradition, or may be he wanted to exhibit his power and 
status to the Sunni Mughal Humayun, the emperor of allegedly vast territories and 
richness, which the latter could not hold. It might have awed the 'sovereign' 
Humayun and also might have helped in acknowledging the superior status of a 
Persian Padishah over wandering Mughal 'sovereign'. These prepositions are not 
hard to digest once we consider the recent past of the relationship of these two 
dynasties. 
Besides adherents of two conflicting sects of Islam, Shiism and Sunnism, the 
Persians and the Mughals were also rivals in the contest of the prestigious Central 
Aftabchi, The Tezkereh al Vakiat or Private Memoirs of the Moghul Emperor Humayun, pp.59-
61. 
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Asian lands. The changing fortune of the Uzbeks, Ottomans, Persians and 
Mughals for ihe dominance of Central Asia was one of prestige and honour for 
different sovereigns. What united the other three dynasties against the Persian 
dynasty was thcMc adherence to Siiiniisiii. The Chaghtai Mughals, under Babur 
were relatively less powerful and less uncompromising, which sometimes resulted 
in the joined action of the two against others. At othei times, however, when the 
opportunities permitted, both of them never left any stone unturned to humiliate 
each other. One might recall here the alliance between Babar and Shah Ismail in 
the battle of Ghazdwan where Persians under Najm Thani was badly defeated. The 
Persians ascribed this defeat to the treachery of Babar.^ "" This according to Jouhar 
was one of the reasons that sour the relationship between Humayun and Shah 
Tahmasp. 
After the conquest of Hindustan by Babar, Qandhar served as a boundary line not 
only between the Mughals and the Persians, but also between the Shia Sistan and 
Sunni Khurasan regions. Thus, both looked to take possession of it. At the time of 
Babar's death, Qandhar and Kabul were under the Mughals, held and managed by 
Mirza Kamran. There were at least two Persian attacks on Qandhar during 1536 
and 1537, the earlier one by Stm Mirza, the son of Shah and the later by Shah 
•• Aftabchi, The Tezkereh al Vakiat or Private Memoirs of the Moghul Emperor Humayun, p.69; 
Also see Ishwari Prasad, The Life and Times of Humayun, p.2; Sukumar Ray, Humayun in Persia. 
p.27. 
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Tahmasp himself.'"'^  Mirza Haider Dughlat narrates the importance of Qandhar 
in the following word: 
It was this Shah Tahmasp who, whenever he made war upon 
Khorasan met with such determined opposition from the 
Uzbegs under Ubaidullah Khan, and such overpowering 
resistance from their numerous forces, that he was always 
compelled to retreat.''''"' 
Despite gaining victory in his second attempt. Shah Tahmasp had to give up 
Qandhar to Mirza Kamran, as the latter was not hoped to help Shah against the 
Uzbegs?"" 
The conflict within the Mughal household and defeat from an external Afghan, 
which forced Humayun to proceed towards Sistan provided an opportunity to Shah 
Tahmasp to exhibit his grandeur and power to the Mughal 'sovereign' who once 
defeated him now was at his mercy. Consider the places where Humayun moved 
before meeting Shah Tahmasp. Jouhar provides the name of at least three other 
important cultural and political centers of Persia en-route to Qazwin, namely Herat, 
Mashad and Nishapur. All these four places were the cultural centers of Persia, a 
symbolism of Shia faith where Shah was not only a Padishah, but also a religious 
head. As compared to this, the Mughal 'sovereign' who defeated the Shah was not 
'"^ Mirza Haider Dughlat, Tarikh-i Rashidi, p.468. 
'«Ibid 
344 Ibid., p.469. 
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only defeated by the Afghans, but also was continuously disobeyed by his 
nobles, including his own brothers. Besides, at every place in Persia all the 
grandees of the empire came out to receive Humayun and showed every respect to 
him. Probably, this was also aimed at exhibiting the superior status and following 
of a Persian Padishah over a Mughal 'sovereign' who hardly had any following. 
After the meeting with the Shah, where Humayun was shown high respects and 
was seated on the same cushion, many qamarguha )MinXs were organized. It was 
common practice among Mongols, of whom the Mughals were a branch, to go on 
hunting expeditions, which served many purposes. Often, it was to maintain 
essential supplies, or suppress rebellions, or for training, or even as only a pleasure 
pursuit.''''^  However, on these occasions, the hunting served not only as a medium 
to exhibit Shah's superior military and shooting skills but also to test that of 
Humayun's. An important incidenct at hunting related by Jouhar, probably 
confirms the above hypothesis. Jouhar writes: 
"^^  For example see Anand S. Pandian, "Predatory Care: The Imperial Hunt in Mughal and British 
India." 
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The next morning the King (Hunayun) again joined the 
hunters, and, having proceeded to a place .'^ bout four coss from 
the Tukhti Soliman, began the sport; but the orders of Shah 
Tahmasp were, that no person but himself and the king should 
discharge an arrow without express permission. After a short 
time, a deer came bounding towards his majesty; when the 
Persian monarch called out, "now Humayun, let us see how 
you shoot." On which his Majesty discharged his arrow, 
which struck the animal behind the ear, and it fell struggling 
on the ground; at which all the Persians were 
astonished 
This is when Humayun was also tested for his horsemanship by making him to 
mount an unbroken horse.'''*^ At most of these hunting expeditions. Shah's 
womenfolk also accompanied. If the two 'sovereign' were exhibiting their 
superiority over each other, so do were their women. Gulbadan Begam mentions 
that on one occasion Shah had arranged chatr and tags, which provided an 
opportunity to Shahzada Sultanam (Shah's sister) and Hamida Banu to boast of 
their sovereign's superior privileges. Gulbadan writes: 
That day Shahzada Sultanam asked Hamida Banu Begam: 
'Are such chatr and Tag met with in Hindustan?" The begam 
answered: 'They say two dang with respect to Khorasan, and 
346 Aftabchi, The Tezkereh al Vakiat or Private Memoirs of the Moghul Emperor Humayun, p.67; 
Sukumar Ray, Humayun in Persia, p.30. 
" ' Aftabchi, The Tezkereh al Vakiat or Private Memoirs of the Moghul Emperor Humayun, p.64. 
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four dang with respect to Hindustan. When a thing is found in 
two da^g, it is clear it will be found better in four.'''** 
However, the most glaring example that provides a clue that these two sovereigns 
wanted to exhibit their superiority over other is again provided by Humayun. 
Finding Humayun as a wanderer, driven out from his own dominion, it was a good 
opportunity for Shah Tahmasp to seek answer or justification for any old event. It 
is alleged that Humayun after the victory of Gujarat, through his method of divine 
arrows, a method used to predict future, placed Shah Tahmasp on the second class 
of twelve arrows, while his own name on first class of twelve arrows. This 
provided a ground to Shah Tahmasp to seek justification for this particular act of 
Humayun, which at least symbolically lowered the position of a Persian Shah in 
comparison to Mughal 'sovereign'. Replying to the query from Shah, Humayun 
replied: 
The fact is, that 1 then looked to the extent of our mutual 
dominions; and as Persia at that time was only of half the 
extent of the kingdom of Hindustan, I therefore considered 
you as inferior to myself Tahmasp then said, in an ill natured 
manner, "it was a consequence of your foolish vanity, that you 
could not properly govern those extensive dominions; you 
348 Begum, Humayunnama, pp. 170-171. 
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were therefore driven away by the villagers, and left your wife 
and fanily captives.''''^  
Well, then taken from above, the Shia-Sunni factor also contributed in the apathy 
between Persia and Hindustan, and despite all the respect shown towards 
Humayun, remained an important element that soured the relationship between the 
two, even if Abul Fazl is believed, for a short time.''^ ° 
However, Jouhar Aftabchi has taken pains of going into much greater details about 
Humayun's 'humiliation' for being a sunni emperor without any dominions, and 
that too at the mercy of the Shah. According to Jouhar, Humayun and his trusted 
noble Bairam Khan were humiliated for not wearing a particular cap associated 
with Shia sect. He went as far as alleging that Shah Tahmasp was actually forcing 
Humayun to adopt Shia faith and put it as a precondition for the latter's help.''^ ' 
In fact, given the precarious situation in which Humayun entered the Persian 
territory, and also in anticipation of what lies ahead, a cleverly thought message 
was given to him by Husain Quli Mirza right at the time of entering Sistan. Husain 
Quli Mirza met Humayun on his way from Mashhad to Mecca after studying the 
"^^  Aftabchi, The '^e:kereh al Vakiat or Private Memoirs of the Moghul Emperor Humayun, p.69; 
Sukumar Ray, Huriayun in Persia, p.28. 
""Abul Fazl, Akbarnama, I, p.439; Sukumar Ray, Humayun in Persia, p.28. 
•'^ ' For details, see Aftabchi, The Te:kereh al Vakiat or Private Memoirs of the Moghul Emperor 
Humayun, pp.62-66; For a critical examination, see Masoom Raza Qazim, "Humayun in Iran," 
Islamic Culture, 53; and Sharma, Mughal Empire in India, pp.54-55. 
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Shia and Sunni Faith. He initially told Humayun that in Persia any one who 
condemns the first three Caliphs is praised, and then warned him that for little 
praise no Sunni would deviate from his faith.''^ ^ 
Humayun under the circumstances in which he was placed could not have afforded 
to have infuriated the zealous Shia Shah of Persia. His father Babar earlier is 
alleged to have professed Shia faith for the help of Persians. Humayun, thus, 
showed his respect to the beliefs of Shia and visited the shrines of Shia Imams. 
However, Shah's mind apparently was poisoned against Humayun by some his 
own men and some of Humayun's, like Rushan Kuka, who was displeased with 
Humyun on being caught with stolen jewels from Hamida Banu.^" Had it not 
been for the jjenerous help and support of Shah's sister, Humayun might have 
ended up in more troubles. It was she, who on the plea of having a friend in 
Humayun rather then adding the list of his foes convinced Shah to extend his 
support to Humayun.''^ '* 
The help (kumak) of Shah to Humayun was not unconditional. If Jouhar is to be 
believed, three conditions were put before Humayun, the content of which is 
nowhere mentioned. However, some speculations could be made. It must have 
been a condition to promote Shia faith in Hindustan, if not to adopt it, and 
secondly, Qandhar be given to the Persians. It was only after acceding to the 
"^ For full story, see Dughlat, Tarikh-i Rashidi, p.740. 
See Begum, Humayumama, pp. 171 -174; Aftabchi, The Tezkereh al Vakiat or Private Memoirs 
of the Moghul Emperor Humayun, p.68 and 72. 
Aftabchi, The Tezkereh al Vakiat or Private Memoirs of the Moghul Emperor Humayun, p.64. 
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above conditions, a troop of 12000, which in actual turned out 14000 was sent 
with Humayun to re-conquer his lost territories and status.''^ ^ In the words of 
Gulbadan Begum: 
/A length the Shah dispatched his own son and Khan's 
and Sultans and amirs with his majesty to help him, 
together with good arms and tents, folding and audience 
tents; and chart and taq and shamiana, excellently 
wrought, and all sorts of the things necessary and fit for 
a king, from the mattress-warehouse and the treasury 
and the workshops and kitchen and buttery. In a 
propitious hour those two mighty sovereigns bade one 
another farewell and his Majesty left that country for 
Qandahar.^ ^^ 
4.5 Re-conquest of Hindustan and 'Sovereignty* 
Humayun's fortune started to favour him once the Persian Shah accorded him high 
respect in his dominions. Khwaja Jalauddin Obhi, a noble of Mirza Askari deserted 
his master and joined Humayun earlier.•'^ ^ The fort of Bust, which was under the 
officers of Mirza Askari, was ordered to be conquered, and from there Humayun 
proceeded towards Qandhar. There is every reason to believe, as asserted by 
Gulbadan that on getting the news of the approaching Humayun, Mirza Askari sent 
young Akbar to Mirza Kamran, who hurriedly tried harem insinuation for stopping 
Aftabchi, The Tezkereh al Vakiat or Private Memoirs of the Moghul Emperor Humayun, p.77. 
"•^  Begum, Humayiinnama, p. 174. 
' " Dughlat, Tarikh-i Rashidi, p.739. 
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Humayun by sending Khanzada Begam, sister of Babur.^ ^* In 1545, Qandhar 
was conquered from Mirza Askari and as promised was handed over to the 
Persians. Fortunately for Humayun, the young prince under whose command 
Qandhar was given died even before Humayun had reached Kabul and thus 
provided an opportunity to him to take it back. Accordingly, Qandhar was taken 
back or rather conquered back, and after nearly five years, Humayun was again 
seen practicing his royal prerogatives, as he divided Qandhar among his officers.^ ^^ 
Freed from the Persian obligation and tasting victory after a long time, it appears 
that Humayun this time was adamant and cautious, as well as, practical in 
exercising the powers of a Padishah. When several chiefs pleaded clemency for 
Mirza Kamran, Humayun showed sternness and did not acceed away to their 
demands immediately.^ *° 
Witnessing a resolution in Humayun, many of the noted amirs started to desert the 
camps of Mirza Kamran. Among them were Yadgar Nasir Mirza, Mirza Hindal 
and Babus Beg also joined Humayun. Realizing little success, Kamran fled to 
Hindustan, and thus, Humayur re-conquered Kabul in 1545. For next, full ten 
years Kabul was changing hands between Humayun and Kamran until 1555 when 
the Afghans were defeated in the battle of Sirhind. 
^'' Begum, Humayunnama, p. 175; Aftabchi, The Tezkereh al Vakiat or Private Memoirs of the 
Moghul Emperor Humayun, p.78. 
Aftabchi, The Tezkereh al Vakiat or Private Memoirs of the Moghul Emperor Humayun, p.80. 
'*°Ibid.,p.81. 
*^' Begum, Humayunnama, p. 177. 
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These ten years were very important in marking the slow progress towards the 
evolution of a political structure. No doubt, Kamran took Kabul more than once 
after it was won by Humayun, but the manner in which he handled his officers, and 
the manner in which he conducted himself clearly indicated that he was no longer 
prepared to lower the prestige of the crown. Possibly the experience gained in 
Persia in this regard played a role. 
Thus, the distribution of Kabul and its dependencies as assignments among his 
officers was a first major step taken by Humayun.^ ^^ All the officers who deserted 
Kamran to joia Humayun were adequately promoted. Efforts were also made to 
gain some allies by writing to Mirza Sulaiman of Badakshan, who was punished, 
in the absence of Humayun for being his ally by Kamran.^ ^^ Suspecting 
contravention of his desire to see him, Humayun marched out against Badakshan 
and won it in 1546.^ '^* This was a hardly done before 1540, when he, failed to take 
action and act strongly when even his decrees wer'; not obeyed. 
Again we find Humayun acting shrewdly, when he had to make peace with Mirza 
Sulaiman after Kamran took Kabul and most of his officers had deserted him. In 
the peace settlement with Mirza Sulaiman, Humayun like a clever statesman 
retained Qundez and assigned it to Hindal.^ ^* However, after reconquering Kabul, 
'*^  Aftabchi, The Te:kereh al Vakiat or Private Memoirs of the Moghul Emperor Humayun, p.83. 
' " Ibid., p.83. 
•'*'' Begum, Humayunnama, p. 180; Aftabchi, The Tezkereh al Vakiat or Private Memoirs of the 
Moghul Emperor Humayun, p.84. 
'^ ^ Aftabchi, The Tezkereh al Vakiat or Private Memoirs of the Moghul Emperor Humayun, p.85. 
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Humayun punished its people for allowing Kamran to capture it by allowing 
his soldiers to plunder it for whole night. 
However, when Mirza Kamran showed signs of repentance not only he was taken 
well, but Mirza Askari was also released. All the four brothers, Humayun, 
Kamran, Askari and Hindal sat on the same carpet and took the meal together. 
According to Jouhar perhaps to prevent further troubles, Humayun divided the 
territories among his three brothers. Jouhar writes: 
On the following day the King marched from Talican, 
with his three brothers, to the mountains of Asheq 
Masheq, where they remained for a week; during which 
time the King made a division of the country between 
them and the other chiefs. The districts of Kulab he 
assigned to the princes Kamran and Askery, burthened 
with a pension to Chakar Beg, one of the generals of 
kamran. The forts of Talican and Zuffer, with their 
dependencies were given to Mirza Sulaiman and that of 
Candahar to the prince Hindal.''*^ 
According to Gulbadan Began, it was during this time that some regulations (tura) 
were also enjoined by Humayun for interviews with King.''^ * 
366 Ibid, p.87. 
Aftabchi, The Tezkere/t at Vakia! or Private Memoirs of the Mogbul Emperor Humayun, pp.92-93. 
^*' Begum, Humayunaama, p. 187. 
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He also devised plans of extending his dominions by marching out against 
Uzbegs in Balkh. On his request, Mirza Sulaiman and Askari joined his forces but 
Kamran failed to turn up.^^' Despite the disaster at Balkh, Humayun unfailingly 
strove hard and fought like a Padishah and more importantly inspired confidence 
in his troops. But when Kamran was nabbed at Ghakkar, this time he showed no 
brotherly affection and blinded Kamran. Our sources, especially Gulbadan writes 
that Humayun was reluctant to take a strong action, but was convinced hard by his 
nobles to take action. Gulbadan Begum recalls: 
To be brief, all the assembled Khan's and Sultans, and 
high and low, and plebian and noble, and soldiers and 
the rest who all bore the mark of Mirza Kamran's hand, 
with one voice represented to his Majesty: Brotherly 
custom has nothing to do with ruling and reigning. If 
you wish to act as a brother, abandon the throne. If you 
wish to be King, put aside brotherly sentiment.''^ ^ 
Probably owing to this resolution of his officers, who stood by him in difficult 
times, Humayun before the march for Hindustan gave orders for the blinding of 
Kamran. 
To conclude, it is evident from the two sections of the above chapter that Humayun 
after initially trying to give practical shapes to the concept of 'Padishah' and in an 
^^'Ibid., p. 191. 
""Begum, Humayunnama, pp.200-201. 
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effort to evolve a political structure suffered humiliating defeat from the 
Afghans. His softness to take stern action against his own brother, especially 
against Mirza Kamran added to his miseries and ultimately forced him to seek 
shelter in Persia and suffer humiliation from the Persian King. The time he spent 
with Shah Tahmasp in Persia, however appeared to have shown the working of a 
'sovereign' and his sternness in his decisions and in his ability to turn his desires 
into decrees. Thus, although with the help of the Persian army Humayun was able 
to conquer Qandhar, but afterwards started to act independently and strongly. 
Instead of mere wish lists, practical promotions were made. Humayun was the first 
of the Turks to emphasize that the 'King was the shadow of God on the earth'. 
Khwandmir calls him a personification of the spiritual and temporal sovereignty 
(Jamai Sultanati Haqiqi wa Majazi), and His Majesty the King, the Shadow of 
God {Hazrat-i Padshah Zill-i-llahi). Abul FazI used the word 'Insan-i KamiV, or 
the perfect men for him who use to receive institutions and inspiration from 
God."' 
The division of territories as assignments, the treatise with different rulers, and 
more importantly his firmness started to at least guide the 'Mughal concept of 
sovereignty' and shaped its political structure as well. It shall be discussed in the 
next chapter which was heavily influenced by Persians. 
" ' Abul Faz\, Akbarnama, 1, p. 120 and 115. 
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CHAPTER-FIVE 
Towards Centralisation: Akbar and the Evolution of 
Mughal Polity (1556-1575) 
The Mughal Empire entered into a new phase of crisis in 1556, after the accidental 
death of its Emperor Humayun, who in the previous year had just managed to re-
conquer Delhi, which was lost from Mughal control due to the haughty nobility as 
has already been discussed in the previous chapter. The Mughal throne at this time 
was far from secure, with numerous internal and external enemies waiting for an 
opportunity to attaclc.^ ^^  Akbar, the son of Humayun, was just fourteen years old, 
and, the absence of a fixed law of succession meant that his uncles could have 
weighed in with their claims to the throne.^" The Mughal nobility inherited by 
Akbar from his father and grandfather was mainly Turani (that is Turks, but 
applied to all central Asia). Although the racial composition of the nobility, by the 
time of Humayun, included some Persians as well, the nobility as such was 
dominated by the Turanis. The Turanis were known for their fickleness and Fitna 
(a Persio/Arabic word used for describing sedition, rebellion, dissention, anarchy 
••" Soon after Humayun's death Hemu, the Prime minister of Adil Shah occupied Delhi and Agra. 
The regions of Punjab were contested by Sikandar Shah Sur. Mirza Muhammad Haicim virtually 
became independent from Delhi. Moreover the territories in the neighbourhood of Delhi and Agra 
fell in the grip of severe famine and plague. For a detailed study of the difTlculties endured after 
Humayun's death, see R. P. Tripathi, Rise and Fall of the Mughal Empire (Allahabad, Central Book 
Depot 1977). 
"^ Akbar was born at Amarkot in A. D. 1542 while his father was on exile. Thus at the time of 
Humayun's death he was hardly fourteen years old 
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and likewise).^ '^* However, it was Bairam Khan, a Persian noble and ataligh 
(tutor/guardian) of Akbar, perhaps with the concurrence of senior nobles, who 
proclaimed Akbar as the Emperor of Mughal dominions in South Asia.^ ^^  
It has been argued by I.A. Khan, that Timurid rulers, whom the Mughals succeeded 
never ruled as absolute sovereign.^ ^* Their hands were tied by the laws of 
Chinggis Khan, called as 'yasa'. These laws granted hereditary privileges to the 
nobility. According to I.A Khan, the early Mughals were fervently keen to follow 
these laws. In this context, the power of the nobility in the late 1550 is 
understandable as discussed previously. The Timurid's gave precedence to yasa 
over anything under the sun, so much so that even Muslim law (shariat) had a 
limited role to play.^ ''^  But Muslim law was there, and therefore, be it due to yasa 
or owing to shariat it is quite apparent that there were certain inherent elements in 
Mughal system which rendered the power of the 'sovereign' weak. In this debate, 
under the strong influence of Aligarh school of thought, all explanations share the 
tendency to explain both Mughal sovereignty, and status of the nobles, in 
"^ For the racial composition of the Mughal nobility in 1555 see Iqtidar Alam Khan, "The Nobility 
of Akbar and Development of his Religious Policy, 1560-1580," Journal of Royal Asiatic Society 1 
(1968).The word 'fitna' in terms of political theory has been best deployed by Andre Wink. See, 
Andre Wink, Al-Hind: The Making of the Indo-Islamic World (Leider: E. J. Brill 1990). 
" ' For Bairam Khan, see the relevant chapters in S. K. Banerjee, Humayun Badshah 
(Calcutta,Oxford University Press 1983). Tripathi, Rise and Fall of the Mughal Empire. Iqtidar 
Alam Khan, "The Mughal Court Politics During Bairam Khan's Regency," Medieval India-A 
Miscellany I (1969). 
"* According to the 'Yasa-i Chinggisi', the 'Khaqan' (Leader) was always elected by an assembly 
called 'qurultai'. He could not be nominated. Also, all those claiming ancestry from the tribe and 
family of Chinggis Khan, had hereditary privileges. See Iqtidar Alam Khan, "The Turko Mogol 
Theory of Kingship," Medieval India - a Miscellany 11(1972). 
" ' See Sanjay Subrahmanyam Muzaffar Alam, ed., The Mughal State 1526-1750 (Delhi, 1998). p. 
22. 
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teleological terms. As a result, certain other important elements and finer 
nuances of Mugiial polity as inherited and as subsequently developed by Akbar 
have been overlooked. '^* The upshot of the present dissertations analysis of the 
Mughal court politics in Akbar's early years is a re-appraisal of a linear model of 
the development of Turko-Mongol kingship. 
The nature of the sources through which the history of the Mughal Empire in 
general and that of Emperor Akbar in particular is documented offers a serious 
problem."'^ ' Just like any source of any other medieval society, the scope of the 
Mughal court chronicles, written in Persian, is very limited. They were profoundly 
elite focussed and the narration was limited either to the court and the nobility 
(conquests, administrative measures etc.) or to the men of the religion (spread of 
particular religion, rise of sects etc.). The primary objective of the writer was to 
praise the patron 'ising flattery as the tool of expression and exaggerating the 
account. With the hyperbole language and excessive flattery, as was the case wjth 
Abul Fazl, the mentor and historian of Akbar, much of the crucial facts remain 
difficult to discern. In this context it appears that the Mughal historian were 
simply following a precedent set by a fourteenth century historian of the Delhi 
Sultanat, Ziauddin Barani who wrote that history is the special preserve of the 
nobles and the distinguished, the great men and the sons cf great men. This outlook 
"«Ibid 
' ' ' The literary sources for Mughal history abounds in number. They comprise of standard worics on 
history, biographies and chronicles, travelogues and foreigner's accounts and a huge mass of 
general literature of incalculable historical value. Apart from the travelogues most of the sources 
were written in Persian. 
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naturally looked at the court only and the inferences drawn on the basis of such 
account could not represent all the classes in the Mughal society thereby providing 
us only with a partial picture. 
Although, the historians in their work have promised to be 'objective' in their 
narration, one cannot overrule their own prejudices, which comes into play in their 
description of the fact. For instance, Abdul Qadir Badaoni (Muntakhab-ut 
Tawarikh and Najat al-Rashid) had a special grudge against Emperor Akbar 
whereas the official historian Abul Fazl (Akbarnama and Ain-i Akbari) owing to 
his closeness with the emperor had provided a highly exaggerated account.^ *" 
Similarly, the account left by the Christian missionaries who induced by the 
emperor's keenness in Christianity, were eager to convert him to Christianity, have 
left a highly subjective account^ '^. Thus, most of the information is not only 
highly 'contaminated' but also intensely 'selective'. 
The problem becomes more acute when the contemporaries are dealing with the 
nobility and their role and behaviour towards a particular emperor, espec'Cilly when 
dealing with their own relatives. Though the memoirs of Babur are often 
' '° Both, Badaoni and Abul Fazl were the disciple of Shaikh Mubaral<, father of Abul Fazl who 
were accused of innovations in Islam and had to lead a life of wanderers before Rmperor Akbar 
admitted them into court. They thus had animosity towards fanatical Islam and the Muslim Clerics. 
This attitude blended completely with the emperor's mind and Abul fazi's subsequent rise in the 
nobility is attributed to his religious ideas. Badaoni, on the other hand was a bigoted Muslim and 
did not approve of emperor's attitude towards Islam. He attributed his low profile in the nobility due 
to his religious outlook and criticizes both Akbar and Abul Fazl. Sec Abul Fazl Allami, 
Akbarnama, tr. Henry Beveridge, New Delhi: Saeed International, 1989, 3 vols. Abdul Qadir 
Badaoni, Muntakhab-ut-Tawarlkh, tr. W. H. Lowe, Karachi: Karimso is, 1976, 2 vols. 
' " See J.S.Hoyland translated and S.N.Banerjee annotated. The commentary of Father Monserrate, 
New Delhi: Asian Educational services, 1992. 
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compared with the "Confessions of St. Augustine" he, too, could not help his 
biases from finding a place in his narration.^ *^ The two autobiographical 
dictionaries, Tazkirat al-Umara and Dhakhirat ul-Khavanin have been particularly 
helpful in an attempt to know about the nobility and their profile. These works 
describe the lives of some of the prominent nobles. Both biographical dictionaries 
tremendously help in analysing Mughal politics of these particular times. This 
chapter, besides showing the importance of the connective links between South 
Asia and Central Asia, argues that the various reforms initiated by Akbar were a 
direct result of a crisis in the social and political space given to the principle of 
'blood', and also interestingly to the principle of 'milk' in Mughal society. The 
crisis could be traced back to Central Asia. 
Thus, this chapter explores the interplay between different nobility groups in the 
Mughal body politics against the backdrop of Emperor Akbar's (r. 1556-1605) 
various innovative administrative reforms. This chapter also contributes to the on-
•"^  Writing about Khadija Begam, the wife of Sultan Husain Mirza, Babar moans that she was very 
dominant who caused Sultan Hisain Mirza's sons to rebel against him and calls her as of "silly 
character". Similarly about the first wife of Sultan Husain Mirza, Babur writes, "The first wife of 
Sultan Husain Mirza was Bega Sultan begam and about her Babar writes, " She was very cross-
tempered and made the Mirza endure much wretchedness, un till driven at last to despair, he let 
himself free by divorcing her. What was he to do? Right was with him. A bad wife in a good man's 
house, malce this world his hell. God preserve every Musalman from this misfortune! Would that 
not a single cross or ill tempered wife were left in the world!" See Baburnama, tr. From the original 
Turki text by Annette Susannah Beveridge, London; Luzac and Co; 1922,1, p.301. 
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going discussion on Akbar, and talces the scholarship beyond the simplistic 
explanation that the emperor's spectacular reign was a result of his genius.''*^ 
5.1. Clash of 'Blood' versus *Milk*; Nobility and the Weakening 
of Central Authority (A. D. 1556-1560) 
It has already been highlighted in the previous chapter that the principle of'blood' 
posed serious problems to the authority of Mughal emperors from 1526-1556. All 
those who could claim blood relation with the ruling house of Babar or even the 
same descent from Timur or Chinggis Khan, defied the authority of Mughal 
emperors. This predicament is well documented in the recent modem works, 
which explains and trace this phenomenon back to Central Asia. The argument is 
well understandable in this context. However, a minute analysis of the source 
material during the early period of Akbar's reign reveals the equal dominance of a 
group of nobles who did not have any blood connection with the Mughal ruling 
house. This group comprised of foster parents of Akbar were popularly known as 
atka khail. The interest of this group were in conflict v/ith the group of nobility 
who claimed same blood relationship with the emperor and much of the conflict 
^'' For a recent scholarship on Akbar see Munis D. Faruqui, "The Forgotten Prince: Mirza Hakim 
and the Formation of the Mughal Empire in India," Journal of Economic and Social History of the 
Orient 48 (2005), Ruby Lai, Domesticity and power in the early Mughal world, 
Cambridge:Cambridge University Press 2005; Rosalind O'Hanlon, "Manliness and Imperial Service 
in Mughal North India," Journal of Economic and Social History of the Orient 42 (1999).; John F. 
Richards, ed., Kingship and Authority in South Asia (South Asian studies, 1978). 
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between 1556-1560 and to some extent up till 1568 that weakened the position 
of Akbar as a 'sovereign' could be attempted to explain from this perspective. 
Thus a closer and fresh examination of Mughal sources, during the early years of 
Akbar reign (both contemporary and near contemporary accounts), reveals the 
existence of two groups exerting direct or indirect influence to undermine the 
status of the 'sovereign'. 
These groups were (a) wet-nurses and their relatives, also known as the 'foster 
battalion {atka khait) and (b) blood relatives or Tiirani nobles. 
It appears from the account of both Abul Fazl and Badauni that during the regency 
of Bairam Khan (A.D. 1556-1560), there was continuous conflict for political 
ascendancy between the 'aristocracy of blood' and the 'aristocracy of milk.'''*^ 
Mughal reverence for Mongol customs, gave the hereditary (Turani) nobility 
privileged status.''*^ Hov/ever in juxtaposition, was the immense importance 
attached to the anga (wet-nurse) in the Muslim tradition. Children, sharing the 
same wet-nurse were regarded as 'milk-siblings.' These bonds of association 
conferred an overweening and politically dangerous sense of entitlement to the 
Emperor's 'milk relatives'. 
' " I have referred 'aristocracy of blood' to those nobles who claimed of the same lineage as that of 
the ruling house. Broadly speaking, the term can be applied to 'Turani' nobility for which I. A. 
Khan, has written extensively. 
^" See Khan, "The Nobility of Akbar and Development of his Religious Policy, 1560-1580." 
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Akbar had quite a few wet-nurses. Abul Fazl lists at least nine of them — 
baring one. The absence of the name of Maham Anga is conspicuous, as it was she 
who, more than any other, who carried the banner for the 'aristocracy of milk'.^ ** 
Her name appears for the first time in the chronicle Akbamama, after the accession 
of Akbar, when he recalled his zanana Qiaram-i muqaddas) from Kabul and sent 
Maham Anga to receive them. Abul Fazl then writes about her as extremely loyal 
and much respected by Akbar.^*' 
At the time of the accession of Akbar, in 1556's at least three wet-nurses were in a 
position to maintain links with the court, through their masculine relatives. They 
were (1) Maham Anga with her son Adham Khan (2) Jiji Anga with her husband 
Shamsuddin Atka and (3) the anonymous mother of Zain Khan Kukah. The 
situation at the time of the accession of Akbar was full of opportunity for various 
groups, who could influence the young emperor, for the monarch too, was under 
the vice-regency of Bairam BQian. 
It appears that there was intense competition amongst Akbar's wet-nurses. Each 
wanted to become the favourite foster mother. Of course, Maham Anga was a 
mistress of tactful ambition, who from the beginning, had plans to be the favourite 
"* They were Jiji Anga, Daya Bhawal, Fakhr-i-Nisa, Bhawal Anga, the wife of Khwaja Ghazi, 
Koki Anga, Bibi Rupa, Khaldar Anga and lastly Pija Jan Anga. It is interesting to note that the 
name of Maham Anga does not appear in the list. This may be due to Maham Anga being a title 
and not a proper name. For full discussion see Abul Fazl, Akbarnamah, ed. Maulavi Abdur Rahi.Ti, 
Calcutta: Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1878-1887,1, pp. 134. 
" ' Ibid., 2, p. 55. 
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foster mother of the emperor. She complained to Huinayun, that Jiji Anga, 
another foster mother of Akbar, was practicing incantations, so that the child 
Akbar should not accept anyone's milk but her own.^ ** At the accession of Akbar, 
Maham Anga seemed to have enjoyed a considerable sway over the heart and mind 
of the young Emperor. Abu'l Fazl writes about her as having "abundant sense and 
loyalty, held a high place in the esteem of Shahinshah and who had been in his 
service from the time of cradle till his adornment of the throne and who had trod 
the path of good service with the acme of affection."''^' 
In the second reignal year, Akbar a young boy of 16 years was married to the 
daughter of Abdullah Khan Mughal. It appears that here Maham Anga seemed to 
have played an important part since Akbar did not have any power to form or enter 
into any sort of matrimonial alliances. Bairam Khan, the Vakil of the Empire 
resented this marriage because one of the daughters of Abdullah Khan was already 
married to Mirza Kamran, who had posed so many problems for the ruling 
emperors. Bairam Khan regarded Abdullah Khan as partisan of Kamran but his 
resentment seems to have little impact on the decision.''^ " 
At this stage Bairam Khan must have realised the importance of Maham Anga and 
of the dangers she might pose to his position. In order io strengthen his position 
Bairam Khan married Salima Sultan Begum, daughter of ilumayun's sister and 
"'ibid.. Up. 187. 
'*' Akbarnama, 2, p.86. 
^^° Akbarnama, 2, p.88. 
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Akbar's cousin. This marriage must have enhanced the prestige of Bairam 
Khan among the Mughal nobles as a kinsman of the ruling house. However, 
Bairam Khan's suspicion against Maham Anga did not disappear. He in fact grew 
more vigilant and always saw the moves of Maham Anga suspiciously. This is 
evident from the fact that during the siege of Mankot Bairam Khan fell il' and was 
confined to his tents. At this time Akbar enjoyed himself with elephants fight 
when accidentally two elephants came near to Bairam Khan's tent. The crowd of 
people and the general uproar caused apprehensions and annoyance to Bairam 
Khan and came to suspect some conspiracy against him. He sent a message to 
Maham Anga saying, "I am not conscious of having committed any offence in this 
sphere circled threshold and I have not displayed anything except well wishing 
respect. Why then mischief makers imputed some offence to me and caused such 
unkindness as that furious elephants should have been let lose against my tent."''" 
Bairam Khan in fact did act in highhandedness but his contribution in securing the 
throne for Akbar was more than that. This growing power of Bairam Khan led a 
conspiracy against him, led by Maham Anga which ultimately forced Akbar to take 
the reign of Government in his hands. Akbar dismissed Bairam Khan from the 
office of Vakalat and appointed Shihabuddin Ahmad Khan as the new Vakil on the 
advice of Maham Anga. Bairam Khan suspected the role of Maham Anga in his 
dismissal beforehand and he accepted Akbar's offer of going on a pilgrimage to 
Mecca, when he wrote to the officers on the borders saying that he wants to take 
' Akbarnama, 2, pp.91-92. 
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revenge against those who had perverted the mind of Akbar and had made him 
a vagabond, especially "Maham Anga, who was a great authority (and who) had 
wrought this, and was making it her business to ruin him." '^^  Bairam Khan was 
ultimately defeated and murdered in by an Afghan of Patan in Gujarat in 1560.''^ '' 
After the death of Bairam Kiian, it appears that the scuffle between the 'aristocracy 
of blood and the aristocracy of milk' became more intense, given the vested 
position to the person of emperor of both the groups.^ '^' Each group appears to be 
frantic to get the highest position in the nobility and to exert as much influence on 
the state policies as possible. Maham Anga exploited the situation towards her 
^'^^Akbarnama, 2,p.]59. 
•"'The name of the widow of Bairam Khan was Salima Begam. 
Historians have argued as to the causes for the dismissal of Bairam Khan. According to 
V.A.Smith, Akbar, The Great Mogul, Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1917, the dismissal of Bairam Khan 
was due to the sunni reaction against the pro-shia policies of Bairam Khan, R.P Tripathi, Rise and 
Fall of the Mughal Empire, is of the view that Alcbar by 1560 was coming up of age. He, by this 
time was eighteen years old and did not have any Privy Purse and so wanted to have to government 
in his hands. 
"* The Central Asian nobles, owing to the customs of Chinggis Khan claimed hereditary privileges 
where as the foster relatives had milk privileges. Both these groups acted in high handedness 
undermining the positi jn of the Emperor. The Turani nobles have been the most untrustworthy 
nobles. All the revolts chronicled by Babar as made against himself were under the Mughal 
leadership. Babar writes that "up to now they (Mughals) have rebelled five times against me. It 
must not be understood that they rebelled through not getting on with me; they have done the same 
thing with their own Khan's again and again". See Babarnama, 1, p.l05. The Foster Battalion had 
also taken Emperor for granted as is evident from the above. Regarding one of his foster brother, 
Mirza Aziz Koka, Akbar used to say that 'a channel of milk connects me and Mirza Aziz Koka'. 
Moreover, they all had their Jagirs (revenue assignments) at one place where they had developed 
local roots, sometimes showing an attitude of defiance. In his thirteenth reignal year (1568-1569) 
Akbar removed the Atka Khail rrom the Panjab and took great credit to himself for this step, and 
said that he had scattered the Atka Khail so that they had become like the stars of the constellation. 
Abul FazI {Akbarnama, 2, pp.486-487) giving the reason for their removal writes that "As 
gardeners adorn gardens with trees and move from one place to another, and reject many, and 
irrigate others, and labour to rear them to proper size, and expatrit te bad trees, and lop off evil 
branches, and remove trees that are too large and graft some upon others, and gather their various 
fruits and flowers, and enjoy their shade when necessary, and do other things which are necessary 
in the science of horticulture, so do just and far-seeing Kings light the lamp of wisdom by 
regulating and instructing their wisdom, and so uproar the standard of guidance Whenever a 
large body is gathered together of one mind and speech, and show much push and energy, it is 
proper to disperse them, firstly for their own good and secondly for the welfare of the community". 
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needs much to the fiasco of the 'Turani' (Central Asian) nobility. Abul FazI 
writes that "Maham Anga in her great loyalty and wisdom took charge of affairs 
and made Shihabuddin Ahmad Khan and Khwaja Jahan her tools and exerted 
herself to soothe those who came."'''^ Soon afterwards she devised the appointing 
of Bahadur Khan to the office of Vakalat, who caused dissension in the nobility. '^^  
Abul Fazl mentions that "in those days, though Bahadur Khan had the name of 
Vakil, yet in reality the business was transacted by Maham Anga."'''^ In 1561, 
Akbar appointed Shamsuddin Muhammad Atka as the new Vakil which was 
resented by Maham Anga who regarded herself as the substantive Vakil. It appears 
for the first time that Akbar wanted to free himself from this politics and there 
were reasons for i.>at. Once Akbar had a pressing desire for Rupees eighteen, 
which the then Diwan could not supply and ultimately Maham Anga gave to Akbar 
the said amount. It must have been a pity for the emperor who did not have any 
privy purse. Moreover, Adham Khan, son of Maham Anga was also acting in an 
arbitrary fashion. Abul Fazl mentions Adham Khan in the following, words, "folly 
and blindness of heart were the confirmed qualities of Adham Khan." As the 
commander of the royal army who captured the province of Malwa, Adham Khan 
did not send two beauties from the harem of its ruler Baz Bahadur to Akbar. "He 
^'^^ Akbarnama, 2, p. 149. V.A.Smith has referred the period after the death of Bairam Khan, and the 
rise in power of Maham Anga as the period of Petticoat government. This period saw a steep rise 
in the power of Maham Anga. Though V.A.Smith included in his petticoat government the name of 
Mariam Makami, the mother of Akbar as well but her role was not prominent. See, Akbar, the great 
Mogul. 
'^* Within six months of Bairam Khan's fall, Akbar appointed, in quick succession, as many as four 
persons to the exalted office of the Prime-Minister. It appears that Akbar did not permit them to 
adopt an independent course of action. By appointing Bahadur Khan as the Prime-Minister it also 
seems that Akbar was degrading the exalted office because of the tussle in his nobility for the post. 
^^^ Akbarnama,2,p.\5\. 
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intrigued with his mother's servant who waited in the royal harem, and spirited 
away from the Shahinshah's enclosure, two special beauties from among Baz 
Bahadur's women and who had been recently exhibited to His Majesty. Able men 
undertook the service, and by making proper search they caught both of them and 
brought them back. Maha.Ti Anga perceived that if these two women were 
introduced to His Majesty the veil over her acts would be raised and her son's 
treachery be revealed. She therefore caused these two innocent ones to be put to 
death for 'a severed head makes no sound."''* 
It also appears from Abul Fazl's account that Adham Khan in fact did try to murder 
Akbar. He writes, "His Majesty slept that night on the roof of Adham Khan's 
house. That evil inauspicious wretch was lying in ambush and was waiting for his 
opportunity, as perhaps the glance of the holy one might fall on his Harem and so 
the villain might make this a pretext and slay him. Adham Khan's ill omen harem 
house was a thing of which that wise and chaste one never thought. As the Divine 
protection ever watches over that spiritual and material cynosure, that black 
hearted and ill fated one had no power or pretext (for injuring him) and the a vaunt 
of real and spiritual sovereignty protected him in his loneliness."^'' Adham Khan's 
highhandedness reached to a point where he murdered the Vakil Shamsuddin 
Muhammad Khan Atka, the foster father of Akbar and with a naked dagger in his 
hands entered the apartments where Akbar was sleeping. Niamat Khan, the 
^^^ Akbarnama,2,^.22\. 
'''Ibid. 
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eunuch acting loyally closed the doors and Akbar then capitally punished 
Adham Khan. Soon, Maham Anga also died. 
However, the problems posed by this 'aristocracy of milk' continued. The family 
of Shamsuddin Atka Khan persisted to act with the presumption of amnesty.^ °° 
Mirza Aziz Kuka, the son of Shamsuddin Atka Khan, who was slightly younger 
then Akbar, assumed the role of the leader of the foster battalion. Partly due to 
convention, and partly due to the absence of any competition from other foster 
relative, Mirza Aziz Kuka assumed great powers. Akbar was often offended by his 
boldness although he could hardly punish him, owing to Kuka's stature and 
support within the zanSna."*"' Regarding him, Akbar used to say, "Between me and 
Aziz is a river of milk, which I cannot cross."'"'^  Akbar had to finally disperse the 
whole family {atka khail) from the region of Punjab.'*"^  
If Akbar found it difficult to deal with the defiant milk nobility, it was still more 
challenging for him to tackle the haughty blood nobility, who continued to 
challenge his authority. It is noteworthy that from 1560-1567 no less than nine 
nobles revolted against Akbar and not surprisingly they were high grandees of the 
'""' For a general history of the family of Shamsuddin Atka, see Afzal Husain, The NooUity under 
Akbar and Jahangir. 
""" It appears that there was a continuous pressure on Akbar from the zanana to pardon Aziz Kukah. 
See Fazl, Akbarnamah, 3, p. 308. 
•""^  Abul Fazl, Ain-i Akbari, H. Blochmann trans., Calcutta, Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1873, 1, p. 
343. 
"" In his thirteenth regnal year (1568-1569) Akbar removed the Atka Khail from Punjab and for 
having done so, took great credit and said that he had scattered the Atka Khail so that they had 
become like the sturs of the constellation. See Fazl, Akbarnamah, 2, pp. 332-333. Also see Abdul 
Qadir Badauni, Miintakhab al-Tavarikh, ed. Munshi Ahmad Ali, Calcutta, 1865, 2, p. 106. 
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emperor. Out of Abul Fazl's list of thirty Mansabddrs of the rank of 5000, ten 
actually caused Fitna to the emperor.""'* These were (1) Bairam Khan (2) Adham 
Khan (3) Mirza Ibrahim ""^  (4) Mirza Muzaffar Hussain, (5) Munim Khan, (6) AMI 
Quii Khan (7) Abdullah Khan (8) Mirza Sharfuddin (9) Mirza Aziz Kuka, and (10) 
Asaf Khan. If we exclude from the list the revolts of Bairam Khan, Adham Khan, 
and Mirza Aziz Kuka whose defecate of Akbar have been noted in a different 
context above, there still remain seven other nobles. Interestingly, except for the 
revolt of Asaf Khan, who was a Persian all the other nobles were Turani. This fact 
according to Aligarh School of thought underlines the weak position of'sovereign' 
within the Turko-Mongol theory of Kingship. Had it not been for the brilliant 
research of Iqtidar Alam Khan, we would have documented and analyse these 
revolts again.""^ 
However, what is new in the present research is the establishment of the role of 
matrimonial alliances in these revolts. It is interesting to note that two out of the 
seven nobles mentioned above were married to the royal princesses. They were (1) 
Mirza Muzaffar Hussain married to Shahzadah Khanim, daughter of Akbar (2) 
Mirza Sharfuddin Hussain married to Bakshi Banu Begum, sister of Akbar.""^  
The reference to another daughter of Akbar, Aram Banu Begum could not be 
established. 
•"''' The word Mansabdar is devivcd IVom Arabic word 'iminsib' meaning olfice or rank. The 
Mughals organised their army on this basis it was a revenue-cum-miiitary assignment. 
""^  Mirza Ibrahim was never a grandee of the Mughal Empire However Abui Fazl has included his 
name in observance of the etiquettes. 
*°^  For details please see I.A Khan 
•**" It has been argued that after Akbar prohibited the marriage of Mughal Princesses. See Andrea 
ButenschSn, The Life of a Mogul Princess: Jahanara Begam, Daughter ofShahjahan, London : G. 
Routledge & Sons, ltd, 1931. 
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Thus by 1567-68 Akbar faced this acute crisis from his nobility. He must have 
understood and realised the problertis to his authority if the powers of these groups 
of nobles remained unchecked. Thus soon after the ouster of Bairam Khan, we can 
realise that Akbar was innovating various ways to superimpose his authority by not 
only checking the growing powers of the nobility but also elevating his position as 
a 'sovereign'. These steps shall now be considered in detail. 
5.2 Curbing the Powers of Nobility 
Two years after the dismissal of his regent Bairam Khan, Akbar by marrying the 
daughter of Raja Bhar Mai, Kachhwas Rajputs of Amber, formalised series of 
matrimonial alliances with the valiant Rajput community of Hindustan, an event 
which was unp'-ecedented.'"'* Through these matrimonial alliances Akbar managed 
to recruit in his nobility a powerful and more importantly a loyal group. Besides 
""^  The process of establishing matrimonial alliances with the Hindu Rajputs has been studied as the 
'Rajput Policy of Akbar'. S.R.Sharma, The Religious Policy of the Mughal Emperors, Calcutta: 
Humphry Milford, 1940, argued that Akbar married the Hindu princesses because of his secular and 
liberal outlook. Iqtidar Alam Khan, The Nobility of Akbar and Development of His Religious 
Policy, I560-I580' argued that Akbar had to recruit Hindu Rajputs because of the menace of his 
Turani nobles. In an another article, The Mughal assignment system during Akbar's early years 
1556-1575 in Irfan Habib ed., Medieval India Researches in the History of India 1200-1750, Delhi: 
Oxford University Press, 1992, he is of the view that Akbar's attitude towards Rajputs should be 
studied in the context of the compromises which was made with the local Zamindars, especially the 
Rajput Kings. A.B.Pandey, Later Medieval India: A History of the Mughals, Allahabad, Central 
Book Depot, 1963, argues that the cooperation of the Rajputs alienated the foreign character of the 
Mughals. Norman Zeiglar, Some notes on Rajput loyalties during the Mughal Period, in Muzaffar 
Alam and Sanjay Subrahmanyam ed.. The Mughal Stale 1526-1750. Delhi: Oxford University 
Press, 1998, p.168-210 argues that the family offering her daughter in marriage was automatically 
reduced to a subordinate position before the-family of a son. Thus, Akbar's position is quite clear in 
this regard. Irfan Habib, Agrarian System of Mughal India, Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1963 
have calculated that the regions under the Rajputs yielded maximum land revenue to the Mughal 
treasury and thus the Akbar's desire to conquer these areas without fighting is very obvious. 
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Rajputs a number of Persian nobles were also recruited. It has been argued by 
I.A. Khan, that the recruitment of non-Turani element in the nobility of Akbar was 
a well calculated political move by Akbar. Through this act, he not only got the 
support of Rajputs but also countered the problems posed by the Turani nobles. 
Without challenging the excellent argument based on meticulous research, I shall 
put forward another plausible explanation for establishing matrimonial alliances 
with the Hindu Rajputs. This argument stands supportive and is in addition to the 
study of l.A Khan. 
It should be noted here that even prior to the problems posed by Maham Anga, 
Akbar faced a serious challenge to his authority soon after his accession from 
another woman. Mirza Humayun, the ruler of Badakshan, on Humayun's death 
showed sign of rebellion. It is interesting to note that Abu'l FazI, the official 
chronicler of Akbar's reign attributed this rebellion to the wife of Mirza Sulaiman 
called Haram Begam, also known as Khurram Begum. Abul Fazl writes that Mirza 
Sulaiman made Khurram Begam a ruler over himself and could not conduct any 
business without her advice. This wife of Mirza was favouring one part of 
Badakshan over another, which led to a reaction against her.''°^ Haram Begam left 
*°^ Mirza Kamran, brother of Humayun, wanted to marry Haram Begam, the wife of Mirza 
Sulaiman, the ruler of Badaicshan and in fact had sent a proposal to Haram Begam. Haram Begum 
who had in her thoughts to capture Kabul called her Husband Mirza Sulaiman and her son Mirza 
Ibrahim and moaned, "Mirza Kamran must have come to think you are cowards, since he sends me 
a letter like this. Have I deserved to be written in this way? Send off a letter for me about it and 
rebuke him. What does such a man deserve who, the son of a mother, yet does such monstrous 
things, and who fears neither me nor my son?" The Begam's marital character spices this story, 
since her husband did not dare even to make war without her consent. See Begum, Humayunnama 
p. 193. 
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Badakshan and came to Kabul and joined Humayun's harem. Abul Fazl writes, 
"She in her little sense and evil soul had seen the outward state of Kabul and 
resolved to get possession of it. She represented this to Mirza Sulaiman as an easy 
undertaking and forced him to invade Kabul"'"° to the much distress of young 
monarch Akbar. Haram Begum and the province of Kabul again become a source 
of trouble for Akbar when the former began to play politics differently, now 
because of her husband Mirza Sulaiman, who wanted to marry the widow of Mirza 
Kamran but Haram Begam married her to Mirza Ibrahim, her son against the will 
of the widow. Mirza Ibrahim later had a son called Mirza Shahrukh by the widow 
of Mirza Kamran. After the death of Mirza Ibrahim, his wife Muhtarim Khanim 
excited Mirza Shahrukh to rebel against his grandfather Mirza Sulaiman which he 
did. 
Akbar, though still in his teenage was watching all the events carefully. The 
Mughal Empire at that time was practically run by Bairam Khan, who was the tutor 
of Akbar and also the Vakil (Prime minister). At this time the royal Harem was 
till in Kabul waiting for the affairs there to settle before making a move towards 
the imperial capital. The event was so dangerous that it is only after settling the 
affairs of Mirza Sulaiman that Akbar was able to recall his harem from Kabul to 
India. 
''^° Akbarnama, 2, pp.39-4\. 
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At this stage Akbar might have realized about the problems which the women 
posed by seeking active part in the politics. He had seen that before in the affairs 
of Kabul and now personally witnessed it in his own court. He might have also 
realised that the women's interest were self-centred, often to forward their own 
personal interest &i>d that of their relatives. Though an illiterate,. Akbar had a 
passion for history and he might have learnt from those histories the problems 
which were faced by his ancestors by giving in the body of women a degree of 
autonomy. By this time he had also witnessed the position of women among his 
Majority Hindu subjects.'"' The Hindu women did not have any independent 
identity.'"^ Her identity was dependent on her husband, to whom once married 
there was no going back. Symbolically, a woman is part of her husband, his half 
body. Rules for proper conduct mandates that she transfer her powers, as they 
*" The word 'Hindu' is a geographical definition which refers to the people living beyond the river 
'Sindhi/ (Indus). According to historians, this word 'Hindu' was first used by the Persians who came 
to India through the North-Western passes of the Himalayas. The Arabs also used it. According to 
the 'Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics' ed. By James Hastings (Vol.6, reference no.699) the 
word Hindu is not found in any of the Indian literature and scriptures before the advent of the 
Muslims. In his book, "Discovery of lndia"(London, Meridian, 1956) P.74-75, Jawahar Lai Nehru 
wrote that the earliest occurrence of the word Hindu can be traced to a 'Tantrk' in eighth century 
A.D. and it was used to describe the people. It was never used for describing the followers of a 
particular religion. Its relationship to religion is of late occurrence. The word 'Hinduism' is derived 
from the word 'Hindu' and the British used it for the first time. According to the 'Encyclopaedia 
Britanica' (vol.20, reference no. 581), the word 'Hinduism' was first used by the British writers in 
A.D. 1830. Thus, the right word for the religion should be 'Sanatana Dharma' (Eternal religion) or 
the 'Vedic ZJ/jormt'(Religion of the Vedas) 
'^^  The concept ot female in Hinduism represents a duality: On one hand she is benevolent and on 
the other hand she is malevolent. Two facets of femaleness relate to this duality. The female is first 
of all "Sakti" (energy/power), the energising principle of the Universe. The female is also "Prakriti" 
(Nature), the und'fferentiated matter of the universe. Uniting these two facets of femaleness, 
women are both energy/power and nature. The equation women =Power + Nature = Danger, 
represents the essence of femaleness as it underlies Hindu religious belief and action about women. 
It is essential for a man to control women's power in order to render that power into benevolent. For 
an excellent study see Susan Wadicy, 'Women and the Hindu Tradition' in Rehana Ghadially ed.. 
Women in Indian Society: A Reader, New Delhi: Sage Publication, 1988, pp.23-43. 
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accumulate, to her husband for his use.'"^ A central theme of the norms and 
guidelines for proper female behaviour, especially in the male dominated classical 
literature, is that men must control women and their power. Even otherwise, 
whether from folklore, traditions or mythology, the role model for women has 
always been submissive and subservient to her Husband.'"^ Unlike the Muslims, 
Sita, the obedient wife of Rama and the heroin of the epic 'Ramayana', who in spite 
of wandering in the jungles with her Husband and showing an attitude of complete 
dedication was asked to prove her chastity by the same husband remains the role 
model for many Hindu women even today/" If a husband dies the wife had to 
bum herself alive on the pyre of her husband, a practice known as Sati, so that they 
can be husband and wife in the second life. Father Monserrate had provided a 
vivid description of the sati practice in the following words, "The wives of the 
Brahmans, a famous class of nobly-born Hindus, are accustomed, in accordance 
with an ancient tradition of their religion, to burn themselves on the same pyres as 
their dead husbands. The wretched women are rendered quite insensible by means 
*" The dominant norms for the Hindu woman concern her role as a wife. Classical Hindu laws 
focus almost exclusively on this issue. Role model and norms for mothers, daughters, sisters etc. are 
less prominent. 
•*'^  The need for women to be obedient and subservient towards her husband has be'-n explicitly 
mentioned not only in ancient texts but also in the texts of the later period. For a basic guideline see 
Harikrishna Jayantakrishna Dave ed., Laws o/Manu (Manusmrit'i), Bombay: Bhartiya Vidya Series, 
1972. Also see, Wendy Doniger and Sudhir Kakar tr., Kamasiitra, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002. 
"" See Jacqueline Suthcrn Hirst, Siia's Story (A project of the Dharam 1 linduja Institute of Indie 
research, Faculty of Divinity, University of Cambridge) Hindu Value series 1; series editor Julius 
Lipner (Surrey, Bayeux Arts incorporated, 1997). Also see Sudhir Kakar, "Feminine Identity in 
India" in Rehana < jhadially ed., Women in Indian Society: A Reader, New Delhi: Sage Publication, 
1988. In Islam as well the wife of Prophet Muhammad was accused of adultery. However, the 
accusation was dealt very ditTerently because from that moment it was decreed that to accuse chaste 
women is a grave sin. Unlike the Hindu tradition, Aisha (Wife of Prophet) was not asked to prove 
her chastity. Chapter no. 24, Versell-23 (An-Nur) of the Holy Quran speaks very clearly about 
this. 
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of certain drugs, in order that they might feel no pain. For this purpose opium 
is used sometimes they are half drugged; and before they lose their resolution, 
are hurried to the pyre with warnings, prayers and promises of eternal fame. On 
ariving there they cast themselves into the flames. If they hesitate, the wretched 
creatures are driven on to the pyre and if they try to leap off again are held down 
with pales and hooks."'"^ The pride and honour of Hindu husband rested on his 
wife and on the part of the wife there was an attitude of complete submission. In 
fact Muslim's admiration of sati dates back to the time of Amir Khusro and the 
Mughals too admired their submission and loyalty towards their husband.^ '^  
Akbar must have also realized the issues of sexuality and their use and abuse by 
the women, which was the inherent weakness in the man. Thus, it appears that 
Rajput policy of Akbar was to counter check the menace posed by the autonomy of 
Muslim women and their interference in political affairs of the empire. 
The Muslims admiration of loyalty and submission towards the husband among the 
Hindu women has already been narrated. Not only the wife submitted but also the 
whole family of a Hindu wife was considered to be of lower status than the family 
of the groom. In other words, the whole family would become submissive; 
however, powerful and influential they would be before the groom's family. By 
this strategy, Akbar counter checked the menace posed by his womenfolk and the 
•"^  The commentary of Father Monserra/e, pp.61-62 
^" Amir Khusrau's (d.I235) famous verse: "There is no more manly a lover in the world than the 
Hindu women. To burn oneself on a burnt-out candle is not what every flying insect can do". Even 
the theologian Abdul Qadir Badaoni in his Nijat-iir Rashid, (A.D.I591) writes in a similar strain, 
quoting a similar couplet: "in the path of love, how one can be behind a Hindu woman, who bums 
herself alive over a dead (beloved)". See S. Moinul Haq ed., Nijat-iir Rashid, (Lahore, 1972) p.412. 
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harem and this strategy seems to have worked. There is no reference of any 
Hindu women in the harem of Akbar taking any part in state politics. Besides, for 
a fear of acquiring the attitude of Muslim women, Akbar never changed the 
religion of his Hindu wives and more and more Mughal Princes were married 
among the Rajputs. The Rajput wives of Akbar practised idol worship inside the 
royal palace. Akbar got the loyal support of Hindus which made his imperialistic 
designs much easier, both in terms of conquering the whole of India and also in 
bringing his nobility under complete subordination. Though, as usual, in 
portraying his master Akbar as a perfect monarch, Abu'l Fazl says that a law was 
passed prohibiting the practice of sali. However, Father Monserrete writes that 
Akbar summoned the Christian Fathers to actually witness the sati practice and 
mentions how Father Rudolph publicly reprimanded the king for his approval of 
such "revolting crime."'" ^  It does appear that even if Akbar issued such an order, 
neither it was implemented nor did it prohibit Akbar's admiration towards sati. 
One of the most powerful noble and who's Sister Akbar married in 1562, Raja 
Man singh who championed Akbar's cause and followed every rule had 1500 
wives and on his death sixty performed sati.'"' That there was an attempt to 
undermine the position of wife in general and women in particular can be gauged 
from the number of wives Akbar and his nobility kept. Though there is a mention 
of only a few of Akbar's wives but one cannot rule out immensely large number of 
•"' The commentary of Father Monserrate, pp.61-62 
"" Abul Fazl Allami, "Ain-i-Akbari", Transl. H.BIochmann (Calcutta, Asiatic Society of Bengal, 
1873) vol.1, P..341 (Hereafter referred as Ain-i-Akbari) and Shaikh Farid Bhakkari, "The 
Dhakhirat-id Khawanin" tr. Z.A.Desai (Delhi, Idarah-i-Adabiyat, 1999) part 1, p.79. The latter has 
60 person's male and female which renders it even more interesting. 
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concubines and those who even did not had the status of a concubine. In this 
way the person does not have to go to the same women every night and thus could 
remain free from any influence. 
The over-all impact of Rajput women on the Mughal, zanana is summed up by 
Annette S. Beveridge. She writes-
Unfortunately the barriers of language and habit must have kept 
Akbar's Rajput wives from charming the Musalmani ladies by 
recital of the legends of their race. These Hindus can never have 
been welcome inmates of the palace to any of the Moslims; but 
pagan as they were thought, their conduct as wives must have 
insinuated the thin edge of conviction that no one form of faith is 
committed the nurture of the sense of duty."^" 
Harbans Mukhia in his recent work The Mughals of India concludes that 
matrimonial alliances between Mughals and Rajputs established the supremacy of 
the Mughals.''^' Rajput tradition has it that a daughter could only be given in 
marriage to either the same or the higher caste {pratiloma). Thus, through this 
marriage, the supremacy of the Mughals was established. Using sociological tools, 
Mukhia in fact provides a new understanding of the Mughal-Rajput matrimonial 
phenomenon. However, Harbans Mukhia provides the wrong understanding and 
See introduction of Gulbadan BTgum, "Humdyiinndmah," ed. Annette S. Beveridge (London, 
1902). pp. 68-69 
*^' Harbans Mukhia, Mughals of India (London,Blackweii 2005)., p.l46 
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definition of the indigenous words anuloma and pratiloma. Anuloma 
(hypergamy) prescribes marriage of a woman either in the same caste or above, 
while Pratiloma (hypo gamy) is a marriage of a woman to a man below her caste. 
Through this and other mechanisms caste hierarchies were created in India. The 
explanation provided by Harbans Mukhia, however is the other way round.'* '^' 
5.3 Reorganising Administration; The Mansabdari System 
Despite the matrimonial alliances with Hindu Rajputs and dispersing the foster 
battalion to differei.t places, Akbar could not have comprehensively subdued the 
ambitious nobility without reorganising his administration, more specifically the 
army which was dependent on the mansab system, or the assignment of revenues 
and the conferment of rank. According to Abdul Aziz: 
The mansab, although primarily a military rank really 
constituted the terms in which official hierarchy, and 
incidentally social status, was expressed. A mansab did 
not by itself imply any particular office. Sometimes the 
conferment of a mansab was equivalent to mere grant of 
source of income to a person by way of recognition; it 
may be, of purely professional services or skill (as those 
of a physician or a poet).'*'^ '' 
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Ibid., pp. 146, 149 and also see glossary 
See for example David Mandelbaum, Society in India (Berkcly,Univcrsity of California lv70), 
M. N. Srinivas, India : Social Structure (Delhi,Hindustan Publishing Corporation 1982). 
*^* Abdul Aziz, The Mansabdari System and the Mughal Army, Delhi: Idarah-i Adabiyat, 1972, p.2. 
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Taking further from what has been suggested by Abdul Aziz, we can possibly 
deduce that, firstly mansab was a military rank, and secondly it also served to 
maintain social and official hierarchies. But then the question arises that why 
Akbar had to introduce mansab system in 1574-75. A detailed analysis of the first 
15 years of Akbar's reign after the ouster of Bairam Khan makes it abundantly 
clear that the introduction of mansab system in 1574-75 was shrewdly drafted 
stratagem of Akbar to further curtail the powers of his ambitious nobility, besides 
of course the grano objective of streamlining his revenue and fiscal matters.''^ ^ 
The Turani nobility, as discussed previously was apparently adamant on sharing 
the power with the sovereign, perhaps owing to the Central Asian heritage. The 
system of sharing war spoils and booty for a rapidly moving army might have been 
just fine. However, in order to annex an area/territory/region, the conquered land 
has to be assigned not only to impose the dictates of central authority but also to 
extract revenues necessary for maintaing a ready army as well as fill the royal 
exchequer. In the section on mansabdars, Abu'l FazI cleariy points towards this 
necessity. He writes, "But as the strength of one man is scarecely adequate to such 
an ardous undertaking, he selects, guided by the ight of his knowledge, some 
excellent men to help him, appointing at the same time servants for them."''^ ^ 
Most of the studies done on mansabdari system have been from the economic point of view. 
See, for example, Irfan Habib, W.H.Moreland. 
"^ Abu! Fazl, Ain-i Akbari, pp.247-248. 
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There are numerous evidences that both, Babur and Humayun assigned 
conquered territories to his nobles, as been discussed previously at appropriate 
places. Their purpose was two fold: First, to maintain regular administration and 
to quell any pockets of resistance, and second, individual assignments (jagirs). 
The first was usually a military assignment of a military zone headed by hakim, 
while the second was a revenue assignment of a sarkar (province) or a pargana 
under a particular military zone. According to I.AKhan, the vagueness in the roles, 
authorities and jurisdictions of the nobles of these two kinds of assignments often 
ensued tussle, and thus, it necessitated the introduction of mansab system.^ '^ 
There were other problems with the existing system too. I.A Khan has shown 
conclusively that during Akbar's early years most of the assignments were 
concentrated in the hands of Turani nobility, and to still make the matter worst, 
these were in the same region. The cumulative result of all these, owing to the 
haughtiness of the Turani nobility was the building of strong local roots so as to 
often challenge the central authority, the weakening of army due to non-
maintenance of stipulated army contingents and weapons, and lastly corruption and 
hardship. According to Badauni, mansabdars indulged in luxury and extravagance 
and were more intent on amassing wealth than on equipping their contingents or 
considering the welfare of the peasantry. The result was that efficient soldiery was 
non-existant.'*^* 
427 
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I.A.Khan, "The Mughal Assignment System during Akbar's Early Years, 1556-1575", PIHC, 
Baduni, 2, p.l90. 
201 
As a first step towards curtailing the powers of nobility, Akbar had already 
started to disperse the jagirs of one family to different places to break their power 
and neutralise their local roots. The dispersal of Atka khail in 1568 is just one 
example. In the second step, Akbar made it obligatory on every noble to maintain 
a fixed contingent of horses from his assignment, besides withdrawing not only his 
own salary but also the share of royal exchequer. Thus, every noble was assigned 
a rank denoting not only his social status but also his personal salary (zat), as well 
as the required contingent (swar). This was the mansab system. Abu'l Fazl 
informs us that 66 grades were fixed from 10 to 5000, over which it was reserved 
only for the royal princes.''^' Not going into very great detail, Abu'l Fazl sums up 
the mansab system in the following words: 
In selecting his officers. His Majesty is assisted by his 
knowledge of the spirit of the age, a knowledge which 
sheds a peculiar light on the jewel of his wisdom. His 
majesty sees through some men at the first glance and 
confers upon them high rank. Sometimes he increases 
the mansab of a servant, but decreases his contingent. 
He also fixes the number of the beasts of burden. The 
monthly grants made to the mansabdars vary according 
to the condition of their contingents. An officer whose 
contingent comes upto his mansab, is put into the first 
class of his rank; if his contingent is one half and 
upwards of the fixed number, he is put into the second 
429 In actual there were only 33 grades. 
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class; the third class contains those contingents which 
are still Iess/^° 
To still break the back bone of the Turani nobility, Akbar did further two things. 
He started to assign more and more mansabs to the non-Turanis, and to ensure that 
mansabdars do not cheat on the number of the horses to 'je maintained, Akbar also 
introduced the dagh (branding) system, whereby the so called mandatory 'beasts of 
burdens' were marked with unique signs so as to prevent the common practice of 
borrowing other noble's horses on the required day. 
Through these systems, Akbar was able to counter check and nullifies the 
insinuations of Central Asian customs, manifested mainly in tura, which were 
making the Turani nobility to believe that they have a share in royal power. By 
reserving the highest grades of over 5000 for the princes of royal blood, Akbar also 
sent a message across that royalty and sovereignty cannot be shared, and thus, must 
have further strengthened the position of his family as the only legitimate claimant 
to the Mughal throne. 
430 Abul FazI, Ain-iAkbari, p.248. 
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5.4 Symbolism, Submission and Elevation of the Position of 
'Sovereign* 
Akbar is rightly regarded as tlie real founder of the Mughal Empire in South Asia. 
The policies he formulated and executed enabled him to safeguard his throne and 
empire from the vested interest of many groups. Almost all his policies started 
after the termination of the regency of Bairam Khanin 1560. 
An interesting episode after the death of Bairam Khan confirms the hypothesis that 
through many symbolic acts Akbar was trying to elevate the position of 
'sovereign'. This was Akbar's marriage with the widow of Bairam Khan. 
According to Ruby Lai, Akbar married the widow of Bairam Khan to prove his 
commitment and loyalty to all those who were close to the Mughal court.* '^ The 
circumstances leading to the ouster and later murder of Bairam Khan however do 
not support the hypothesis of Ruby Lai. The ouster of Bairam Khan was not easy, 
as Bairam Khan by 1560, had acquired a lot power, and was also supported by the 
powerful Uzbek nobility.''^ ^ And it may also be mentioned that Akbar was 
cautious while gradually assuming sovereignty. His moves would eventually 
decide his fate, and any move against Bairam Khan was no less than a battle. Even 
^'' Lai, Domesticity and power in the early Mughal world., p. 169 
"" Iqtidar Alam Khan, The Political Biography of a mughal Noble: Miinim Khan Khan-i Khanan, 
1497-1575 (New E'elhi.Orient Longman 1973)., pp. 57-58 
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when Akbar assumed sovereignty and Bairam Khan was still alive there were 
apprehensions in the emperor's mind of a coup. The murder of Bairam Khan 
marked the final victory of Akbar, and, his marriage with Bairam Khan's widow 
was a symbolic act to show his complete victory and 'sovereign' status. 
The capture of an enemy's women, whether mother, wives, concubines or, for that 
matter, even slaves was a dominant symbol of conquest in those days. And, a 
woman's suxcxdtjauhar in case of Rajputs to avoid captivity, robbed the victor of 
victory. Thus, it was very important for the victor to capture the women of the 
loser, as women were perceived the carriers (rather then generators) of the 
reputation and status of their father/husband or sons, which could then be 
transmitted to the male who possessed them. This symbolic act was manifested in 
pre-modem Greece, as well as, in South Asia. Elizabeth Carney observes-
Sexual possession of these bearers of status (women), 
whether legitimated by marriage or not, was a 
particularly powerful symbol of victory a kind of 
second victory, both sexual and military, over the males 
to whom the women had belonged."*^ ^ 
Thus, the marriage of Akbar with the widow of Bairam Khan was more than the 
former's commitment to help and be loyal to all those who were close to the 
Mughal court, as is concluded by Ruby Lai. 
'*" Elizabeth Donnelly Carney, "Alexander and Persian Women," The American Journal of 
Philo/ogy\]7(\996).,p.564 
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The second symbolic act of Akbar was to recruit personal disciples called 
chilas. John F. Richards, in his outstanding work had pointed out that Akbar had 
to elevate his position to that of the vice-regent of God to execute the authority. 
One of the ways was to recruit chilas (disciples or personal followers).''^ '' 
Furthermore, he elevated the status of the monarch to the high pedestal of vice-
regent of God on earth. Additionally, Akbar introduced a system of personal 
discipleship whereby any one can become a personal follower of the emperor. 
These disciples, called chilas, had direct access to the emperor; the latter, as if a 
personification of the God, showed himself to the public every-day through the 
introduction of a practice calkdjharokha darshan. 
The credit of establishing the practice of jharokha darshan, according to Abul fazl 
goes to Akbar.''"'^  Abul Fazl writes: 
After performing his morning devotions, he is visible 
from outside the awning, to people of all ranks, whether 
they be |,iven to worldly pursuits, or to a life of solitary 
contemplation, without any molestation from the mace-
bearers. This mode of showing himself is called, in the 
language of the country, darsan (view); and it frequently 
happens that business is transacted at this time. The 
second time of his being visible is in the State Hall, 
whither he generally goes after the first watch of the day. 
But this assembly is sometimes announced towards the 
434 
JJ5 
See Richards, ed., Kingship and Authority in South Asia. 
Ain-i Akbari, p. 155 
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close of day, or at night. He also frequently appears at a 
window, which often opens into the State Hall, for the 
transaction of business ^^^ 
It became an established tradition of the empire, and those who believed in it 
assembled every morning at dawn at the foot of the jharokha (window). 
According to Badauni, "low people who could not get into the Daulat Khana 
flocked together below ^t jharokha at sunrise. Unless they saw the "sacred face" 
they regarded food and drink prohibited to them."''^ ^ Akbar appeared at the 
jharokha, and after giving the darshan (audience) held an open court in which 
Hindus and Muslims, high and low, men and women; all were allowed to present 
petitions and represent their cases in person, and the King gave 'justice' in these 
cases on the spot.'*^ ^ Slowly and gradually, the position of emperor shifted from 
top to the centre, v. hereby all subjects had the access to the emperor. 
Akbar, by allegedly starting a new religion 'Din-i Ilahi,' was attempting to gain 
temporal power and personal following among his subjects. Although it appears 
that, the move to introduce a new religion failed miserably, it led to the 
introduction of the new feature in the Mughal monarchy of the recruitment of 
chilas (disciples) of the emperor. The practice further strengthened the credibility 
«<*Ain 
"^''Badauni. vol.2, p.236 
Ibn Hasan, ''Central stnicliire of the Mughal Empire" (Lahore: Oxford University Press, 1967), 
p.68 
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of the Mughal emperor among the nobility and the masses, and he grew closer 
to his subjects. For the subjects, the emperor was becoming a sort of a role model, 
an icon of perfection, the vice-regent of God on earth, who should be imitated in 
every sphere of life to attain material and temporal goals. 
Through these symbolic acts, Akbar built upon his personal appeal to establish an 
image or metaphor of the emperor's person as an embodiment of the empire. To 
challenge or destroy the emperor's person was to challenge or destroy the imperial 
system, for they were identical.'* '^ By the first half of the seventeenth century, the 
system was firmly rooted in the Mughal Empire. There are repeated references to 
the king recruiting disciples from every corner of the empire. The purpose of these 
disciples was to imitate the emperor and his habits in minute detail. Although 
Aurangzeb forbade the practice of Jharokha Darshan, he continued to enrol the 
chilas in his service. 
This new phenomenon in the Mughal system yielded a new position to the 
emperor and if the changes are studied in context with cosmological concepts, it 
reveals a startling difference. The Mughal Emperor was now at the centre of 
administration. He was a core, with different sections of the subjects being the 
periphery (See appendix). Whereas, on one hand, the emperor was accessible from 
"" J.F.Richards, The Formulation of Imperial Authority under Akbar and Jahangir, in Muzaffar 
Alam and Sanjay Subramaniyam ed. ''The Mughal Stale 1526-1750" (Calcutta: Oxford University 
Press, 1998), p. 128 
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the centre to all his subjects, on the other hand, he was standing in the centre, 
Uke a Sun whose radiance affected the whole empire. 
Yet another symbolic act to create his own independent identity and to cut-off the 
Central Asian roots and heritage was manifested in :he attempt of Akbar to 
promote and patronise the Chishi Sufi tan'kh instead of Naqshbandi tarikh, which 
for a long time was patronised by the Timurids. The Naqshbandi silsilah is an 
offshoot of the silsilah-i Khwajagan which was organised in Turkistan by Khwaja 
Ahmad 'Ata Yasvi (d: 1166) whom the Turks respectfully refer to as Hazrat-i 
Turkistan. In the fourteenth century Khwaja Bahauddin Naqsbandi (d: 1389), a 
spiritual descendant of Khwaja Ata revitalised the silsilah, and his impact was so 
phenomenal that the silsilah became identified with his name. 
The Timurids were the stern follower of the Naqshbandi silsilah. Timur himself 
built the tomb of Khwaja 'Ata and paid respectful visits to his shrine. His 
descendants married into the saint's family. Mirza Haider Dughlat had described in 
detail how the Timurid Princes used to receive Khwaja Ubaidullah Ahrar, a 
spiritual descendant of Khwaja Naqshband, "standing at a distance with their eyes 
fixes on the ground". Babur's father was himself a disciple of Khwaja Ahrar. 
However, after 1560 it is noteworthy that Akbar started to patronise the Chishti 
silsilah. The Chishti silsilah was basically an Indian sufi order with few or no ties 
to either Afghanistan or Central Asia. Hence there was no question of split 
loyalties. Through this, Akbar was able to portray himself as the monarch of India 
with local ties and was also able to severe off at least emotional heritage with 
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Central Asia. Thus, Akbar started to make frequent visits to the shrine of 
Khwaja Moinuddin Chisti at Ajmer. What is equally interesting is to note that 
Akbar's favourable attitude towards the chishtis started at a time when Mirza 
Hakim was continuously challenging his authority. The assassination attempt on 
the life of Akbar outside the shrine of Nizamuddin Auliya in 1564 by Mirza 
Sharfuddin, a disgruntled Naqshbandi noble might have convinced Akbar to opt 
for the Chistis. Thus, in 1569 Akbar undertook a dramatic step of ordering the 
construction of a new Imperial capital near the formerly sleepy village of Sikri. It 
was named 'Fatehpur' (abode of victory). Over the next fifteen years, Fatehpur 
would become synonymous with Akbar's power; the religious and political 
'legitimacy' of his three sons who were born in Sikri between 1569-1572. 
It is interesting to note that after the demise of Mirza Hakim, Akbar totally 
abandoned the exi-'usive favour given to the Chishtis so far. Thus after having 
undertaken almost annual pilgrimages to the great Chishti shrines in Punjab, Ajmer 
or Delhi between the early 1560s and early 1580s, Akbar never undertook another 
pilgrimage between 1581 and his death twenty four years later in 1605. Similarly 
his interest in Fatehpur Sikri also ended abruptly and he ordered imperial court's 
departure for the Punjab after Mirza Hakim's death in 1585. The city was 
abandoned. Apparently the Naqshbandis again found favour with the Mughals. A 
distinguished Chishti saint of the seventeenth and eighteenth century wrote as 
follows to one of his disciple who was trying in vain lo influence the religious 
outlook of Aurangzeb {Badshah Hindustan az aulad amir Timur qst was amir 
limitr iradat be khidmat Shah Naqshband dashat). 
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5.5 The Evolution of the Concept of iStrong Monarchy 
The received image of Akbar as the one who gave Mughal Empire a concept of 
centralisation and strong monarchy owes a great deal to his mentor, companion and 
historian Abul Fazl. Through his works Akbarnama and its bulky and detailed 
appendix Ain-i Akbari, Abul Fazl projected Akbar as divinely figure and 
introduced, rather rc-introduced the ancient but strong concept of Persian 
Kingship. Both through practical actions as well as theoretical input from Abul 
Fazl Akbar was able to revive the concept of strong monarchy that helped him not 
only to rule for nearly half a century but also to sustain that rule by his progeny for 
another century. In doing so his legitimacy to rule on the basis of his ancestry not 
only from Timur but also from Alanqua, the legendry mother of all the Mongols 
was highlighted. 
Like Babur, Akbar from early in his reign used a seal, especially in revenue-grant 
documents, where, on the rim of the circle, his genealogy was traced back to 
Timur, and Irfan Habib have collected enough evidences to the effect.'*'"' It vvas 
Arif Qandhari who also did not hesitate to ascribe to Akbar the title Sahib-i Qiran 
reserved especially for Timur.'*'" Abul Fazl goes a step further and compares the 
horoscope of Akbar with Timur, the latter offering a scale of comparison whereby 
it was asserted that it indicated higher achievement than did Timur. A chapter in 
Akbarnama was therefore suitably devoted to the achievements of Timur, 
'*•*" Irfan Habib, ' Timur in the political tradition and historiography of Mughal India" (paper 
presented at the International colloquium on The Timurlds and their successors, Tashkent 
(Uzbekistan), 1996). 
''' Ibid. 
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providing a short though careful chronicle apparently based on Yazdi/'*^ An 
ambitious project Tarikh-i Khan,dan-i Timuria was also commissioned whereby 
not only the deeds of Timur, Babur and Humayun were highlighted in words but 
also were painted. While stressing on the genealogical connections in an attempt to 
elevate the status and position of Akbar, Abul FazI trace his ancestry back to the 
legendry Alanqua, the mother of the Imperial Mongols.'*'*'' And if the ancestry is so 
high then the attempt to portray Akbar as a perfect man and a monarch {Insan-i 
kamil) was obvious. 
It is interesting to note that Abul Fazl had in his mind some concept of monarchy, 
which naturally floated in his writings. This concept perceives emperor as central 
and absolute to the dominion and people. Abul Fazl uses the imagery, even the 
terminology of the Ishraq tradition, when he puts temporal sovereignty at the 
highest station in the hierarchy of objects receiving spiritual light: 
To the Unique Almighty there is no higher station than 
that of the Padshah Royalty is a light from the 
Inimitable Almighty and a ray from the world-
illuminating Sun, the essence of the books of perfection, 
the assemblage of excellences. In the language of the 
day it is called/«rr-/ Izadi (divine light).'*'''' 
Fazl, Akbarnamah, vol.1, pp.77-81 442 
""^  Ibid, p. 122 
'"*'/4//7, vol.1, p.2 
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The concept of monarchs as receipt of divine light or radiance is a Well known 
ancient Sassanian tradition and concept, which provided absolute authority to the 
Sassanian Kings and elevated their status and position above every one else, and 
apparently Abul Fazl also was reverting to that concept through which Akbar's 
position could be strengthened. The farr was conceived as a blessing bestowed 
from above, usually by Asi, the goddess of wealth and recompense. Originally it 
appears to have meant the good things given to mortals by the gods", but the 
concept was also hypostasizxd as a deity. As a divine gift, it accompanied men and 
women favoured by the gods and it afforded them power and prosperity. The 
zamayad Yasht, although dedicated to the earth, in fact celebrates the farr as 
possessed by gods, prophets, and great heroes of Iranian myth and legend. 
The farr is one of the most enduring concepts of Iranian tradition and figures 
prominently in the national history. No King could rule successfully without it. It 
was only by virtue of farr that the mighty achieved fame and glory. Its presence 
brought success and symbolised 'legitimacy'. Its absence changed men's fortune, 
indicating divine disfavour and often auguring imminent fall or defeat. 
It appears that Abul Fazl by portraying Akbar as the recipient of i\\\s farr or divine 
favour was not only emphasising the model of Iranian/Sassanian Kingship but was 
also trying to provide him divine 'legitimacy' to rule instead of 'legitimacy' by 
being the progeny of Timur and Chinggis. This was perhaps the safest and the 
strongest way whereby Akbar could pose himself not only above the nobles but 
also above all mankind. 
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From 1556-1575 Akbar undertook various strategies to counter check the 
problem faced by the nobles and also planned meticulously to elevate his position 
as 'sovereign'. Naturally, Abul Fazl was central to all these and his written 
documentation of the deeds and sayings of Akbar projected him as a divine being. 
Ties with Central Asia were limited, if not severed. So was the case with the 
Islamic tradition and practice. There are few references whereby Akbar exhibited 
some connection with the Yasa and these were no less than political strategies 
themselves. Instead what was attempted by him was to revert back to the Persian 
concept of sovereignty which provided, or deem to provide strong centralisation 
and absolute power to the king. 
Through a series of policies and symbolic acts Akbar blocked the 'dangerous' 
insinuations of the Central Asian traditions by carefully checking the ambitions of 
his nobles. He also made the Mughal 'sovereign' a centre of all political social and 
religious affairs and elevated his position among the nobility and the masses to that 
of the vice regent of God. The strong new position of the 'sovereign' depended 
obviously on the personal strength of the emperor. Due to his personal strength, 
Akbar ensured that his administration worked efficiently, and no hindrances are 
encountered from the nobility. 
Ernst H. Kantorowicz brilliantly demonstrated that the King possess two bodies. 
One is his natural body, which is just like the body of any other man, subject to all 
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sorts of needs and temptations. The other is his political body, which is above 
all other human beings, who is not only incapable of doing wrong but even of 
thinking wrong/'*^ According to Edmund Plowden, whose Reports were collected 
and written under Queen Elizabeth wrote, "that by the common law no Act which 
the King does as King, shall be defeated by his Non age. For the King has in him 
two Bodies, viz., a Body natural, and a Body politic. His Body natural (if it be 
considered in itself) is a Body mortal, subject to all Infirmities that come by Nature 
or Accident, to the Imbecility of Infancy or old Age, and to like Defects that 
happen to the natural Bodies of other people. But his Body politic is a Body that 
cannot be seen or handled, consisting of policy and Government, and constituted 
for the Direction of the people, and the Management of the public Weal, and this 
Body is utterly void of Infancy, and old Age, and other Natural Defects and 
Imbecilities, which the Body natural is subject to, and for this cause, what the King 
does in his Body politic, cannot be invalidated or frustrated by any Disability in his 
natural Body."''^ 
The analysis of Akbar actually cries for a nod in the direction of Kantorowicz's 
thesis. It demonstrates that a king is also subject to pressures and insinuations as 
any other man is. He has a family himself consisting of many relatives including 
wives and children and sometimes he has to show consideration to them as well. 
^'" See Ernst H. Kantorowicz, The king's two bodies: a study in medieval political theology 
(Princeton: Princeton University press, 1957) 
'*''* Cited from Ernst H. Kantorowicz, The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political 
Theology {Vnnzeion: Princeton University press, 1957) p.7 
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He has a personal life as well, with his wives, concubines, and mistresses 
inside the harem. On the other hand, he is Zillillah (shadow of God on earth) who 
is devoid of doing anything wrong. The divine King, like Akbar is above all the 
pleasures and pain. Whatever he does in his everyday life is for the attainment of 
the general good of his kingdom and people. He should be obeyed. Disobedience 
to the King is not just 'revolt' but an act of 'sin'. With these concepts, Akbar was 
able to carve out not only a large Kingdom but also a large following' and the 
success of his strategies is well illustrated from his long and nearly unchallenged 
authority. Even after his death in 1605 his sons and grandsons continued to hold 
the Kingship for another century, thereby establishing a dynastic 'legitimacy'. 
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CONCLUSION 
The present work is a modest attempt to understand the evolution and nature of the 
Mughal political structure from its inception in 1526 up to 1575 when most of its 
administrative and political set-up and structure had evolved and were functional. 
The question that surrounded the entire journey from 1526-1575 while exploring 
the evolution of Mughal political structure rallied round the Central Asian notions 
and concept of sovereignty, which for some scholars hardly permitted the rise of 
strong centralised monarchy, and from where the Mughal traced their descent. This 
in part, owed to the dominance of the laws of Chinggis Khan in what is popularly 
referred to as the Central Asian concept of sovereignty. While on one hand the 
research focuses on the impact of Central Asian instituations on Mughal politics 
and administration, it also on the other hand explores the role ofyasa in the Central 
Asian political structure. siyasOy the Persian key word and terminology equivalent 
to the English 'Politics' was used to understand the evolution of the political 
structure both in Central Asia and later on under Mughals 
In an attempt to understand the political structure of the Mughals, an analysis of 
the position of its sovereign becomes inevitable. In a monarchical set-up, 
especially during the medieval period, it was a sovereign who was the cornerstone 
of political structure and administration. His position within his territories and 
among his subjects clearly defined the administrative machinery and also his 
position among the rest of his contemporary monarchs. He enjoyed absolute 
powers not only over his subjects, but also over his nobles as well as other 
members of the ruling house. 
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The analysis of the reign of the founder of Mughal dynasty in Hindustan, 
Babur and to some extent during the early period of his son and successor 
Humayun demonstrates that the powers exercised by the nobility, which at that 
time were overwhelmingly Central Asian origin, and in a sense were 'blood 
relatives' of the Mughals of Hindustan hampered the growth of strong monarchy. 
Theoretically a sovereign's power and position is unchallenged. However, the 
analysis shows that the early Mughals and even their ancestors hardly enjoyed that 
position. Numerous princes and nobles often challenged the dictates and authority 
of the sovereign, not only during the reign of Babur and Humayun but also during 
the reign of their ancestors in Central Asia. 
The rationale that the above predicament was due to the nature of the Central 
Asian concept of sovereignty based on the laws of Chinggis Khan appears to be 
oversimplified, and has been questioned in chapters I and II. Chinggis Khan who 
allegedly proclairrsd these canons was himself sovereign enjoying absolute 
powers. Later, Timur also ruled as a strong ruler with absolute powers at a time 
when the laws of Chinggis Khan had acquired a paramount status in the Cent^ al 
Asian political and administrative structure. That he never claimed the title of a 
sovereign was due to the fact that he was not related by blood to the house of 
Chinggis Khan, and his matrimonial alliances with the legendry house was an 
attempt to obtain legitimacy to rule. 
The issue of legitimacy apparently formed the core of the politics (siyasa) during 
the medieval period; especially when in Islamic system there was no known fixed 
law of succession. The theorists were attempting to re-define the siyasa to 
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harmonize it not only with the fast changing political situations but also with 
shariat. The meaning and practical application of siyasa Icept on evolving as the 
Islamic system itself evolved, as has been discussed in the introduction of the 
thesis. From the mere and simplified meaning of 'management' it acquired new 
definitions and further additions were incorporated to it with the change in Islamic 
political structure. 
The magnamity as well as notoriety of the Mongolian conquest under Chinggis 
Khan forced the issue of legitimacy to the fore front of the siyasa, and not 
surprisingly the lawb of Chinggis Khan, yasa, were confused with siyasa as 
discussed in Chapter I. The big question about who has the legitimacy to rule, 
which initially was confirmed on the House of Prophet, was equally challenged by 
the 'House of Chinggis Khan'. The conversion of Mongols after the death of 
Chinggis Khan also solved the issue that anyone could claim legitimacy to rule. It 
is apparently by virtue of this easy access to legitimacy that numerous princes and 
nobles could aspire to become sovereign, which in fact they did, often at the cost of 
the sovereign's position. Thus, the present study offers a different explanation to 
the earlier findings that attempted to show the feeble nature of a sovereign in the 
Central Asian political system. 
The early Mughals, namely Babur and Humayun faced the challenges from their 
nobility as well as brothers and uncles mainly due to the above reason. Babur 
himself claimed leghimacy to rule over Hindustan by claiming it as his ancestral 
property, implying his emphasis over his blood connections with the house of 
Timur, which also had acquired the legitimizing power. Whereby the blood 
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connections with the house of Timur and also maternal connection with the 
house of Chinggis Khan provided Babur a strong base to claim legitimacy, it also 
ensured the continuing of the policy where emphasis on blood connection provided 
easy legitimacy to the position of sovereign. The problem of nobility during the 
reign of Babur is quite understandable from this point of view. The attempts by 
Babur to introduce the concept of 'justice' as a legitimizing tool in siyasa too 
proved disastrous for the lenient attitude he had to show towards other nobles, as 
discussed in Chapter III. However, the nomination of his son Humayim as his 
successor to the throne in Hindustan does in fact point towards the fact that Babur 
was gradually successful in exerting his position. 
Humayun, right from the beginning, did assert his authority and supremacy. 
During the initial ten years of his reign, Humayun not only acted independently but 
also, to an extent wasable to counter the principles of 'blood and legitimacy', 
which provided a sort of autonomy to the nobles, especially the male members of 
the ruling house. The conferrment of grants, titles, awards and positions to his 
chiefs was clearly the prerogative of a sovereign. Although these awards and gifts 
were not on a considerable level, yet they point towards the fact that gradually the 
concept of Mughal kingship was evolving, and the powers of a 'sovereign' were 
widening. 
The administrative innovations carried out by Humayun point towards the fact that 
he was keen to elevate his position among the other members who claimed equal 
status with him. His attempts to not only reform his administrative machinery but 
also his status was evident from various innovative methods he devised to claim 
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his divine status, notably putting a veil over his face and division of nobility 
into three classes. By putting himself and his family in the first grade, Humayun 
appears to have sent the message across to his Central Asian nobility that he was 
not equal to them but over and above them. Through other metaphoric acts, like 
placing of veil on his face, Humayun distanced himself from the nobles who 
thought that the emperor is one amongst them. History is witness to the fact that on 
numerous occassions various sovereigns had to resort to this method. Balban, in 
the fourteenth century acted likewise when he claimed divine status to counteract 
the slave nobility. Balban posed himself above all, especially above the slave 
nobility by not exhibiting his emotions in the public, for, in order to prove his 
extraordinary status he had to prove that he was above all emotions.Thus, 
Humayun certainly had a precedence to follow. It has been argued that all of his 
innovations were well-crafted strategy to make the position of sovereign absolute, 
rather than meaningless innovations. The administrative innovations of Humayun 
had rather deep meanings. 
By 1540, Humayun through his military conducts and other symbolic acts, did try 
to give shape and meaning, not only to Mughal kingship, but also to Mughal 
administration. It was only due to these continuous efforts by Humayun to elevate 
his position that he faced threats and challenges to his authority and innovations by 
the same nobles, resulting in the loss of territories of Hindustan in 1540. Along 
with the nobles the inmates of the harem also played prominent part in favouring 
or deposing a particular prince or noble. The Blood relatives too enjoyed a 
privileged position. 
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Akbar had to counter the ambitions of these different factions that had arisen 
primarily due to an easy access to the legitimacy. By the time of Akbar, legitimacy 
could also be manufactured by promises of gifts, offices and position to those who 
legitimized the ruler, mainly the religious class. The last chapter also notes the 
important position of the foster or the milk relatives that remained largely 
unnoticed from the modern studies, and as such were at equal footing with the 
blood relatives. The politics of the time was clearly steered by the legitimacy 
paradigm instead of or in addition to the Central Asian notions of sovereignty. 
The period after the end of regency, that is from 1560 up to 1575 indicates the 
attempt by Akbar to counter this legitimacy principle of both milk and blood by 
not only elevating his position to the highest pedestal but also through 
administrative innovations. The tussle between different nobles to acquire the 
coveted position of wakil & Diwan led Akbar to denigrate the post itself by 
appointing people of non-Turani origin, and having absolutely no claim to these 
posts. This had two effects. Firstly, it conveyed the clear message to the haughty 
nobles from Central Asia that it is the prerogative of the sovereign to appoint 
anyone at any post. Thus, no post is a prerogative of any family or any aoble with 
specific geographical or blood affiliations. The appointment of a eunuch Phul 
Malik, later styled Itimad Khan to the coveted office of diwan, is just one example 
in this direction. Secondly, by appointing persons having no claim to high post, 
Akbar in fact was obliging them and believed that they should remain loyal to him. 
Placing of one generation nobility (eunuchs) and by recruiting more non-turani 
people in his nobility, Akbar in fact successfully challenged the nobles believing in 
Central Asian principles. 
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Recruitment of Rajput women in harem and their male counterparts in the 
nobility, admitting personal disciples, and introducing mansab and jagir system 
were all aimed at controlling the powers of the nobility and elevating the position 
of the sovereign. To raise the position of sovereign to that of God or his shadow 
was not something that was totally unknown in medieval politics. The Delhi Sultan 
Balban or for that matter Chinggis Khan had also to elevate their position to assert 
their authority. 
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